THE JOURNAL OF DIALOGIC ETHICS:
Interfaith and Interhuman Perspectives



THE JOURNAL OF DIALOGIC ETHICS: Interfaith and Interhuman Perspectives

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THE JOURNAL OF DIALOGIC ETHICS: Interfaith and Interhuman Perspectives

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The Journal of Dialogic Ethics: Interfaith and Interhuman Perspectives exists to promote dialogue within and among religious and/or interhuman traditions in response to emerging communication ethics issues in the current historical moment. The journal provides an academic home for a multiplicity of faith perspectives, welcoming both articles that speak from the particularity of a religious tradition and articles that engage interfaith dialogue directly. In addition, the journal welcomes a variety of interhuman perspectives addressing issues of dialogue.

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Editorial Introduction: Continuing

Annette M. Holba

As indicated by Ronald C. Arnett's inaugural editorial introduction, "A Beginning," this journal exists to open and hold space for inter-dialogue within, among, between, and in the midst of diverse religious and/or human traditions. These dialogues respond to emerging issues pertinent to communication ethics in the current historical moment. Contributions to this journal come from varying perspectives, providing an opening to a polyphony of voices engaging interfaith and interhuman perspectives around issues that matter to dialogue and its practice. Because the journal is open access, we hope that we can expand the dialogue around these issues in ways that honor ideas and promote respect, empathy, and care toward others.

The five articles offered in this second issue of the *Journal of Dialogic Ethics: Interfaith and Interhuman Perspectives* offer rich discussion exploring ethical and civic duties to place, expanding our conception of begging/panhandling and charity, pointing to the establishment of the Husserl Archives as an enactment of dialogic ethics, understanding communication as the maintenance of dialogue through a process of testing and contesting ideas, and finally, examining moods and dispositions that cultivate an attitude of practiced agency that creates a home-world. The contributors in this issue—Susan Drucker and Gary Gumpert, Christopher J. Oldenburg and Adrienne E. Hacker Daniels, Susan Mancino, Algis Mickunas, and Richard L. Lanigan—demonstrate their philosophical insights pointing to ways in which we might cultivate care, empathy, and appreciation for others and their ideas through dialogic spaces.

In "The Mediated Polis: Love Thy Urban Neighbor?," Susan Drucker and Gary Gumpert discuss ethical obligations to a city and to neighbors living in a city. They explore experiences people have in cities around one's ethical and civic duties to place. They consider how technology has impacted living in a city related to one's ethical obligation to the other and to the environment. Drucker and Gumpert employ Emmanuel Levinas's philosophy around responsibility for/to/toward the other as a mediated neighbor. Drucker and Gumpert begin with refining definitions of terms such as "urban," "polis," and "city" to situate their discussion around neighborhood and the duties and responsibilities one has for and to the other. This opens to a rich discussion around duty, communication

ethics, and how the technological terrain impacts, influences, and changes the uses and functions of community and what it means to be a neighbor in the urban environment.

In "*Caritas* and *Tzedakah*: An Interfaith Understanding of Interlocutor Dynamics Surrounding the 'Act' of Begging," Christopher J. Oldenburg and Adrienne E. Hacker Daniels expand our understanding of the act of panhandling/begging to neutralize our perspective and judgments about the panhandler/beggar. They do so by illuminating more precisely the concepts of *caritas* (charity) and *tzedakah* (charitable giving as moral obligation) to show that the negative connotations associated with panhandling and begging need not be how the action or person involved is judged by society. Using the works of Augustine, Aquinas, Levinas, Pope Francis, and Maimonides, their essay brings together an interfaith discussion that has the ability to reconstruct an understanding of panhandling/begging that is less offensive and less outside the norms and mores of societal practices. Unpacking *caritas* and *tzedakah* also provides the framework and ground for understanding giving to others as an ethical obligation within interlocutor experiences.

In "Establishing the Husserl Archives: Dialogic Ethics' Revelatory Insights," Susan Mancino explains the origin of the Husserl Archives in Belgium by telling the story around what had to occur to move Husserl's papers out of Germany to some place where they could be safe from destruction. Mancino states that the moving of Husserl's papers was an enactment of dialogic ethics from the perspective of Emmanuel Levinas. Her argument follows with a discussion around the interplay of Levinas's notions of the saying, the said, and the trace. Additionally, Mancino identifies interfaith and interhuman implications of this enactment, and she connects this discussion with her larger body of scholarship on dialogic ethics within public commemoration and public memory.

In "Understanding Communication," Algis Mickunas provides a rich discussion about how we understand communication, suggesting that there is an abundance of theories about communication that construct without representing anything and define practices and processes in their own way. Mickunas recognizes that the hermeneutic circle in meaning making is all interpretation, which does not offer access to the way things are because the language we use is constructed—not real. Noting that the task of philosophy is identical to the maintenance of dialogue, where all claims can be tested and contested, Mickunas lays out the requirements of dialogue, something which he acknowledges many others have done before. However, the requirements Mickunas advances are grounded in the notion of requiring the co-presence of communicators who are engaged in a common venture that ultimately can lead to transcendence.

In Richard L. Lanigan's "Home-World: Moral Memory and Disposition as Habits of Mind," he discusses the "home living model of axiology," providing an account of how mood becomes an attitude in a practiced agency of belief where judgment is operative and practical for human agency. Lanigan contextualizes his discussion around German sociological and communicological perspectives, providing historical, linguistic, and visual examples of chiasm from Hitler and Trump as counterfeit polemics. Lanigan asserts that there are challenges with

communication around moods and dispositions, and people need positive second judgments, or *logimós*, which is a discursive reasonableness of the common good where we can be at home in anybody's house.

A Final Note of Acknowledgment and Introduction

I am humbled and honored to follow Dr. Ronald C. Arnett's footprints in serving as editor for this journal. His vision and leadership for starting this journal, as well as his leadership in the communication discipline in general, has been remarkable and life-affirming. His invitational approach to dialogue in his teaching, scholarship, service, and mentoring of students long after they graduate has been a reminder for many to take the high road in their communicative affairs—always. Building bridges toward others must be our default approach especially in times of contention and disagreement where communicative violence has the possibility of unfolding. This journal is a hallmark of Arnett's legacy as it seeks to promote inter-dialogue that is invitational and open—creating and holding an interspace that advocates for dialogic potential and cultural humility. Inter-dialogue cannot happen without openings for interfaith and interhuman co-presences; we must do this together as we learn from one another and express common interests as well as differences that we also hold and share.

The Mediated Polis: Love Thy Urban Neighbor?

Susan J. Drucker
Gary Gumpert

Abstract: Who is a "neighbor" and how has the language of the polis, neighbor, and neighborhood changed over time? Is there a duty owed to a neighbor or a city? How does a city speak and how do we speak of the city and neighbors? Each new medium of technology realigns the nature of community. The overwhelming dependence on technologies to make life easier is enticing. But technologies effect the uses and functions of community, neighborhood, civic duties, and obligations associated with being a neighbor. Viewing the ethical obligations to a city and to neighbors in a city, this article explores the experiences of city life and ethical/civic duty to place. It examines the impact the rise of the mediated neighborhood may have and considers how Levinas's view of phenomenology regarding a responsibility for "others" in urban settings can be applied to mediated neighbors.

Keywords: polis, neighbor, Levinas, social media, duty

The title is provocative, but its meaning can be meandering and confusing, so we begin with a definition of "urban." The *Online Etymology Dictionary* tracks the following evolution of the term:

> "[c]haracteristic of city life, pertaining to cities or towns," 1610s (but rare before 1830s), from Latin *urbanus* "of or pertaining to a city or city life; in Rome," also "in city fashion, polished, refined, cultivated, courteous," but also sometimes "witty, facetious, bold, impudent;" as a noun, "city dweller," from *urbs* (genitive *urbis*) "city, walled town," a word of unknown origin. The word gradually emerged in this sense as **urbane** became restricted to manners and styles of expression. In late 20c. American English gradually acquiring a suggestion of "African-American." *Urban renewal*, euphemistic for "slum clearance," is attested from 1955, American English. *Urban sprawl* recorded by 1958. *Urban legend* attested by 1980. (Harper, n.d.)

And then there is the matter of the "polis." And the "mediated polis," referring to the concept of the ancient Greek city-state. The "polis," as found in "metropolis" and "megalopolis" refers to an "urban complex" that is heavily populated.

It is the city with which we grapple. In our attempt to confuse you even more, we return to the *Online Etymological Dictionary*, which traces the word "city" to the Latin root *civitas*, originally meaning citizenship or community member and eventually relating to place in a more physical sense.

All of this should help us figure out the issues with which we are about to grapple because the physical city and the social city have become hopelessly entangled over time, to a great extent, due to the link between communicative technology, the physical conglomeration of structures, and the social nature of its inhabitants as they have become interdependent. The polis, the city, its neighborhoods, and its inhabitants are simultaneously dependent and interdependent. Does urban interdependence bring ethical obligation in communicative interaction?

The acceleration of media technology is not a novel concept, but its interlocked impact on the shape, form, and structure of the urban landscape requires further analysis. In our work, we often return to Victor Hugo's classic novel *The Hunchback of Notre-Dame*, in which the character of the Archdeacon speaks of the impact of Gutenberg's invention of the printing press, saying, "This will kill that," referring to the impact that the new technology would have on the power of the church, with less dependence on the extraordinary edifice, the cathedral, and the redistribution of power to the ordinary worshiper via the Bible ([1831] 1964, 174). The theme is powerful and indisputable, and we take from it several major principles—a few of which we would like to set forth today—that are particularly relevant to "The Mediated Polis: Love Thy Urban Neighbor?" The first is rather obvious—that is, *each new medium of technology realigns the nature of community*. Few would argue with this observable aphorism, but we think it relevant that we reduce it to the personal and the observable.

The authors live 1.4 miles apart in the same urban community of Great Neck, immediately outside of New York City. We generally gather in the Gumpert dungeon to research, plot, think, and write. We live in a community consisting of nine autonomous and independent neighborhoods, an area just adjacent to the City of New York on the north shore of Long Island. The nine villages include Great Neck, Kensington, Saddle Rock, Great Neck Estates, Great Neck Plaza, Kings Point, and Russell Gardens, and a number of unincorporated areas. The population of each of these areas ranges from approximately 2,000 to 10,000. Our daily email inbox generally includes a message from Nextdoor Kensington, a social media app (Nextdoor n.d.-c):

> **Fire Siren from Great Neck Vigilant Fire Cuttermill Road.**
>
> *I don't know who else this might affect. But my office is on the middle of Cuttermill Road almost directly across from the fire station at 83 Cuttermill Road. 4-5 times a day at least they blast off that loud siren. They are really ear piercingly loud. Sirens aren't even necessary in this era where everyone has an electronic communication device. They used to be needed to alert the volunteers. I'm very supportive of the fire department. They are heroes. But why can't they get rid of the sirens?*

From another person:

> **Driver needed.**
>
> *I need someone to drive my mom to her appointments. Most are on Lakeville Road near to her home. 5-10 miles away at most and are scheduled a week or more in advance. She is 92 and taxi or Uber services difficult for her.*

Some seek activism:

> **Last chance to speak out against 733-741 Middle Neck Road High Rise.**
>
> *If you missed the Village of GN hearing on this proposed building, and most people did miss it because it was held on a Monday afternoon at 1:30 pm . . . This agency needs to hear from you—those of you who could not be present . . .*
>
> *Details on where to submit remarks against the project are provided.*

Some reach out to introduce themselves, seeking connection:

> **Hi, I'm Cathy.**
>
> *Nice to meet you. Hi everyone, I am Cathy on Emerson Dive. Nice to meet you all!*
>
> **Hi neighbors. I'm Terri.**
>
> *Live in apartments off Grace Ave. in Great Neck Plaza.*

Some are personally revealing:

> **Losing a parent and then taking anti anxiety to sleep and then feeling worse.**
>
> *My Mother died and I was put in klonopin for sleep but now it seems it is really not helping......she was my only family and I am so down......anyone else go through this? I don't do well on anti-depressants but the emotional pain is terrible ...I have lost weight and have no other family......*

Yet another entry suggests a face-to-face meeting:

> **Need Cycling Buddy.**
>
> *Hi! I'm Sherry, looking for a bike riding buddy. I ride moderate to moderate fast. Love doing the 9 mile loop around great neck and open to other locations.*

There is a great deal of traffic on the site—sometimes even suggesting and perhaps arranging an actual meeting of its participants. Interspersed between the local interactions are sponsored items, both from the immediate area and elsewhere.

Nextdoor is part of a national movement, part of a carefully choreographed community vista. There are thousands of Nextdoors. Their information is intriguing. Their CEO, Sarah Friar, has written this:

> As a society, we have become worse at connecting face-to-face and building impactful relationships with one another. Belonging is a universal human

> need, and in every corner of the world today people are yearning to feel more connected with real people in real places in real ways. So, how can we work together to combat the social isolation we feel and forge a more connected world? (Friar 2019).

The Nextdoor community in Santa Cruz explains that

> Nextdoor's stated purpose is to cultivate a kinder world where everyone has a neighborhood they can rely on, and our mission is to be the neighborhood hub for trusted connections and the exchange of helpful information, goods, and services. (Alejandro and tcnsc n.d.)

An additional option is available to sign up to volunteer to offer assistance to neighbors who need it. Nextdoor consists of 226,000 disconnected neighborhoods throughout this country (241,000 throughout the world) that thrive through sponsored content and partnerships. "Neighbors in the United States, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Australia, Denmark, Sweden, and Canada are using Nextdoor to meet, gather, exchange, and share," according to the Nextdoor website (Nextdoor n.d.-a).

Nextdoor's income depends on local deals, sponsored posts, and neighborhood sponsorship. The venture is estimated to be worth over $2 billion. It is referred to as a "hyperlocal social networking service for neighborhoods," and it is based in San Francisco, where it was founded in 2011 (Wikipedia 2021). In addition, "[u]sers of Nextdoor are required to submit their real names and addresses to the website; posts made to the website are available only to other Nextdoor members living in the same neighborhood" (Wikipedia 2021).

The stresses on orchestrated mediated relationships manipulated by a giant puppet master help to further redefine neighborhoods as electronic entities rather than physical ones. It is more convenient and encouraging to connect with the next-door neighbor electronically rather than on a physical, face-to-face basis. Increasingly, notifications provide reminders that Nextdoor allows small businesses to run ads to reach new customers in their areas. Reminders of this option appear frequently. It is the expressed purpose of Nextdoor to bring its constituents together—as long as the concept of "neighborhood" is financially viable?

On a usual day of checking emails from Nextdoor Kensington, the lead posting proclaimed that "[m]ost of us are committed to the right and necessity to walk, alone or with others" (Nextdoor n.d.-c). Few, if any, would argue with that statement. We were curious, and we clicked on the "learn more" box, which took us to a post asking us to "[j]oin me for a neighborhood walk." The Nextdoor posting, in partnership with the #WalkWithMe movement, explains the connection:

> During this time of social isolation, neighbors around the world have found new and unique ways to come together and unite around causes they care about. Nextdoor instantly connects you with everyone nearby, providing a great opportunity to spark a conversation and build real-world connections.

> There are endless reasons to join the #WalkWithMe movement. (Nextdoor 2021)

#WalkWithMe began following the murder of George Floyd when a 30-year-old Black man from Nashville, posting on Nextdoor, indicated his concern about walking safely in his neighborhood.

> In response, hundreds of neighbors commented to show their support, reflect on how to create a more welcoming environment, and ultimately come out to walk alongside him. Shawn shared, "I was scared to walk alone and now look who is behind me. Look who has my back." Countless other neighbors across the country followed in Shawn's footsteps to start a nationwide movement. (Cohen 2021)

One would not argue the sentiments of #WalkWithMe, but the partnership with Nextdoor is curious, as the one is dependent on the commercial intentions of the other. Is #WalkWithMe to be taken literally? Or is #WalkWithMe simply a rallying cry of a movement rather than an actual physical opportunity to walk and talk with our neighbor? Is Nextdoor a "mediated polis"? Does it pretend to be a polis? Is the mediated polis nothing more than a noncommercial endeavor based upon algorithms that deliver citizens to advertisers? Is the mediated polis a way to produce wealth or a civic entity, or both?

The classic Greek polis represented the politics and public life of the community and reflected the relations between self and others. The polis was a face-to-face community. Every polis had its own set of laws, and its own specific gods, its own values. In *Politics*, Aristotle notes that human beings need certain material conditions that are not attainable by the individual; therefore, human association, the polis, becomes the natural way to meet those material and moral needs. For Aristotle, the polis emerged as a way to ensure human existence; it endures so that humans can live well. The polis provides identity and the social requirements for an ethical life.

The pace of our lives has accelerated, the complexities have multiplied, and reliance on the *technologies of convenience* has grown. Technologies of convenience refer to the attributes of all media to facilitate the transfer of information, data, and interaction. Tasks that required direct interactional and transactional face-to-face communication can be accomplished through an array of mediated options to suit individual preferences. These technologies enable the completion of jobs, chores, and responsibilities and provide the apparent choice to engage or avoid others.

The contemporary citizen weaned on the *technologies of convenience*, prior to the pandemic, has come to rely more than ever on these technologies to meet their daily needs in an era of social distancing and lockdowns. The overwhelming dependence on technologies making life easier is enticing, but they affect the uses and functions of a neighborhood. For some, they redefine neighborhood.

The pandemic has compounded the march toward these technological affordances as we were all forced to seek ways to manage our professional and personal lives physically distanced from our neighbors. With a possible "return to normal," does such reliance become permanent? What does this mean regarding

an ethical obligation to the polis/city? Does the mediated polis require different civic duties?

Whither Duty and Obligation?

A “duty to the city” has been proposed as the counterpoint to the “right to the city,” theorized in 1968 by Henri Lefebvre in *Le Droit à la ville*. While widely adopted internationally, what this right entails has been a matter of debate. To Lefebvre, the right to the city “stresses the need to restructure the power relations that underlie the production of urban space, fundamentally shifting control away from capital and the state and toward urban inhabitants” (Purcell 2002, 101–2). The right to the city is seen as a right to urban life. The right to the city involves two principal rights for urban inhabitants: the right to participation, and the right to appropriation (Purcell 2002). The right to participation is rooted in citizens playing a key role in decisions about urban space, while the right to appropriation “includes the right of inhabitants to physically access, occupy, and use urban space” (Purcell 2002, 103).

David Harvey (2013), professor of anthropology and geography at the City University of New York, further explains the right to the city as “far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city . . . the freedom to make and remake our cities.” The “right to the city” proposed that rather than markets, it was residents who had a right to the benefits of urban life. This echoes Aristotle’s belief that the highest good was the virtue and happiness of citizens, and the purpose of the city was to make it possible for the citizens to achieve just that.

The “Duty to the City” was recently proposed by Carlo Ratti and Saskia Sassen in the context of the catastrophic effect the pandemic had on some cities. They wrote,

> The “duty” we propose is easily defined: If you have property in the city, you should not leave it empty. This would apply both to owners and tenants. The urban container cannot service without its contents; as the ancient Romans put it, the physical city, or “urbs,” is inextricably tied with the community of its inhabitants, the “civitas.” The duty to the city could be implemented through various actions, including new fiscal policies coupled with more flexible zoning regulations, so that real estate assets are swiftly and dynamically repurposed. (Ratti and Sassen 2021)

While Ratti and Sassen (2021) do frame the duty in economic terms, they expand their call to include a duty to invest in “living” capital.” They note the social impact of property and the importance of revenue to the lives of urban residents for addressing issues of segregation and for supporting those contributing to urban vitality, such as artists and teachers.

This notion of the duty to the city has captured our imagination as something that transcends the financially based obligation suggested by Ratti and Sassen. Does duty to the city extend to the civic nature of the city, to the city as a community of others? Can this be translated to a duty to check on your neighbor?

A duty to keep eyes on the street in a Jane Jacobs sense? A duty to acknowledge others walking down the street, a duty of civility? To get vaccinated? Rooted in the polis, how are virtue and happiness attained and manifested in a polis living in the interstice between mediated and corporeal existence?

Does the "right to the city" confront the reciprocal relationship to responsibilities? It has been said that "rights are meaningless unless there's an actor with assigned responsibility for their fulfillment" (Chawla and van Vliet 2017, 6). Are there embedded duties flowing from "rights to the city"?

In *Building and Dwelling: Ethics for the City*, sociologist Richard Sennett (2018) deals more with who drives a city as an ethical issue than what is ethical in city life. In one of the book's fundamental themes, he distinguishes between the French terms *cité* and *ville*. Sennett defines the *ville* as the overarching conceptualization of metropolis, and the *cité* linked to particular place and neighborhood. The *ville* refers to the built urban environment, while the *cité* connotes our urban life, experiences, and attitude to neighbors and strangers. *Cité* refers to a sense of consciousness.

This subtle distinction links to online lives or mediatized lives as we enter physical space constantly connected via smartphones and other devices. If *cité* is about sense of place, what becomes of the sense of place experienced through virtual visits, Google Maps, GPS, and walks glued to screens, or even traversing the city with others playing games or sharing the walk with distant others?

Sennet suggests in both his title and acknowledgments that this book is, in part, about the ethical dimensions of city life. Much as the polis is an organizational or administrative concept, Sennett's approach to this examination emphasizes the organizational, operational, and perceptual dimensions of a city over the human interactional. He frames the question early on in an intriguing way: "This is the ethical problem in cities today. Should urbanism represent society as it is, or seek to change it?" (Sennet 2018, 3). Later, he asks, "What, then, is to be done?" (4). Ethics is then left to what the driving force of city life should be. He moves us in an interesting and valuable direction. Can the conceptualization of the city as "the ethical city" help improve the quality of urban life? Are there specific "though shalts" and "though shalt nots" to guide urban residents? Should we think of ethical principles that can form the foundation of an ethical lens through which to evaluate situations and decisions as we navigate the hybrid existence of citizens of the mediated polis?

One is reminded of deontological ethics, "deontological" coming from the Greek word *deon*, which means duty. Duty-based ethics associates right or wrong with an obligation to do the right things, regardless of consequence. Citizens of the polis are responsible to others—they have duties, but are there such duties in the mediated polis, and, if so, do they differ from duties in the place-based polis? Does the mediated polis affect or redefine the duties of the place-based polis?

Duty to the other triggers an examination of the relevance of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, specifically his conceptualization of ethics. His emphasis placed on encountering others, which initiates responsibility for others, offers a valuable framework when considering modern relationships within the polis. For Levinas, the French word *autrui*, or other, is at the heart of the matter. Levinas's

concern was for interpersonal relations and the relationship of self to "other" persons. It is a universal "other" to whom duty is owed. The duty may be toward attaining diverse ends, including the duty to act ethically or, echoing Aristotle, toward increasing the happiness of the collectivity.

Levinas deals with space in so far as an encounter between the self and the other, which leads to an ethical imperative, is an "intersubjective space"—that space in which one relates to the other(s) (Levinas [1947] 1989, 48). This is a moral space "in which ethics (responsibility, reciprocity, proximity, collectivity and co-existence) frame and temper interpersonal, structural and political relationships" (Howitt 2002, 300). But "space is not merely metaphorical. Proximity to the other involves a face-to-face engagement with difference which Levinas insists must involve that 'non-in-difference'" (Levinas [1947] 1989, 124).

Howitt (2002) argues that "Levinas' language is strongly spatialized. Terms such as 'distance', 'movement', 'transcendence', 'space', 'height', 'dwelling' and 'infinity' appear often in his work" (300). Levinas points to the common lived origin, in the importance of *rapport de face à face*, or the face-to-face encounter, and deals with the concept of embodiment. Arnett asserts that Levinas is essential for those interested in communication ethics, and this can be further modified to reflect significance for the development of a mediated ethics (Arnett 2017). Phenomenological research has sought to address the shift from material spaces of interaction to virtual and mediated experiences.

There has certainly been a propensity by some, including the authors, to consider or dismiss mediated interpersonal communication as inferior or substitutional for the richer and more genuine form of face-to-face interaction (Turkle 2011). "Virtual communities are often critiqued for being 'thin' and 'shallow' lacking the depth that local proximity in face-to-face communities brings" (Introna and Brigham 2007, 166). This assumption relies on classical theories of face-to-face interaction and the role of space. Increasingly, it is the concept of presence that is consequential to understanding the lived experience, distinguishable from the embodied experience (Bracken and Skalski 2009; Hahn and Stempfhuber 2015; Zhao 2015). While this examination is beyond the scope of this article, it is certainly necessary to note the work examining what constitutes the conditions of mediated experience and the implications of mediated encounter with the other (Introna and Brigham 2007).

In extending Levinas's thinking, Introna and Bingham (2007) have introduced an interesting interpretation into the relationship of virtual interaction and the other, asserting that

> [v]irtual interaction . . . reconstitutes proximity such that Others—strangers—are simultaneously those far away and near us. In virtually mediated environments, the Other disappears from an immediate face-to-face encounter, but simultaneously appears on our screens in ways that cannot be ignored. This paradox of virtual proximity is productive for rethinking the concept of community more generally. (168)

They argue that a new formulation of community, an ethical community, can be found through the encounters with the other based on difference and the

uniqueness of the other (Introna and Brigham 2007). It has been suggested that our increased "presence in on-line environments challenges our tendencies to ground moral and ethical behaviours in face-to-face or materially co-present contexts" (Miller 2012).

We grapple with the moral ambiguity of the mediated interaction and the technologies of convenience. What does Levinas's view of phenomenology imply regarding a responsibility for "others" only encountered through mediated spaces? How far does this duty extend? Does duty extend to those nonhuman/virtual others?

It is not a long way from the polis to Nextdoor and #WalkWithMe. Nor is it a giant leap from the virtual neighbor to the matter of ethics and obligation. While the concept of the virtual neighbor has its benefits, so too do the limitations and drawbacks emerge. The financial motivation, a core feature, colors the experience, as does the scope of what is defined *for* the participant as neighborhood. The personal, perceptual conceptualization of neighbor and neighborhood has been a matter of study by diverse scholars and practitioners in such fields as behavioral geography and environmental psychology. The importance of differing perceptions has been associated with "mental maps" (Graham 1976). These are connected with the unique subjective experiences and images individuals carry with them of the external environment. This emphasis on individual perception explores the personal model of the environment or perception of neighborhood or area of interaction. The work of Kevin Lynch (e.g., 1960's *The Image of the City*) comes to mind. Research in psychology has revealed that "mental maps vary widely with nationality, region, ethnicity, gender, education, and socioeconomic class" (American Psychological Association, n.d.). Media studies scholars have examined how exposure to mass media images of places and foreign cities can influence perception and mental maps. Photographs, movies, news reports, and social media all contribute vivid images, providing the means for individuals to create their own mental maps of places they may, or may not, have ever physically visited (Redi et al. 2018; Hollenstein and Purves 2010; Avraham 2000). Neighborhoods have been studied using this concept as a tool to understand and measure them (Ciobaun 2008). While some neighborhoods are officially delineated, the mental map rooted in the perception of neighborhood is consequential when evaluating who one considers a neighbor and what duty, if any, is thereby owed. Individual sense of neighborhood is rooted in experience and has a history. The boundaries of what one considers "their neighborhood" and, therefore, who they consider their neighbor does not emerge overnight but rather is the result of time, effort, and interaction.

Nextdoor, however, does the work for you, defining the boundaries of your neighborhood, or, more accurately, these boundaries are established by the first user or founding member, who can choose the neighborhood name. However, "Nextdoor reserves the right to make corrections to names and boundaries based on feedback from other neighbors or to adhere to Nextdoor's guidelines on neighborhood names." (Nextdoor, n.d.-b). Founders are told that "Nextdoor boundaries and names should, to the extent possible, reflect the traditionally accepted boundaries and names for a neighborhood" (Nextdoor, n.d.-b). While the

help center provides instructions for changing neighborhood boundaries, the default boundaries and name may well not reflect the mental map of users. Nextdoor Kensington, for example, straddles not only diverse neighborhoods within Great Neck but also bleeds into the next county and encompasses a massive private cooperative community. The populations, densities, laws, regulations, and tax structure there are quite different from those in Kensington, leading to a sense of cognitive dissonance or distancing from those "neighbors" encountered online.

The gradual ebb and flow of neighborhood events and interactions, planned and unplanned, intended and unintended, incidental and accidental create, and are created by, rituals. According to Arnett, "[F]from a Levinasian perspective, communication ethics is an existential burden enacted each day, by each person and responsive to each moment through one's own uniqueness of responsibility to and for the Other" (2017, 3). Each day in a place, to some degree, is ritualized and experienced in an embodied encounter with place and neighbors.

The ritual view of communication proposed by James W. Carey immediately comes to mind. His widely adopted definition of a ritual view of communication is "communication linked to terms such as 'sharing', 'participation', 'association', 'fellowship', and 'the possession of a common faith'" (Carey 2009, 15). This ritual view embeds the communication process in social relations along with traditions and is associated with the continuation of society over time. It is thought-provoking to consider the significance that Carey ascribed to conversation in his scholarly endeavors as he attributed much of his early schooling to talk to his neighbors (Pooley 2016). Throughout Carey's career, and his insights into ritual and public life, one sees the thread of his upbringing in a close-knit, religious, ethnic, working-class "community bound by talk" (Pooley 2016).

Yet, disembodied spaces created by technologies of convenience offer authentic encounters, with proximity playing varying degrees of significance. Nextdoor offers a disembodied interaction established within a degree of physical proximity. There are other interactional spaces in which there can be no proximity. How do you deal with duty and obligation in a disembodied interaction? Do enforceable, institutionalized rules substitute for the ethical duty owed in the embodied relationship, or does duty to the other transport to aspatial encounters with a newly conceptualized sense of neighbor no longer rooted in proximity?

Are media technologies invisibly connecting and disconnecting people from the place-based polis? Local businesses are supported with orders for contactless deliveries and curbside pickups—technological magic delivers the products. Are the options for connection to virtual neighbors maintaining and updating connection to place, or are the technologies of convenience detaching and disconnecting us from authentic experiences of place and neighbor?

Our work is rooted in a fundamental principle that every communication medium connects and disconnects us at the same time.

Sophocles once said, "Nothing vast enters the life of mortals without a curse." This aspect of the vastness of media developments and its implications leads us to the following mantras:

a. The more we extend our connection, the more insular or isolated we become.

b. The more we control our communication environment, the less surprise or chance is a daily expectation.

c. The more we connect, the more we seek to control the connection.

d. The more we detach from our immediate surroundings, the more we rely upon surveillance of the environment.

e. The more individuality we achieve, the less community of place we seek.

f. The more we extend our senses, the less we depend upon our sensorium (Gumpert and Drucker 2020).

To these we add the following axioms:

a. Each new medium realigns the nature of the polis.

b. The city consists of geographically-connected and media-connected communities.

c. Each polis, or community, is defined by connection and obligation.

d. Membership in the polis requires a set of ethical obligations.

The differences between mediated and direct experiences have become less distinct. Interactions and information are guided by the nearly invisible media influence of omnipresent algorithms. "The less apparent or obtrusive the medium is to the audience, the less evident is the influence of the medium" (Gumpert and Drucker 2007, 192). The plethora of *technologies of convenience* offer constant connection. Are the necessary media connections directed by modern puppet masters pulling the strings of the polis?

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Caritas and *Tzedakah*: An Interfaith Understanding of Interlocutor Dynamics Surrounding the "Act" of Begging

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Abstract: This essay attempts to destigmatize the act of panhandling/begging and to mitigate the demonization of the panhandler/beggar by elucidating the meaning of charity in Christianity (*caritas*)—through the works of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and, contemporarily, Pope Francis and the preeminent ethicist of the twentieth century, Emmanuel Levinas—and in Judaism (*tzedakah*)—through the works of Maimonides. Moreover, we examine the contentious relationship between charity's theological and secular, legal contours. We conclude by reflecting on why the act of panhandling need not be an aberration of societal norms and that *caritas* and *tzedakah* allow for the realization and actualization of central ethical tenets in interlocutor dynamics.

Keywords: panhandling/begging, charity, Maimonides, Pope Francis, nonverbal communication

Introduction

As stated in the introduction to their edited volume *Urban Communication Regulation*, Jassem and Drucker observe that the twenty-first century "is the first century in which the majority of the world's people will live in urban areas with over three billion residents in cities representing a demographic transformation on an unprecedented scale" (2018, ix). Against the backdrop of skyscrapers, luxury condominiums, high-end stores, and other venues showcasing material wealth and the creature comforts of living—all purportedly contributing to the "American dream" in one way, shape, or form—and teeming with people who are well fed, well-heeled and well loved, we have in each urban center a tale of two cities, where for hundreds of thousands of people across the country, the dream is illusory and more nightmarish than oneiric. In keeping with the Dickensian allusion, one of the most well-known stories encompassing themes of poverty, charity, and begging is Charles Dickens's 1837 novel *Oliver Twist*. At the end of

Chapter II, Oliver Twist twice utters the famous request, "Please, sir, I want some more" (Dickens 2005, 36). According to Dennis Walder in *Dickens and Religion*, "the fundamental aim of *Oliver Twist* . . . is to move us . . . into sympathy and charity for the poor" (2007, 42), and charity is the vehicle for the triumph of goodness (44). He further explains that Dickens believed that "charity is 'the one great cardinal virtue, which properly nourished and exercised, leads to, if it does not necessarily include, all the others'" (45).

According to the National Homelessness Law Center (NHLC), begging and panhandling are appellations ascribed to "acts of asking for help by people experiencing homelessness and those at risk, often by ordinances that criminalize this act" ("Panhandling," n.d.). In supplementing this definition, the NHLC adds that, as more people find themselves in the perilous situation of being unable to meet their basic needs (food, water, shelter), the legal constraints legally banning panhandling and begging have increased 43% over the past decade ("Panhandling," n.d.).

The Institute of Global Homelessness (IGH, n.d.) conceives of begging and panhandling as "subsistence strategies" characterized as "informal economic activities" facilitating a key goal of "earn[ing] income on a day-to-day basis so that they can meet their immediate needs for food, shelter, hygiene products and/or entertainment." Panhandlers and beggars can also provide entertainment to others, known as busking ("Panhandling, Busking and Squeegeeing," n.d.). Although the IGH notes that not all homeless people panhandle and beg, and that not all panhandlers or beggars are homeless, there is an overlap between homelessness and panhandling/begging (IGH, n.d.). The IGH delineates 17 "causes & intersections" of and with homelessness, of which begging and panhandling constitute a paired intersection on the list. On a given day in January 2020, 580,466 people were homeless (National Alliance to End Homelessness, n.d.; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2021). Panhandling and begging seem like stopgap measures—as mere ersatz—but they are necessary for managing the quotidian exigencies. The goal of the campaign #IAskForHelpBecause, initiated by the NHLC in 2018, is to "humanize those who need to ask for help while advocating for their constitutional right to do so" ("Panhandling," n.d.). In their brilliant article, "Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to Beg," Helen Hershkoff and Adam S. Cohen acknowledge that "many of the world's major religions—and many secular ethicists—hold that there is a duty to give money to people in need" (1991, 899).

This essay attempts to destigmatize the act of panhandling/begging and to mitigate the demonization of the panhandler/beggar by elucidating the meaning of charity in Christianity (*caritas*), through the works of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and, contemporarily, Pope Francis, and in Judaism (*tzedakah*), through the works of Maimonides. As a society, we have been more magnanimous toward the more institutional approaches to giving (e.g., food banks, the American Red Cross, round-up giving, social mediated solicitations like GoFundMe), as well as at extolling the virtues of the act of giving, while downplaying the act of receiving, rendering it more of a vice than a virtue both in intent and practice. The charitable act, manifest here as begging/panhandling, is fundamentally a phenomenological

and ethical communicative reciprocal encounter between interlocutors, employing both verbal and nonverbal modalities of communication.

Our argument proceeds as follows: We trace the meaning of charity as defined by prominent Church fathers and its resonance in the views of the current pontiff, Pope Francis, and the preeminent ethicist of the twentieth-century, Emmanuel Levinas; we look toward the meaning of charity as defined by twelfth-century Jewish philosopher and scholar Maimonides and its resonance with contemporary economic paradigms; we examine the contentious relationship between charity's theological and secular, legal contours; we conclude by reflecting on why the act of panhandling need not be an aberration of societal norms and that *caritas* and *tzedakah* allow for the realization and actualization of central ethical tenets in interlocutor dynamics.

St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Pope Francis on *Caritas* and the Act of Almsgiving

The provenance of *caritas* is as long-standing as the patristic tradition itself with the redoubtable Church fathers, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, writing extensively on the *topos* of Christian charity. More recently, Pope Francis provides an intriguingly pastoral and phenomenological hermeneutic for how one is to practice *caritas* through almsgiving. His guidance illuminates ethical communication modalities and, as can be argued, operates from a Levinasian vantage. In light of this fact, the scope of this section will limit its explanations of *caritas* as it relates to the rhetorical and theological appeals surrounding the practice of almsgiving.

Much of St. Augustine's rhetorical triumph in spreading Christianity can be attributed to the abiding influence of Cicero's rhetorical theories and his views on wisdom written in *Hortensius*, which Augustine admitted induced in him a prayerful ardor (Troup 1999, 15–32). Relatedly, the concept of *caritas* or charity, characterized by Cicero as the love for humankind, was also appropriated by patristics; when used to translate the Greek *agape* found in Holy Scriptures, *caritas* was Christianized to embody Jesus's principal teaching on love of God and love of neighbor ("Works of Charity" 2003). Gary A. Anderson's exceptional book *Charity* offers a profound explication of *caritas* as not just a "Kantian 'duty' . . . but a declaration of belief about the world and the God who created it" (2013, 4).

In his *De Doctrina Christiana*, Augustine defines charity as "a motion of the soul whose purpose is to enjoy God for His own sake and oneself and one's neighbor for the sake of God" (Riga 1968, 378). Augustine also defines and expounds upon Christian charity in several writings and important sermons in the early fifth century. Some of Augustine's most codified teachings on charity are articulated in his *Homilies on the First Epistle of John*, a set of sermons dedicated to the exegesis of a single biblical text in an effort to lay the foundation of the newly formed faith with the first stone of Christian love. Augustine argued that the motivation and benefits of *caritas* enacted through almsgiving centered on several scriptural-based premises including consubstantiality between God and the poor, almsgiving as universal obligation, almsgiving as indemnification for sins, carnal

gifts as a means of securing spiritual recompense, and almsgiving as interdependent burden sharing between rich (burden of superfluity) and poor (burden of not having) (Ramsey 1982, 257). The primary principle we focus on, since it relates directly to the theological turn in phenomenology and ethical encounters with panhandlers, is the first premise, what Boniface Ramsey labels "the identification of Christ and the poor," which constitutes Christian almsgiving specifically as "Christian" (1982, 253–54). *Caritas*'s consubstantiality between love of God and the poor is expressed in Augustine's oft quoting of Matthew 25:40: "When you did it to one of these least of mine you did it to me" (Ramsey 2007, 298). Moreover, in another sermon, Augustine instructed that "if you love the brother whom you see, you will see God at the same time, because you will see charity itself, and God dwells within it" (Levering 2013, 58). St. Augustine established an act of *caritas*, such as almsgiving, metaphorically, not only as an expression of faith but also as a mutually reciprocal encounter with Christ.

In terms of the act of almsgiving, Augustine explicates St. John's warning that "if anyone has the world's goods and sees his brother in need, yet closes his heart against him, how does God's love abide in him?" (1 John 3:17). As we will see, Aquinas argues that it is kindness or mercy, and not *caritas* directly, that is the catalyst for almsgiving, a vehicle of charity that Riga (1968) calls "a participated theological virtue" (379). Augustine qualifies St. John's admonitory statement by reassuring his flock that one's charity must be nourished by practice. This transpires through almsgiving. Augustine makes the connection more pointedly: "Lend your money to the Lord, therefore, in the hand of the poor" (Ramsey 1982, 229). As Ramsey (1982) wrote, all of Augustine's attempts to equate the panhandler with Christ and with charity itself are aimed to rhetorically animate and galvanize the imagination of the auditor or reader and represent more than "simply the necessary accouterments to eleemosynary exhortations" (230). To date, the Catechism of the Catholic Church advocates *caritas*'s central connection between love of neighbor and love of God as well as its refining and conversionary capacity. "Charity upholds and purifies our human ability to love and raises it to the supernatural perfection of divine love" (Catholic Church 1997, 1827).

Volume thirty-four of St. Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* provides an exhaustive examination of the Christian virtue of charity and articulates and prioritizes a hierarchy for love (Question 26) and later for charitable giving (Question 32). For Aquinas, *caritas* was more than a Christian obligation; echoing St. Paul, he averred that it was the greatest of all virtues (1975, 25). He defined it as "a friendship of man and God" (1975, 7). Thus, sharing in the nexus of happiness between the human person, one's neighbors, and God is the very groundwork of *caritas*.

It should be noted that more recently, Seth Chalmer views Aquinian *caritas* as an emotional element of love and questions the locus of *caritas*, contending that while Aquinas insists *caritas* must lead to concrete actions of kindness, its "essential principle is an internal love . . . an intangible feeling rather than real, measurable action" (2012, 172). Yet, love based on this agapistic logic does indeed comprise and command outward acts of kindness or mercy, for as Aquinas wrote, such is the "same act which loves God and which loves neighbour. And this

account of charity extends not merely to the love of God, but also to the love of neighbour" (1975, 83). In this respect, Aquinas is simpatico with Augustine on *caritas*'s divine interdependence between recipients of charitable acts and God. Aquinas elucidates this point with respect to almsgiving, "whereby something is given to the needy out of compassion and for God's sake" (1975, 239). Concomitant with Augustine on the question of almsgiving as an act of charity, Aquinas, with his ubiquitous and methodical Rogerian "on-the-other-hand" maneuver, frames his response around the same rhetorical question Augustine asks of his audience, quoting 1 John 3:17: "But if anyone has this world's goods and sees his brother in need, yet closes his heart against him, how does God's love abide in him?" (1975, 239).

Jean Porter points out that Aquinas's hierarchy of loving and consequently almsgiving stands in direct contradiction to Augustine's unequivocal democratic application of *caritas* that "[o]ne ought to love all persons equally" (1989, 199). Consistent with what he said regarding loving one neighbor more than another, Aquinas (1975) explicitly asserts that a certain order should be observed when it comes to who should be given preference in matters of almsgiving (133): "Give to the Godly man, but do not help the sinner, Do good to the humble, but do not give to the ungodly" (1975, 267). Thus, those who are holier, rather than those in spiritual proximity to fallen laity, are to be the favored candidates of almsgiving. Aquinas's final article on "how we should give alms" is somewhat misleading in that the focus relies on the quantity of distribution, vis-à-vis articulating interpersonal communication modalities and mores for interlocuter encounters with those in most need.

Some 750 years later, Pope Francis's perspective on *caritas* is unequivocally more intimate, Other-centered, and rooted in the Catholic social teaching of the preferential option for the poor. Speaking to a group from a global charity in 2019, Pope Francis warned of inchoate and ersatz forms of charity, those we might call institutional. *Caritas* is not "a sterile performance or simple offering to donate to silence our conscience. . . . [I]t is not an idea or pious feeling" (quoted in Brockhaus 2019). This view stands in contradiction to Chalmer's interpretation of Aquinian charity. Moreover, for Pope Francis, authentic *caritas* cannot be an institutionalized form of philanthropy; it must be an intimate and "experiential encounter" (Brockhaus 2019). While there may be an efficiency to institutional giving, as De Freitas et al. (2019), argue, even institutional charities recognize the importance of cultivating a more interpersonal dynamic with recipients:

> Many charitable organizations ask big donors to go on tours in which they become personally involved with the beneficiaries. These tours may satisfy some of the evolved psychological criteria for being involved directly with beneficiaries and the community. The tours may signal that the donors are not just motivated by a concern with their reputations, that they are asserting a higher status than the beneficiaries, and that they are genuinely interested in establishing relationships with those in need. (172)

Charity demands an interpersonal relationship with the poor. Similar to Augustine and Aquinas, Pope Francis underscored a charitable act's capacity to

fashion an intimate and interdependent nexus between benefactor, recipient, and God. In his Angelus Address in 2020, Pope Francis exhorted that practicing authentic acts of *caritas* is "[o]n the one hand . . . looking at others through the eyes of Jesus himself, and on the other hand, seeing Jesus in the face of the poor" (Catholic News Agency 2020). Relating to almsgiving specifically, Pope Francis advocates that giving be an important dialogic and communicative performance undergirded by ethical and phenomenological enactments of *caritas*.

In February 2017, Pope Francis was interviewed by the monthly magazine *Scarp de' tenis* (*Tennis Shoes*), which serves the homeless and the marginalized in Milan. When asked whether it is right to give alms to people who ask for help on the street, Pope Francis provided an exhortation to prospective benefactors that giving "is always right" and that it should be done with respect and compassion because "tossing the money without looking in the eyes is not the gesture of a Christian" (Holy See Press Office 2017). Moreover, Pope Francis accentuated the import of nonverbal gestures when giving, saying to "look them in the eyes and touch their hands" (2017). Pope Francis also shared that when he meets people who are homeless and living on the street, he always greets them and sometimes asks about their lives and background. Furthermore, Pope Francis chastised those who will not give because of their concern that the poor will invariably spend the money on drinking wine (a reasonably Italian objection). Pope Francis responded that "if a glass of wine is the only happiness he [a panhandler] has in life, that is fine" (2017). Even Adam Smith concedes that beer and ale have a salutary as well as "wholesome and invigorating" benefit for beggars being "relieved from one of the burdens of which they at present complain the most" (1976b, 422). Pope Francis added to "ask yourself what you do secretly. What 'happiness' do you seek in private?" (Holy See Press Office 2017). The Pope continued by saying that "you are more fortunate, with a house, a wife, children." Then, Pope Francis asked why we look for reasons to relinquish our responsibility to help others. He ended the exchange by stating, "Teaching charity is not about offloading one's own sense of guilt, but it is touching, looking at our inner poverty that the Lord understands and saves" (2017). Pope Francis's beliefs here also contravene Augustinian and Aquinian claims to *caritas*'s compensatory and redemptive functions.

Pope Francis's view of *caritas* provides exemplary instruction for how the charitable act, manifested as begging, is fundamentally a phenomenological and ethical communicative and reciprocal encounter between interlocutors employing both verbal and nonverbal communication. His emphasis on the performative praxis demands an enhanced dimension of nonverbal communication not only of eye contact but also of haptics: "by looking them [panhandlers] in the eyes and touching their hands" (Holy See Press Office 2017). These main points draw a sustained engagement with and parallel the phenomenological ethics of Emmanuel Levinas.

Pope Francis's reflections on the importance of solidarity call us to embrace the "reality that we are bound by the bonds of reciprocity" (2020b, 107). Additionally, Pope Francis contends that human beings are so made that they cannot live, develop, and find fulfillment except "in the sincere gift of self to others" (2020a, sec. 87). This attends precisely to what Ronald C. Arnett has named

the "universal ethical echo: 'I am my brother's keeper'" (2017, 63). O. Carter Snead, reflecting on the outward-facing act of practicing virtue ethics, remarks that "one's gaze is not fixed, limited to her inner self and its depths. One's attention instead turns outward, understanding that flourishing is becoming a participant and steward in the network of giving and receiving that sustains life as humanly lived" (2020, 99).

Pope Francis, Caritas, *and Levinas*

Pope Francis's conception of *caritas* is imbued with a Levinasian and phenomenological spirit indicative in his ethical imperative that it is always right to give. Quoting Pope Benedict XVI, Pope Francis states that "being a Christian is not the result of an ethical choice or a lofty idea," like, say, epistemology or ontology, "but the encounter with an event, a person, which gives life a new horizon and a decisive direction" (2013a, sec. 7). Encountering poverty, for Pope Francis, is a kind of first ethics or, as he has stated, "first category," whereby he signifies poverty as a central theological term manifest in Christ's own abasement: "This is our poverty, the poverty of the flesh. A poor Church for the poor begins by reaching out to the flesh of Christ. If we reach out . . . we begin to understand something, this poverty, the Lord's poverty" (2013b).

Pope Francis's phenomenological genuflections are recognizable in the register of terms like "gaze," "encounter," "horizons," "the other," and "the face" found in many of his encyclicals and other writings (Oltvai 2018, 317). Since his election, Pope Francis has called for and embodied a shift in the Church's priorities, favoring a more outward, pastoral, and kerygmatic hermeneutic. This Other-centered orientation is rooted deeply in Gospel principles, praxis, the virtue of mercy, and views of the Church as a field hospital; it embraces experiences and encounter over the soundness of doctrine. For Pope Francis to advocate and operate out of such an orientation has no doubt been influenced by the so-called "theological turn" in phenomenology and, in particular, the work of Jean-Luc Marion and Emmanuel Levinas.

Moreover, Dominique Janicaud argues that Moses's encounter on Mount Horeb in Exodus 3:5 represents the "sacred ground of the other" and demarcates the cardinal function of this encounter as the so-called "theological turn" in phenomenology (Oltvai 2018, 319). As more robust evidence for this turn, consider the passage from *Totality and Infinity* in which Levinas equates "the alterity of the Other and the Most-High" (1969, 34). Beyond this, in *Difficult Freedom*, Levinas acknowledges that "Ethics is the optics of the divine" (1990, 157). More explicitly in *Ethics and Infinity*, Levinas remarks, "In access to the face, there is certainly also access to the idea of God" (1985, 92). Related more specifically to Augustinian *caritas*, the identification of Christ with the poor, and Pope Francis's vision of encountering the panhandler, Levinas reminds us, "The Divine can be manifested only through my neighbour"; then, in quoting Jeremiah 22:16, Levinas makes known who one's neighbor is and underscores a similar imperative to Pope Francis's: "He judged the course of the poor and needy; then it was well. Is not this to know me, says the Lord" (1990, 157). Thus, Pope Francis's ethical encounter

of giving, a care for the wellness of the poor and needy, comes to see the Other as sacred.

We might characterize the primacy that Pope Francis places on justice, the poor, and his clarion call to aid the most vulnerable in terms of "*caritas* as first theology." A similar perspective is shared by Levinas, who penned in *Difficult Freedom* that "giving is in some way the original movement of spiritual life" (1990, 62). Levinas also expresses a deep concern for the poor and uses the term "poverty" to describe the face-to-face encounter with the Other.

What is the relationship between ethics and *caritas* effectuated through giving to the panhandling Other? In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas writes, "To recognize the Other is to give" (1969, 75). "I can recognize the gaze of the stranger, the widow, and the orphan," all vulnerable social stations that are often dependent on the aid of others, "only in giving" (77). While such figures could be interpreted merely as biblical metonymies, Levinas argues that we encounter them in concrete ways and that they enable potential giving. Said another way, to welcome the homeless is to disturb the being at home with oneself. Levinas continues, explaining that "my welcoming of the other, is the ultimate fact, and in it, the things figure not as what one builds, but as to what one gives" (77). The giving here vanquishes "the originative I." To encounter the panhandler and to give in the way Pope Francis recommends is to welcome the Other into one's conceptual scheme. Such a view discloses symmetry with Levinas's claim that "the face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all. And me, whoever I may be, but as a 'first person,' I am he who finds the resources to respond to the call" (1985, 89). Responding to the command, what Arnett calls the "immemorial ethical echo" of 'I am my brother's keeper,'" demands our responsibility to the Other; it is an obligation that is formed when, as Arnett puts it, the "derivative I" responds with an outward "here I am" (2017, 39).

Moreover, how one gives should include recognizing the human dignity of the panhandler. Beggars are not toll booth baskets. As Hacker Daniels remarks, "Martin Buber's I-Thou/I-It continuum clearly calls for a relational dynamic between beggar and benefactor, with I-Thou as the more dialogue driven relationship" (2021, 105). Additionally, Johannesen et al. include the qualities of "mutuality, open heartedness, directness, honesty, spontaneity, frankness, lack of pretense, nonmanipulative intent, communion, intensity and love in the sense of responsibility of one human for another" (2008, 52). It is important to recall the communicative component of Pope Francis's ethical imperative of giving, which includes awareness of meaning, attitude, and intentionality and finds its telos in a performative praxis.

Levinas may interpret the choice to ignore the panhandler, or to simply toss money at her, as disregarding "the face's suspension of ontology and to preserve the correlation between absolute knowledge and being" (Hand 1989, 76). Feeding the ego's attempt to protect its own autonomy in the world places knowledge before relation and obligation. Egoism must be teleologically suspended for the Other. Emphasizing ego and ontologically driven deportment derails the productive disruptions of ethics as first philosophy. Likewise, giving *only* out of a concern for one's personal salvation, an upshot of *caritas* according to Augustine

and Aquinas, divorces one from the ethical responsibility endemic to *caritas*. This is why, when experiencing the encounter of giving, Pope Francis mandates that the charitable act perform the dialogic practices of not just eye contact but also active gazing and physical touching. As John Heron has remarked, "[A]ctual encounter occurs only in mutual touching and mutual gazing, each person both gives and receives in the same act" (1970, 243). When such a fruitful encounter occurs, the "divertive eye" of civil inattention to the presence of the panhandler is vanquished by, playing off of Arnett's concept, a derivative "eye," whereby an intimately focused, opened presence, an "infinite vigilance" (Hand, 1989, 75), seeks not totality but solidarity with the face of the Other. As Pope Francis wrote, "For what saves us is not an idea but an encounter. Only the face of another is capable of awakening the best of ourselves" (2020b, 107). Or, as Levinas puts it, "[T]he epiphany of the face as face is ethical" (1969, 76, 199).

Throughout his papacy, Pope Francis has modeled this recognition of poverty's flesh and how the ethical encounter of haptics functions as a kind of conversion. His conversionary vision of the Church is rooted in an outward-facing, periphery-centered, and literally "hands-on" approach, whereby one "takes on the smell of the sheep" (2013a, sec. 24). Giving in this way must be done by touching the Other in order to authentically encounter the flesh of poverty. Touching the Other is a relational language outside the claim to know, or to castigate, or to dominate. For Pope Francis, the gift of touching the flesh allows one to see the face of the Other (2013a, sec. 270).

Pope Francis's command to look into the eyes of a destitute person when giving alms seems to affirm Levinas's grand notion that "ethics is an optics" (1969, 23). Beyond this, in the opening line of the section titled "Sensibility and the Face" in *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas inquires, "Is not the face given to vision?" He also noted that "the connection between vision and touch . . . remains essential. Vision moves into grasp. Vision opens upon a perspective, upon a horizon, and describes a traversable distance, invites the hand to movement and to contact, and ensures them" (1969, 191). Whether Pope Francis had Levinas's relationship between vision and touch in mind when he included the nonverbal communication practices of eye contact and haptics in his instruction on giving cannot be known. However, it is important to note that vision for Levinas is a relational obligation, but that to see the face of the Other is not to observe an occurrence, but to hear a call, the response-ability of the Other that addresses me. In this sense, Pope Francis's directives for almsgiving from a Levinasian perspective would supplement the sensorial gazing and touching with hearing/responding to the command of the face of the Other, thereby resulting in ethical conversion. The face of the panhandler speaks, but she speaks antecedent to any particular encounter.

At first glance, Levinas seems to share Pope Francis's communicative demand of eye contact and touch when giving; however, upon further reading of Levinas regarding vision and touch, discrepancies and conceptual tensions in how one might encounter the indigent Other emerge. Take, for example, in *Ethics and Infinity* when Levinas declares, "The best way of encountering the Other is to not even notice the color of his eyes" (1985, 85). In this sense then, the face does not occupy the precinct of the visual. Equally as countervailing in *Totality and Infinity*,

Levinas remarks that the face "is neither seen nor touched" (1969, 194). Thus, the face's ostensible visuality notwithstanding, Levinas seems to claim that the face is not all a visual phenomenon. However, recall that Levinas's central principle of ethics as first philosophy recognizes the face as a signpost of ethical ubiquity; it is phenomenological first, and its empirical nature comes later. Augustine shared a similar expression related to Christian fidelity when he argued that charity reveals itself through the vehicle of almsgiving, saying that "we acknowledge Christ in good works, not in bodily manner, but with the heart, not with the eyes of flesh, but with the eyes of faith" (Ramsey 2007, 298). In light of the resemblances to Pope Francis's ethics of giving that we have hitherto attempted to draw, how can this be? What are we to make of these seemingly paradoxical claims of Levinas? Why select a visual to emphasize the invisible?

With respect to encounter, eye color, and touch, what we interpret Levinas to be saying here is that focusing attention on physical features, more sur-"face" traits of the Other, can become a perceptual encumbrance and thereby blur the intentionality and sincerity that motivates one to give, rendering the act opaque. In other words, the nidus of Levinas's moral obligation toward the radical alterity of the Other transcends what may appear to the eye. Moreover, any signification one might glean from the physiognomy of the Other should not matter because the face is a command, antecedent to all signs. As Basterra has clarified, the face of the Other addresses us thus and focuses our attention prior to considering the face's empirical qualities (sex, ethnicity, etc.) (2015, 125–26).

Finally, despite these more abstract philosophical discrepancies, what is most important is that Levinas does not deny the particularity of the universality of giving. The Saying engendered by the substantial act of giving, specifically in the ways Pope Francis directs, allows for the Said of all our hesitancies and biases to be interrupted. As Levinas suggested in *God, Death, and Time*, "Meaning begins with giving bread to another and requires practical material acts" (Arnett 2017, 241).

When encountering the panhandler, the synthesis of Levinas and Pope Francis occurs in the recognition of the conceptual moral imperative to heed the command of the face of the Other philosophically, ethically, transcendently, and invisibly with an equivalent practical, phenomenal, tactile, and visible act of *caritas*. According to Levinas, "*giving* is in some way the original movement of spiritual life" (1990, 62). Pope Francis may express this "*caritas* as first theology," but Levinas pushes things a bit further: "the Other is always the poor one, poverty defines the poor person as Other, and the relation with the Other will always be an offering and a gift, not an 'empty handed' approach" (1990, 62). Timothy Rothhaar (2018) explains the economic and spiritual solidarity that giving engenders with the Other. The material resources aid the Other in "survival of the body," which consequently breeds sharing a spiritual resource, i.e., the virtue of solidarity for "the survival of the relationship" (2018, 4). Thus, Pope Francis's imperative that it is always right to give and the phenomenological import of how one gives, which we examined earlier, echoes Levinas, who declared, "To recognize the Other is to give" (1969, 75). And the inverse is true for Pope Francis: to give is to recognize the Other.

The macro-links between Christianity's and Judaism's respective concepts of charity should not be surprising or underestimated, especially when examining the provenance of St. Thomas Aquinas's "harmonizing" of "Biblical doctrine with Biblical teaching" (Dienstag 1975, 195), which Jacob Dienstag attributes to Maimonides's success in cultivating the Aristotelian influence within scholasticism and Christian theology (194). Although competing scholarly opinions exist regarding the degree of Maimonides's influence upon St. Thomas Aquinas, and Dienstag concedes that it could arguably be overstated, he does, however, quote the "Catholic historian of philosophy, Emile Saisset (1814–1863) . . . that 'Maimonides is the precursor of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Guide announced and prepared the way for the *Summa Theologica*'" (196).

Maimonides, *Tzedakah*, and the Laws on Giving

While *caritas* is Latin for "love," the Hebrew word *tzedakah* has polysemous meanings, all converging in its meaning of charity (Meszler 2003, ii). Although the word *tzedakah* is commonly understood as "charity," the Hebrew root of *tzedakah* (tz-d-k) translates as "just," "justice," and "righteousness," and an individual who is an embodiment of justice and righteousness is known as a "Tzadik" (*Encyclopedia Judaica* 2007; Bernstein 2013).

The most influential treatise on charity in Jewish literature is Maimonides's "Laws on Gifts for the Poor," in the *Matnot Aniyim*, the seventh section of the *Mishneh Torah* (Cronbach 1947, 471). As Jacob Neusner points out, the *Mishneh Torah* furnishes the most incisive depiction of the Judaic law of *tzedakah* (1990, 10). In its entirety, the treatise on charity is comprised of ten chapters (Meszler 2003, ix–x). Maimonides introduces the treatise with an itemization of the thirteen germane *mitvot* (divine commandments) (Meszler 2003, 1). The first eleven *mitzvot* are alternately paired as a positive and a negative commandment (1). The eleventh commandment commands one "to set aside the tithe for the poor" (1–2). Worthy of observation is that the first eleven *mitzvot* are applicable to an agrarian setting, while the twelfth and thirteenth *mitzvot* are more applicable to the urban setting. Chapters 7–10 are also read as being more applicable to the urban venue (Meszler 2003, 60) and even more directly related to the context of the beggar on the street. In the last chapter of "Laws on Gifts for the Poor," 10:7–14 delineate what are arguably the most important and influential passages, known collectively as the eight degrees, or levels, of charity (Meszler 2003, 84–86), or the eight degrees of benevolence (Cronbach 1947, 529). The lowest number represents the highest degree, and the highest number represents the lowest degree:

> 7. The greatest level, higher than all the rest, is to fortify a fellow Jew and give him a gift, a loan, form with him a partnership, or find work for him, until he is strong enough so that he does not need to ask others [for sustenance].
>
> 8. One level lower than this is one who gives tzedakah to the poor and does not know to whom he gives, and the poor person does not know from whom he receives,

> 9. One lower level is one who gives tzedakah and the give knows to whom he gives but the poor person does not know from whom he takes.
>
> 10. One level lower is when the poor person knows from whom he takes but the giver does not know to whom he gives.
>
> 11. One level lower is to give to him with one's own hand before he can ask.
>
> 12. One level lower is to give him after he has asked.
>
> 13. One level lower is to give him less than one should but with kindness.
>
> 14. One level lower is to give to him begrudgingly. (Meszler 2003, 84–86)

Maimonides, or Rabbi Moses ben Maimon (1135–1204), also known by the acronym Rambam, and who predated Aquinas by a century, is one of the most influential figures in Jewish history. His greatest works—*Guide for the Perplexed*, the Mishneh Torah, and the commentary to the Mishneh Torah—have exerted profound influence on Christian scholasticism, represented in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas (*Encyclopedia Judaica* 2007). Distinguished by its logic, the Mishneh Torah codifies Jewish law. On its face, it might seem contrary to the charitable act, which intuitively, one might think, should be more steeped in pathos than logos. For Maimonides, "every law . . . has a reason, and ultimately living in accordance with the law leads to the perfection of humanity" (Meszler 2003, v) and that the laws of *tzedakah* possess a "constitutional foundation" (Meszler 2003, iv).

Deontologically, as an act of duty, *tzedakah* is not separate from motivations engendered by kindness, generosity, and empathy. The art of *tzedakah* is equally utilitarian in responding to the practical, basic needs of life for the poor, and it also engages a more transcendent dimension in its "quality of ennobling humanity with virtue" and teaching "one to become more like God through imitating God's level of generosity" (Meszler 2003, ix-x).

As Seth Chalmer (2012) explains, although significant differences are exhibited between Aquinas's notion of charity in *caritas* and Maimonides's in *tzedakah*, their respective concepts of charity converge in meaningful ways. He states that "both agreed that charity includes, but transcends, giving material support for the needy and that charity unites the human-Divine relationship with interpersonal relationships" (Chalmer 2012, 184). A significant divergence observed by Chalmer is curious in his saying that

> Jewish thought demeans caritas by claiming that it does not command tangible action, but its focus truly is primarily on internal love. Christian thought demeans *tsedaqah* by claiming that it is only external with no element of a higher principle of faith, but it truly is more rigidly defined in earthly terms. (184)

In sum, the correspondences between St. Thomas Aquinas and Maimonides make for a fertile corpus of scholarly inquiry. Admittedly, essential differences exist, but the key links are more magnanimously recognized by Dienstag. The

Christian and Jewish ethical perspectives of charity might be understood as distinct in terms of the sequencing and proportionality of each perspective within each theological tradition. Pope Francis's broader reorientating vision of the Catholic Church, from one fixed on doctrinal rigidity and "small-minded rules" (Sparado 2017) toward a more pastoral "poor Church for the poor" spirit, invites compassionate encounters with the panhandling Other. Such a view is indeed indicative of the phenomenological-theological turn that *caritas* implores. In light of established and antecedent claims where Pope Francis diverges from Augustine and Aquinas on the "how" of giving, it is perhaps surprising, but nonetheless the raison d'être of an interfaith hermeneutic, that Pope Francis's challenges to Aquinian provisos of proportionality and those "attached strings" that come with almsgiving are more attuned to a social justice-oriented, Maimonidean telos. The act of almsgiving is sedimented in a sacramental duty and should, as Pope Francis persists, come without worry.

Maimonides's "Laws on Gifts for the Poor" are irrefutably steeped in a Kantian deontology and concomitant categorical imperative (Patterson, Wilkins, and Painter 2019, 11). In the Maimonidean paradigm, the "moral force" of charity resides "in the act itself, rather than the person who acts" (Patterson, Wilkins, and Painter 2019, 11). As has been acknowledged, charity ought to be endowed with consequentialism, imbued with an inherent duty to act and to achieve desired and intended outcomes or goals (12–14). The individual also has a responsibility, as instantiated in Aristotelian virtue ethics and distinguished by the individual's *phrenemos*, understood as "practical wisdom" (4). Lastly, Maimonidean charity possesses as one of its characteristics a high degree of communitarianism, whereby individual choices and acts achieve an augmented communitywide societal impact, "assert[ing] that social justice is the predominant moral virtue" (16). Even exceedingly affluent benefactors, who aspire to the betterment of the world, understand the importance of cultivating significant interpersonal and dialogic relationships. In their brilliant quantitative study, "Maimonides' Ladder: States of Mutual Knowledge and the Perception of Charitability," Julian De Freitas, Peter DeScioli, Kyle A. Thomas, and Steven Pinker conclude that the organizational approach to charity can work and actually benefits from a robust relationship with a more individualistic and non-organizational approach:

> Many charitable organizations ask big donors to go on tours in which they become personally involved with the beneficiaries. These tours may satisfy at least some of the evolved psychological criteria for being involved directly with beneficiaries and the community. The tours may signal that the donors are not just motivated by a concern with their reputations, that they are not asserting a higher status than the beneficiaries, and that they are genuinely interested in establishing relationships with those in need. (2019, 172)

With these ethical dimensions of *tzedakah*, charity is unfalteringly an act of righteousness and the righteous, and an integral component of social justice.

Conjoining Commerce, Capitalism, and an Outstretched Hand

In furthering our understanding of acts of charity, the import of communication ethics intersects with the enterprise of commerce and capitalism vis-à-vis its transactional nature. This interplay is uniquely perspicuous in the work of the eighteenth-century moral philosopher Adam Smith. In his excellent essay on Smith, Arnett (2018) says the following of Smith's contribution to communication ethics:

> He unites the practical and the philosophical in response to the historical moment of 18th century Scotland and Europe. Smith points to a communication ethic aligned with sensibleness that is void of idle abstraction and lives within thoughtful and reflective applicability. (462)

Arnett points to Smith's two great works, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), as exemplifications "of the Scottish Enlightenment's gathering of sentiment and practical application" (2018, 462). Interestingly, in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* ("Of the Sense of Duty"), Smith extols the importance of God in our verbal and nonverbal expressions of charity and manifestations of gratitude. Smith says that they are founded on a sense of duty, but adds, "The sole principle and motive of our conduct in the performance of all those different duties, ought to be a sense that God has commanded us to perform them" (1976a, 171).

In Part IV, "The Effect of Utility," Smith promulgates a part-utilitarian, part-communitarian ethic, reminding us that even the most selfish, individualistic motives can reap rewards for others in unintended ways:

> The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species. (184–85)

Part VI, "Of the Character of Virtue," is redolent of Book II of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Smith explores the ways one manages one's emotions in achieving what he calls "self-command" (237) and allowing one's virtues to flourish in alignment with the Aristotelian Golden Mean (270–72).

In one of the most recognized passages in *The Wealth of Nations* (Book I, Chapter II), Smith (1976b) expounds upon the transactional nature of the commercial enterprise:

> It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of their own necessities but of their advantages. (18)

Immediately thereafter, Smith turns his attention to the beggar, with a curious observation but one that, when reflected upon, is eminently true:

> Nobody but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. (18)

Smith contravenes the conventional wisdom surrounding charity, in that, even when accepting charity given to you, and even when those fruits of the benevolence are perceived as "necessities," the recipients do not jettison their transactional choices, both in terms of what to accept and when to accept it:

> But though this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life which he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. With the money which one man gives him, he purchases food. The old cloaths which another bestows upon him he exchanges for other old cloaths which suit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy other food, cloaths, or lodging, as he has occasion. (18–19)

As morally laudatory and rather uncomplicated it seems to "give" in response to an outstretched hand and/or an oral plea, the legal ramifications of panhandling are seemingly much less pellucid.

The Legal Imperatives of the First Amendment

Panhandling is the recipient of a very "mixed First Amendment reception" within the urban environment, and an even more confounding reception in the more kinetically complex environment of the subway system in large metropolitan areas (Hacker-Daniels 2021, 100). Some legal decisions question whether panhandlers' and beggars' requests are speech or conduct and, if determined to be the former, whether the speech is even a bona fide message. If the message is part speech and part conduct, more commonly known as "speech plus" (Tedford and Herbeck 2017, 306), the communication garners an attenuated First Amendment protection and can be affected as well when circumstances of safety and commerce-driven communication are factored in.

When Dan Norton and Karen Otterson sued the city of Springfield (*Norton v. City of Springfield, Illinois,* 768 F.3d 713 (2014)), the Court deemed the Springfield ordinance prohibiting panhandling in the downtown historic district of Springfield to be constitutional. According to Hacker-Daniels, "Since panhandling is speech, the court had to determine if the restriction was content-neutral.

Individuals were allowed to hold up signs asking for money, in addition to making oral requests for money, but the contribution could not be executed contemporaneous with solicitation, resulting in an immediate transaction" (2021, 103). Moreover:

> The deal had to be sealed at a deferred point in time, since the request for money through the spoken word in direct face-to-face communication with a prospective contributor was construed by the city as potentially threatening and minimally intrusive. Ironically, individuals can ask for money using whatever modality of communication they choose, resulting in immediate contributions in any other area of the city except for the downtown historic district. (103)

In Judge Manion's dissenting opinion in *Norton v. City of Springfield, Illinois* (768 F.3d 713 (2014)), he states that "the City of Springfield's panhandling ordinance is a content-based regulation of speech, subject to strict scrutiny" (Calvert 2015). The parsing of these distinctions as articulated in the dissenting opinion in *Reed v. Town of Gilbert* (576 US 155 (2015)) upended the 2014 decision, with the Seventh Circuit reversing its 2014 decision in *Norton v. City of Springfield* (806 F.3rd 411 (2015)), deeming the preponderance of the panhandling laws in the country unconstitutional ("Panhandling," n.d.).

The First Amendment protections of panhandling/begging are significantly diminished when the act interfaces with mass transit. "In the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, plaintiffs William Young and Joseph Walley sued New York's Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) in *Young v. New York City Transit Authority*, claiming that provisions adopted by the MTA violated their free speech rights under the First Amendment" (Hacker-Daniels 2021, 100–101). Judge Sand conclusively stated that begging and panhandling undeniably fall under the aegis of expressive speech and that "while often disturbing and sometimes alarmingly graphic, begging is unmistakably informative and persuasive speech" (*Young v. NYCTA*, 729 F. Supp. 341, (S.D.N.Y.1990)).

However, in a legal episode of peripeteia heard in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the *Young* opinion was drastically different. "Circuit Judge Altimari argues that the subway cannot be characterized as a designated public forum and avoids triggering the strict scrutiny standard and a concomitant violation of the First Amendment" (Hacker-Daniels 2021, 101). Judge Altimari "express[es] grave doubts as to whether begging and panhandling in the subway are sufficiently imbued with a communicative character to justify constitutional protection," and, beyond this, Altimari suggested "that most individuals who beg are not doing so to convey any social or political message" (*Young v. New York City Transit Authority* 903 F. 2d 146, (2nd Cir. 1990)). Even when begging/panhandling engage speech, it is merely tangential, whereby the conduct (act) is privileged over the speech (Hacker-Daniels 2021,101).

In a meta-reversal, in *Loper v. New York City Police Department* (999 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir. 1993)), "Judge Miner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the communicative essence of begging/panhandling while shutting down the slippery slope that panhandling and begging . . . inexorably lead to more

aggressive activity and greater incidence of serious criminal activity" (Hacker-Daniels 2021, 101–2).

In their examination of the constitutional questions circumscribing begging, Hershkoff and Cohen (1991) disabuse detractors of the reasons for abrogating the First Amendment protection of begging, including the one which argues that begging "is about private need and not the public good" (902). This claim ostensibly comports with the premise that begging is "predominantly commercial speech with financial gain its primary raison d'être" (Hacker-Daniels 2021, 104). Militating against this supposition, Hershkoff and Cohen observe, "the beggar implicitly proposes a communitarian vision in which citizens have a responsibility for each other's survival, a perspective that an informed decision maker should consider" (1991, 902).

In light of this higher ethical good, the beggar's speech should not be punished because commercialism does not necessarily vitiate the communitarian goals of begging. Each beggar is, in fact, a part of the bigger issue whose speech functions synecdochically (Hacker-Daniels 2021, 104). And as counterintuitive as it may seem to those not in want, begging allows one to participate in self-realization, which is fundamental to "the premise of individual dignity and choice," as elucidated in *Cohen v. California* (403 US 15 (1971)) in Hershkoff and Cohen (1991, 903). Hacker-Daniels recounts Hershkoff and Cohen's recognition of the First Amendment disparity in protecting charitable solicitations and not the individual beggar (Hershkoff and Cohen 1991, 905–6; Hacker-Daniels 2021, 104). They note that the lack of a "middleman," as it were, ought not attenuate the constitutional protection of the beggar's speech.

Given that many different constituencies of speakers/messages are afforded the First Amendment protection to communicate with strangers, the beggar's particular act of communication, with solicitation predicated as it is on appeals like those of Blanche Dubois to the "kindness of strangers," is an abrogation insofar as it fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard and ineluctably devolves into a content-based restriction (Hershkoff and Cohen 1991, 906). But, arguably, what is most intimately tied to the moral imperative to protect the right to beg is the cultivation of the relationship in the beggar/donor dyad.

> The immediacy of her appeal breaks down the wall between speaker and listeners and engages her interlocutor in a social interaction. Sociologists call this kind of encounter a "relationship wedge." Its power lies in the fact that once an individual has extended to another enough consideration to hear him out for a moment, some kind of bond of mutual obligation is established, which the initiator can use, in turn, as a basis for still further claims. (Hershkoff and Cohen 1991, 913)

If the communication exchange is consummated, salutary impact can be achieved not only on a one-on-one level but also on a societal level, with intended and possibly unintended positive outcomes, including the beggar's ability to engage a prospective benefactor, where the diminution of the beggar's marginalization can "forge a more inclusive society" (Hershkoff and Cohen 1991, 914). And even when the beggar's presence and speech engender hostility and a

discordant rapport, the benefit of such an experience lies in the created "rhetorical situation"—in the exigence brought to light, and we can certainly say that this embodies an imperfection marked by urgency (Hershkoff and Cohen 1991, 914; Bitzer, 1968). Adding to this exigence is the "dehumanizing imagery" used against the poor, the homeless, and the indigent.

As Slipp argues, panhandling affords the homeless the opportunity to express themselves with very limited options and to avoid being "out of sight, out of mind" (1994, 629). She is not suggesting that one's responsibility is Maimonidean at the highest degree of charity in saying that "it is not each individual's personal responsibility to ensure the livelihood of the homeless," but rather she is stating the importance of a message that is irrefutably expressive and message engendering as both speech and conduct (632).

Conclusion

As evinced by our engagement with interfaith and secular/legal perspectives on the virtue of *caritas* and *tzedakah* pertaining to encounters with panhandlers and beggars, questions of meaning and the performative, practical enactment of *caritas* and *tzedakah* illumine and edify the who, what, how, where, when, and why, but provide no hard and fast answers. Predictably, responses to the synthesis of interfaith conceptualizations (of *caritas* and *tzedakah*) and interlocutor dynamics including communication ethics surrounding the "act" of begging that we have established, regrettably, can and do manifest in partisan political, cultural, and economic ideology. Assigning blame and fault on both sides of the (donor/recipient) equation is ill-conceived, and where none should be assigned. For the ancient rhetorical fragment *Dissoi Logoi* reminds the would-be benefactor:

> Are you not in the position of pitying beggars because they are in a very bad way and also (contrariwise) congratulating them for being well off, if the same thing is good and bad? And there is nothing to stop the King of Persia from being in the same condition as beggars. (Anonymous 2020, 72)

The achievement of self-realization and self-actualization reciprocally serves both the panhandler and the giver/donor in an enantiomorphic way. But this is no reflection of Narcissus, since each interlocutor sees their image (donor and beneficiary), reflected—not in terms of physiognomic features—but more essentially, in the reflection that the donor and beneficiary have of each other (e.g., love, caring, empathy, pain, dignity). Seeing the Other as yourself is foundational not only to dialogical ethics but also to the charitable act itself. Neusner proclaims that the donor is not only obliged to give but is in fact privileged. How might this be? "We are not whole and complete human beings unless we give. That is the fundamental affirmation of this stunning statement that a poor person must give to the poor. I cannot imagine a more profound and complete statement of Judaism than that simple one" (1990, 21). From a Maslovian vantage point, the beggar actually facilitates the giver's ultimate need for "self-actualization," fully understood through Adler's concept of "*Gemeinschaftsgefühl*," defined as "the

flavor of the feeling for mankind expressed by self-actualizing subjects" (Maslow 1970, 165).

One such aphorism from the ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu is often expressed in an erroneous either-or fallacy as a simple reductive corrective to the societal problem of poverty: "Give a man a fish, and feed him for a day, teach him to fish, and feed him for life"—to which a compelling counterstatement may be articulated in quoting the Gospel of Mathew 7:9–11: "Ask and you will receive; seek, and you will find; knock, and the door will be opened to you. . . . Would any of you who are fathers give your son a stone when he asked for bread? Or would give him a snake when he asks for a fish?" (*Good News Bible* 1979)

We arrive at the conclusion that charity as *caritas* and *tzedakah* is integral to not only the physical and emotional sustenance of the recipient and equally the donor but that it is also *sine qua non* to the health and well-being of society at large, reinforcing the importance of the concept *Gemeinschaftsgefühl*, defined by the American Psychological Association (n.d.) as "a social interest or community spirit; a spirit of equality, belonging, and unity."

Whether short or long term, institutional or conventionally interpersonal charity, the modes, mechanisms, and logistics of giving are not the fundamental issues (although legal and ethical contours certainly need to be taken into account), but rather are tangential to personal, ethical, and spiritual deliberation. As Dorothy Day insisted, "The Gospel takes away our right forever, to discriminate between the deserving and the undeserving poor" (Dorothy Day House, n.d.). As it is quoted in the Tractate Sanhedrin, "For this reason was man created alone, to teach thee that whosoever destroys a single soul of Israel, scripture imputes [guilt] to him as though he had destroyed a complete world; and whosoever preserves a single soul of Israel, scripture ascribes [merit] to him as though he had preserved a complete world" (Epstein 1994, 37a). These discrete acts of charity irrefutably qualify as acts that can save an entire world.

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Establishing the Husserl Archives: Dialogic Ethics' Revelatory Ethics

Susan Mancino

Abstract: At the time of his death in 1938, the unpublished papers of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, were at risk of destruction by the Nazi regime. Father Herman Leo van Breda, a graduate student at the Catholic University of Leuven, worked to smuggle this collection from Germany to Belgium where he eventually established the Husserl Archives. This essay considers this account as an enactment of Emmanuel Levinas's dialogic ethics attentive to the interplay of the saying, the said, and the trace. Furthermore, the essay considers interhuman and interfaith implications as well as connections to dialogic ethics within public commemoration.

Keywords: Husserl Archives Leuven, Herman Leo van Breda, Emmanuel Levinas, dialogic ethics

At the time of Edmund Husserl's death in 1938, his approximately 40,000 pages of unpublished materials were left in a precarious position under the threat of Nazi destruction (Arnett 2017; Baring 2019; Levinas [1975] 1996; van Breda [1959] 2007). This essay turns to the extraordinary circumstances of the founding of the Husserl Archives by Father Herman Leo van Breda, who smuggled Husserl's unpublished papers out of Germany to Belgium where he established the Husserl Archives at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie (ISP) at the Catholic University of Leuven. Van Breda, as a 27-year-old graduate student, successfully negotiated the transfer of Husserl's estate (*Nachlass*)[1] with his widow, Malvine Husserl, in the midst of heightened international tensions and growing anti-Semitism. Van Breda organized assistance from the Belgian embassy to transport the materials, secured funding for the institution, and managed to ensure safety for the collection throughout the war, including the Nazi occupation of Belgium. The Archives are van Breda's life's work and legacy as he built an institutional home for research and publication on Husserl, the founder of phenomenology.

1 Husserl's Nachlass included his unpublished manuscripts, his 2,700-volume philosophical library, his correspondence, and various other documents and possessions (Husserl Archives Leuven, n.d.).

Turning to the founding of the Husserl Archives, this essay seeks insights relevant to dialogic ethics within interhuman and interfaith perspectives. The essay proceeds in four sections. The first section, "Establishing the Husserl Archives," reviews the founding and ongoing contributions of this institutional research center. The second section, "Commemorative Tributes: Religious Influences and Interpersonal Implications," turns to secondary accounts on the importance of van Breda's work with attentiveness to Catholic influences in the development of phenomenology (Baring 2019) and implications for interpersonal encounters (Levinas [1975] 1996). The third section, "Levinas's Dialogic Ethics: The Saying, the Said, and the Trace," offers an exploration of the relevance of Emmanuel Levinas's concepts of the saying, the said, and the trace to dialogic ethics. The essay then concludes with "Implications for Dialogic Ethics," which understands the legacy of van Breda and the Husserl Archives as an exemplar of Levinas's dialogic ethics within the scope of public commemoration.

Levinas's perspective of dialogic ethics relies upon a nonreciprocal, disinterested, and impersonal encounter enacted in the interplay of the saying, the said, and the trace. The said materializes in temporally tangible and solidified insights—what has been written, recorded, manufactured, and circulated—while the trace of the saying emerges in the face, the immemorial ethical echo, and the demands of a historical moment. The trace acts as the mediating force that preserves an immemorial saying in the temporalized said. These concepts are mutually interdependent and simultaneously in constant interruption, demonstrating key components central to dialogue and dialogic ethics.

Ronald C. Arnett (2004, 2017) distinguishes this view from Martin Buber's emphasis on reciprocal dialogue, yet simultaneously describes the saying and said as exemplifying Buber's understanding of a unity of contraries. Following Arnett's distinction, Lisbeth Lipari[2] (2004) aligns Buber's I-Thou/I-It and Levinas's saying/said as central themes to understanding their respective positions on dialogic ethics, arguing that Buber stresses "the intersubjective relation between persons in everyday life" while Levinas considers "the transcendence of being through the ethical relation with the 'face' of the other" (126). Levinas's ethical philosophy, unlike Buber's, extends beyond dialogic exchanges in temporalized encounters while maintaining revelatory insights for the study of dialogic ethics. This essay contends that van Breda exemplifies Levinas's dialogic ethics enacted by the dynamic interplay of the saying, the said, and the trace.

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2 Informed by the work of Buber and Levinas, Lipari (2004) contends that dialogic ethics and communication ethics occur via listening rather than speaking (137). Specifically, she describes discursive exchanges between Buber and Levinas as a "failure of communication," marked by "insufficient dialogic engagement with the alterity of the other—a failure, in short, to listen for the other" (122). Without denying both scholars' contributions to dialogic ethics, she reviews controversies within interpretations of their work and places her own perspective on listening as central to this conversation. Later, she describes this perspective as "listening otherwise" and emphasizes its attentiveness to Otherness and alterity (Lipari 2009, 45) and connects it to Levinas's notion of "beyond dialogue," which seeks to articulate encounters that lie within the realm of the saying (Lipari 2010, 359).

Establishing the Husserl Archives

Leo van Breda was born on February 28, 1911, in Lier, Belgium (a small town outside of Antwerp). He joined the Franciscan order and was ordained as a priest on August 19, 1934, when he took on the name Herman. Entering the ISP at the Catholic University of Leuven in 1936, van Breda earned his bachelor's degree in 1937 and his licentiate in 1938. Léon Noël,[3] who was the first to write about Husserl outside of the German language in 1910, introduced van Breda to phenomenology (Baring 2019, 280). Van Breda's thesis focused on Husserl's early writings and reflected Noël's influence (Baring 2019, 290). Intending to continue this line of inquiry in his doctoral studies, van Breda, hoping to access Husserl's unpublished papers, travelled to Freiburg, Germany in 1938, four months after Husserl's death.

Van Breda ([1959] 2007) recounts his journey in a firsthand account that details the events surrounding the founding of the Husserl Archives. He begins with the historical context that brought danger to Husserl and threatened the safety of his *Nachlass*. Although he converted to the Lutheran faith in 1887, Husserl was born to a Jewish family in 1859 and was thus subjected to anti-Semitic laws. Despite the considerable prestige that Husserl brought to the University of Freiburg, he was barred from university facilities (such as the library) and denied attendance at the international philosophical congresses as a German delegate (40–42). This political climate motivated the University of Southern California to offer him a position as chair of the philosophy department in hopes of removing him from the threats of Nazi Germany; Husserl, however, denied the invitation. According to van Breda, Husserl was not willing to accept a position "aimed more at removing him . . . from Germany, than at making him part of the academic staff"; despite additional efforts from his children who had already immigrated to the United States, Husserl "insist[ed] that he would die in the country in which he had lived and worked" (47). Husserl and his wife lived in increasing isolation. By the time of his death on April 27, 1938, few friends and colleagues remained connected to them.

At this time, van Breda ([1959] 2007) expanded his goal from access to Husserl's unpublished work to the publication and preservation of these materials. Repeatedly referring to these works, Husserl acknowledged their importance in "clarify[ing] problems that their commentators had been unable to solve" (39). Upon his death, Husserl left these unpublished works legally entrusted to his son in the United States and physically entrusted to the estate managed by his widow, Malvine Husserl, in Germany. Van Breda feared that the Nazis would prohibit publishers from printing any further copies of Husserl's

3 Léon Noël (1878–1953) was successor to Cardinal Désireé-Félicien-François-Joseph Mercier, who was the founding president of the ISP at the Catholic University of Leuven; both scholars shared an interest in Thomist philosophy. Noël explored the possible connections between neo-scholasticism and phenomenology. His research is consistent with van Breda's work. Baring (2019) likens the contributions of Noël and van Breda, writing: "In 1910 Léon Noël had brought Husserl's ideas into new lands through his writing and teaching. Thirty years later, his student Herman Leo Van Breda accomplished the same task, but this time with trains and traveling cases" (280).

work and most likely destroy his *Nachlass* (40). Given these threats, van Breda hoped to transport the materials to Belgium where they could be published outside of the arenas of Nazi control.

Van Breda ([1959] 2007) turned to the Catholic University of Leuven for institutional support. He met with his doctoral advisor, Joseph Dopp, and another trusted professor, Louis de Raeymaeker, who sought the support of Noël and the ISP. Sharing strong interest in Husserl's phenomenological project, Noël gave his highest support and clarified that van Breda would need an estimate of the scope and importance of the *Nachlass*, judgment on what was publishable, information on the material's legal status, and permission from the legal inheritor (41). This information provided a clear scope for the goals of van Breda's visit.

When van Breda ([1959] 2007) arrived in Freiburg, he met with Malvine Husserl and Eugen Fink, one of Husserl's final and most loyal assistants. Malvine Husserl made her commitment to her husband's philosophical project clear, recognizing its protection as her "strict duty" (43). During their initial encounter, Fink immediately confirmed the significance of Husserl's unpublished papers and revealed the 40,000 pages of stenographic material written by Husserl as well as an additional 10,000 pages transcribed by his research assistants, including Fink, Ludwig Landgrebe, and Edith Stein (43). Additionally, they introduced van Breda to Husserl's extensive philosophical library, which contained over 2,700 volumes collected between 1880 and 1938.[4] The significance of the unpublished papers as well as the annotated philosophical library was undeniable and the urgent need to remove the Husserl materials from Germany was explicitly apparent to all.

Van Breda ([1959] 2007) recognized the logistical and physical challenges facing his plan to transport the materials to Belgium. Particular difficulties included maintaining the physical safety of the collection during its transfer from Freiburg to Leuven, arranging specialized collaborations with Husserl's research assistants, and securing resources, funding, staff, and training (46–47). Despite these challenges, Malvine Husserl confirmed her support for the proposal. By the end of their first meeting, she had made plans to correspond with her son Gerhart in the United States, who maintained legal control of the documents, while van Breda facilitated arrangements and negotiations with the ISP and university administrators (47). Within three days, Malvine Husserl informed van Breda that he should move forward, contingent upon university approval (48). Unfortunately, although the ISP remained supportive of the effort and was willing to edit a portion of the collection, the university feared that they could not guarantee ongoing safety and funding for a collection so large or secure the resources needed for hosting Husserl's research assistants (51). However, the urgency to move the collection became increasingly clear with the Munich Crisis, which made international conflict inevitable as Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy agreed to allow German annexation of Sudetenland in western

4 Van Breda ([1959] 2007) saw beyond the library's "intrinsic value" to its "bibliophilic interest" (44); these volumes contained dedications to Husserl from the works' original authors as well as Husserl's "finely printed" notes (44).

Czechoslovakia. Malvine Husserl "pragmatically" chose to entrust the materials to van Breda without clearly outlined institutional support from the university (52).

The question then became how to transport the massive collection.[5] Van Breda ([1959] 2007) sought assistance from the Belgian embassy in Berlin, which agreed to transport the collection via diplomatic mail (53).[6] With arrangements finalized, van Breda returned to Leuven tasked with securing institutional and financial support for the collection. He found short-term funding from the Francqui Foundation with an annual sum of 70,000 Belgian Francs provided consecutively for two years (61).[7] After the materials arrived in November 1938, van Breda shifted his attention to logistical matters. On December 25, 1938, van Breda coordinated a formal contract signed by Gerhart Husserl (as executor of Husserl's will) and by Noël (as representative of the ISP) that granted the Archives permission to edit and publish its collection (63).[8] In April 1939, the Archives hosted its first researcher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who became a central figure in the French phenomenological tradition.[9] By spring 1939, van Breda arranged for the arrival of Fink and Landgrebe, who provided essential expertise for editing and transcribing the collection (65).[10] On June 21, 1939, van Breda arranged for a Belgian visa for Malvine Husserl, who remained hidden in a convent in the nearby

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5 Early plans involved the assistance of a Benedictine nun and former Husserl student, Adelgundis Jägerschmidt, who would smuggle the papers across the border to the Swiss Alps alongside other members of her order (Baring 2019, 279). When the proposal was deemed too dangerous, van Breda worked alongside Malvine Husserl and Fink for new arrangements that would rescue the Nachlass.

6 In order to secure assistance from the embassy, van Breda ([1959] 2007) needed legal documentation that he held power of attorney over the collection. Seeking counsel from a Jewish lawyer, Malvine Husserl signed the paper alongside a disclaimer unknown to the Belgian embassy, indicating that all property be returned to the Husserl family upon its arrival in Leuven (56–57).

7 Émile Francqui, who was a Belgian government official, founded the Francqui Foundation with the support of American President Herbert Hoover in 1932. Baring (2019) explains that Francqui viewed the success of Belgian universities as "crucial" to national reconstruction after the First World War (283). Van Breda found support in one of the Foundation's programs that provided funds for renowned international scholars to visit and teach at one of the four Belgian universities. Van Breda secured funding from the Francqui Foundation from 1941 until 1944 (284).

8 While the agreement housed the collection at the University of Leuven and granted the institution permission to publish the works, the original documents remained the property of the Husserl family; the only portion of the collection owned by the ISP is Husserl's library, which it purchased for $2,500 (Baring 2019). In 1962, the Husserl Archives (n.d.) received nonprofit status and thus became the "legal body that acts as custodian and manager of Husserl's manuscripts and all related documents."

9 A number of prominent twentieth-century scholars visited the Husserl Archives, including Tran-Duc-Thao, Paul Ricœur, Jacques Derrida, Umberto Eco, Emmanuel Levinas, and Charles Taylor. For more information on who visited the archives, along with dates and commentary on how the archives influenced their work, visit https://hiw.kuleuven.be/hua/about/history.

10 From the onset, van Breda ([1959] 2007) was aware that collaboration with highly qualified scholars and researchers was essential. These researchers would need a "high degree of specialization" that would allow for the organization, transcription, and contextualization of the collection; specifically, the Archives needed to situate its holdings in their historical "setting" and to articulate their relationship to his published texts (45).

town of Herent as she waited for a U.S. visa, which finally arrived in 1946 after the conclusion of the war (65–66).

Van Breda ([1959] 2007) explains that by July 1939, all efforts to establish the archives were complete and that "the real work" of editing, transcribing, and publishing the *Nachlass* could begin (67). Husserl's more than forty years of research utilized an adapted form of German stenography, which could be read by only three of his former students—Fink, Landgrebe, and Stein. While Fink and Landgrebe were interested in the project, Stein had entered a nunnery and was therefore unavailable to assist. Fink and Landgrebe engaged in the transcription of the manuscripts until May 1940 when the German military attacked Belgium and all activities related to the Archives ceased. The war required a new strategy for protecting the Archives' collection that this time meant secrecy.

With the German occupation of Belgium from May 1940 until February 1945, the Archives were under constant threat and necessarily had to be hidden from the public.[11] In a letter to Martin Farber, who founded the *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, van Breda urged the necessity to "camouflage everything, hide everything, and remain silent" (Baring 2019, 284). Likewise, Noël urged Farber to remove any reference to the Archives and to maintain strict confidence regarding Fink and Landgrebe's assistance.[12] Beyond the threat of Nazi destruction, the Archives faced threats from Allied warfare as well. In fact, in 1940, a British and American air raid bombed Belgium, destroying an important part of Husserl's correspondence (66).[13] The Archives were not considered safe until the end of World War II.[14]

Husserl Archives archivist Thomas Vongehr (2007) explains that since its inception the institution allowed "unhindered access" to the *Nachlass*, fueling the publication of *Husserliana*[15] (104–105). Economic difficulties in the early years of

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11 From May until August 1940, van Breda ([1959] 2007) was ordered to leave Leuven and the archives he had established. He explains, "Government orders demanded all Belgian citizens between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five to evade capture by the Germans and to be ready to join the army. Since I could not know that such measure would come to nothing, I followed orders" (67). Fearful of their destruction, he was "overjoyed" to find the materials intact upon his return (67).

12 Knowledge of the Archives would have also been particularly dangerous for the three researchers working in the absence of Fink and Landgrebe: Lucy Gelber, Stephan Strasser, and Gertrude Strasser, who were all members of Jewish families and thus particularly precarious in occupied Belgium (Baring 2019, 284–85).

13 Husserl's correspondence from Heidegger as well as two portraits Husserl made of his teacher, Franz Brentano, were destroyed in this attack (van Breda [1959] 2007, 66).

14 After the war, van Breda worked to gather additional materials relevant to Husserl and phenomenology. He released a call in the *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, requesting that correspondence with Husserl and lecture notes be shared with the Archives. Likewise, he made efforts to obtain the papers of other prominent phenomenologists such as Stein and Scheler. Although these attempts were unsuccessful, they demonstrate van Breda's vision for the Archives (Baring 2019, 286–87).

15 The *Husserliana* contains the complete works of Husserl. Published jointly by the Husserl Archives and the ISP, the *Husserliana* contains four series that feature edited portions of the Archives' collection as well as translations and research guides. Beginning in March 1948, the Archives published the series with Martinus Nijhoff, which became Kluwer Publishing in the 1980s and then

the Archives emphasized the importance of these publications as a major source of income (106). The first publication, edited by Stephan Strasser and introduced by van Breda, was released on March 10, 1950, with 500 copies printed (112–113).[16] Vongehr credits the *Husserliana* as being among the Archives' most significant contributions as it examines the ongoing interpretation, consideration, and reassessment of Husserl's work. The availability of Husserl's *Nachlass* particularly influenced French phenomenology and resulted in numerous "sister archives."[17] These institutions contain copies of collections housed by the Archives in Leuven, safeguarding Husserl's work and assisting with wide access for the collection. Vongehr describes these collaborations, attending to their shared interests as well as their competition.[18] Nonetheless, Vongehr argues that van Breda resisted taking on the role as "dealer of Husserl archives" and reached agreements that provided copies of the materials for a variety of institutions across Europe and the United States. As the complete publication of Husserl's *Nachlass* became "foreseeable," the institution began to look forward to "new duties and new fields of activity" (Bernet 2007, xii). The third director of the archives,[19] Rudolf Bernet (2007), notes efforts to digitize the *Nachlass*, to facilitate and encourage translations of Husserl's work, and to expand the scope of projects and research supported by the Archives as among the institution's more recent goals (xiii).

Van Breda recognized the significance of Husserl's work and accepted responsibility for preserving his unpublished manuscripts through the tumultuous years of World War II. Showing the merits of this effort, Husserl's writings have carried forth influence over the past eighty years, informing far-reaching philosophical traditions and applied contexts that span language,

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Springer in 2004 (Vongehr 2007, 112). *Husserliana* publications have continued since 1950 with the most recent volumes released in 2020. Vongehr (2007) suggests that the massive collection of unpublished materials made the works published by Husserl during his life seem "modest" (100). For a complete list of the series' volumes, see https://hiw.kuleuven.be/hua/editionspublications.

16 *Husserliana*'s first volume featured *Cartesian Meditations* in German, which emerged from Husserl's 1929 lectures in France and was particularly significant in the tradition of French phenomenology (Vongehr 2007, 112–113).

17 Sister archives include the Husserl Archives in Freiburg, the Husserl Archives in Cologne, the Centre d'Archives Husserl at the Sorbonne in Paris, the New School for Social Research in New York City, the Centre d'Etudes Phénoménologiques à l'Université Catholique de Louvain, and the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. For more information on the sister archives, see Husserl Archives Leuven (n.d.).

18 Vongehr (2007) describes the relationship between the International Phenomenological Society, founded by Marvin Farber in 1939, and the Husserl Archives; van Breda and Farber remained in regular correspondence and supported joint efforts but also encountered competition, such as Farber's proposal for the Nachlass to be transported from Leuven to the United States. Van Breda turned to Malvine Husserl for intervention. She suggested that the transfer was "'impossible,' especially considering 'the countless trials and tribulations that Van Breda went through in rescuing them from all the bombing, and considering the moral obligations towards the University of Leuven, which used its own money and spared no effort to preserve the manuscripts'" (107–109). Baring (2019) also addresses "friction" between the Husserl Archives and the International Phenomenological Society (298).

19 Following van Breda's death in 1974, Samuel IJsseling became director of the Archives from 1974 until 1997. Rudolf Bernet served as the third director from 1997 until 2007, followed by Ullrich Melle from 2007 until 2017. The director since 2017 is Julia Jansen (Husserl Archives Leuven, n.d.).

semiotics, culture, religion, music, ethics, technology, and more. Hosting some of the most prolific researchers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the Archives preserves more than the documents van Breda smuggled from Freiburg in 1938; the Archives carries forth traces of Husserl's scholarship that offer far-reaching implications. The next section explores these implications through commemorative tributes to van Breda that announce insights relevant to Catholic religious identity and interhuman encounters.

Commemorative Tributes: Religious Influences and Interhuman Implications

Numerous accounts have commemorated van Breda's work in securing an institutional home for Husserl's unpublished works (Arnett 2017; Baring 2019; Horsten 2018; Levinas [1984] 1989). For instance, Flemish author Toon Horsten[20] (2018) published an acclaimed account of van Breda's contributions. A reviewer in a Dutch daily newspaper (*De Volkskrant*) described Horsten's nonfiction historical account as "a story comparable to a novel by Umberto Eco or Dan Brown except for the fact that it really happened" (Peeters, n.d.). Likewise, French philosopher Bruce Bégout's 2018 novel offers a "literary reflection on Pater van Breda's 'masterpiece'" (Husserl Archives Leuven, n.d.). Van Breda's contributions have garnered significant attention from scholarly, philosophical, religious, and popular audiences.

This section contains two subsections that summarize commemorative tributes to van Breda. The first turns to Edward Baring[21] (2019), who emphasizes van Breda's legacy within Catholic contributions to the development and preservation of phenomenology. The second turns to Levinas ([1975] 1996), who pays homage to van Breda in *Proper Names*. The former considers insights relevant to van Breda's Catholic faith commitment, while the latter addresses his enactment of dialogic ethics with interhuman implications.

Baring: Van Breda's Catholic Influence

Baring (2019) traces the role of Catholic thinkers within the historical development of phenomenology and continental philosophy. He argues that Catholic influences

20 Toon Horsten is a Flemish publicist and writer who discovered the story of van Breda and the founding of the Husserl Archives when engaged in family genealogical research. The story inspired Horsten to write *De pater en de filosoof. De redding van het Husserl-archief* (in English: *The Father and the Philosopher: Saving the Husserl Archives*). Although this work has not been translated into English, it is available in Dutch, German, Spanish, and Japanese. It received international acclaim and a number of prestigious literary recognitions and reached top ten lists for nonfiction works in Germany (Flanders Literature 2021).

21 Edward Baring is a historian at Princeton University, specializing in twentieth-century European philosophy and intellectual history. He studied mathematics and history at the University of Cambridge and Harvard University. He is the author of two books: *The Young Derrida and French Philosophy, 1945–1968* (2011) and *Converts to the Real: Catholicism and the Making of the Continental Philosophy* (2019).

shaped common themes within phenomenological inquiry that exist beyond geographically situated traditions (i.e., German or French phenomenology). In fact, Baring argues that Catholicism was "the single most important explanation for the international success of phenomenology in the twentieth century" (5). He suggests that the structure of the Church provided networks that aided the spread of phenomenological inquiry across countries, continents, and institutions. This subsection reviews and situates van Breda's legacy within Baring's argument.

Baring (2019) notes that phenomenology inspired a number of conversions to and from Catholicism[22] and claimed the interests of two saints—Karol Wojtyła (Saint John Paul II) and Edith Stein.[23] Furthermore, he traces Catholic scholars and teachers as "the most proximate *common* ancestor of philosophers in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and elsewhere" (344). He explains that while these Catholic influences often lacked "lasting fame," they maintained influence over some of the most significant philosophers of the post–World War II era, including Merleau-Ponty, Ricœur, Levinas, and Eco (344). For Baring, these examples are significant as they signal important context about the intended audiences of their texts as well as the institutions that the authors participated within (16).

Baring (2019) identifies trends within Catholic philosophical circles during the first half of the twentieth century with particular attention toward their responses to modernity, Thomism, and neo-scholasticism. Baring explains, "Neo-scholastics sought a philosophical conversion of modernity, a movement from modern to medieval metaphysics—idealism to realism—which, they hoped, would be a precursor to a religious conversion back to Catholicism" (14). Baring places this effort as the goal of Noël's project as well as van Breda's research. Catholic neo-scholastics, like van Breda, hoped to find an "ally" in Husserl that was unactualized in the content of the *Nachlass* (280). In fact, for van Breda, the Archives' Catholic connection became "more of a hindrance than a help" (280).[24] The Archives' connection to the Catholic University of Leuven led many to believe that the institution was a "Catholic enterprise" (288–89). Baring explains that van Breda "quickly became convinced that its reputation as a Catholic institution was an obstacle to its future success, undermining the impression that it was governed by the scholarly principles of disinterested research" (296). Consequently, van Breda routinely distanced the Archives' relationship to the Catholic University of Leuven and the ISP. This impulse for distance guided van Breda's actions as director of the Archives.[25]

22 Notably, Martin Heidegger and Max Scheler referenced phenomenological influences guiding their decisions to convert to and from Catholicism (Baring 2019, 18).

23 Wojtyła, who later became Pope John Paul II, wrote his graduate thesis on phenomenological ethics, and Stein, a student of and research assistant for Husserl, considered phenomenology within Thomist philosophy.

24 Importantly, Malvine Husserl appreciated the Archives' Catholic connection, referencing it in her conversion to Catholicism in March 1942, which was performed by van Breda (Baring 2019, 289).

25 Baring (2019) notes that the first volume of Husserliana "distinguished his [Husserl's] work most clearly from scholasticism" and demonstrated the Archives' independence from the ISP (300).

Baring (2019) references non-Catholic relationships nourished by van Breda and his efforts to expand the international reach of the institution (298). Throughout the 1950s, van Breda coordinated a series of international colloquia that hosted some of the first meetings between prominent members of the German and French phenomenological traditions (299). He worked to secure the sister archives that directly expanded the reach of the collection and facilitated international collaborations between phenomenological research centers. The international presence of the Archives was perhaps most important in securing funding from UNESCO, which offered longer financial security than the Francqui Foundation could provide. As part of the application, he provided forty letters from scholars representing three continents and twelve countries (304). Van Breda simultaneously was motivated by his dedication to Catholicism and downplayed its connection to the Archives.

In doing so, Baring (2019) contends that van Breda shaped phenomenology in a post–World War II era as an "heir" to Catholic philosophy (20). As an exemplar, Baring references Ricœur and Merleau-Ponty, who "were able to exploit the tensions between different Catholic readings of Husserl, Heidegger, and Scheler in the 1930s to craft their own highly influential interpretations of phenomenology—one religious but Protestant, the other avowedly atheistic—a decade later" (20). Baring explains that van Breda never gave up his search for neo-scholastic connections to Husserl's work in his own research but recognized the need to distance this motivation from the Archives. Baring's account of van Breda's neo-scholastic influences demonstrates the growth of phenomenology beyond the bounds of Catholic theology and philosophy. The work of Catholic philosophers and theologians carried forth Husserl's *Nachlass*; this act preserved and shaped secular and other non-Catholic traditions that inform phenomenology's post–World War II presence in continental philosophy.

Levinas: Interhuman Phenomenological Connections

Levinas's ([1984] 1989) project argues that "ethics is first philosophy" rather than theology, metaphysics, Heidegger's fundamental ontology, or any other philosophical tradition or approach. His project offers a phenomenologically-grounded understanding of ethics emergent from one's encounter with another. For Levinas, the face of the Other prompts an ethical call that announces one's responsibility to and for the Other. This responsibility emerges from a "pre-original saying" before and beyond time that reminds one of their obligation toward another (cf. Levinas [1974] 1991, 43–44, 48, 220, 229). Levinas connects this saying to the story of Cain and Abel, answering Cain's question, "Am I my brother's keeper?" (Gen. 4:9), with the "yes" of responsibility to and for an Other

Likewise, when working to secure UNESCO funding, van Breda deliberately downplayed any connections implying that the Archives was a Catholic institution. The application was filed under the Comité de Patronage rather than the ISP or any other name that linked the Archives to the Catholic University of Leuven; furthermore, van Breda failed to mention any financial support from the university when outlining the Archives' funding history (303).

(cf. Levinas [1961] 1969, 232–33; Levinas [1974] 1991, 10, 152, 176). Held hostage to the Other, Levinas's ethical philosophy resists totalization with the rupture of justice; in a nonreciprocal and impersonal exchange prompted by the face of the Other, Levinas describes ethics as interrupted by the unseen, unheard, and absent Other who is also influenced by the implications of my actions (Arnett 2017, 146–56).

Oona Eisenstadt (2005) describes this disruptive and interruptive tension as characteristic of Levinas's project, which lies at the intersections of totality and infinity, politics and ethics, same and Other, Greek and Hebrew, said and saying. Within these tensions, the former terms represent the perspective of a "larger order," while the latter terms serve as a "rupture" and challenge (145–46). Although these tensions may first appear as oppositions, Eisenstadt explains how Levinasian justice requires the rupture and mutual interplay of both terms—each necessary to understand and temper the other (146). She explains that the "rupture is always the rupture of a totality" (146)—even infinity, the Other, and the saying can be totalized without a rupture, a disruption, an interruption, and a dialogic partner that brings forth a new perspective.

This subsection focuses on Levinas's ([1975] 1996) tribute to van Breda in *Proper Names* as an application of his ethical philosophy by demonstrating the interplay of the saying, the said, and the trace. Levinas's task is to identify, in the said of proper names, a trace of the saying that that announces our responsibility to speak and act (4–5). In the trace that emerges through the said of proper names, one witnesses the movement from same to Other in the fulfillment of the saying. The trace of the saying serves as an "awakening" in both "relation" and "rupture" that signifies one held hostage by responsibility for another (6). Levinas dedicates chapter fourteen of this volume to the trace of saying in the work and life of van Breda, who died only two years prior to Levinas's commemorative essay.

Levinas ([1975] 1996) begins his tribute with a brief overview of van Breda's quest "to protect the persecuted" in an era when National Socialism aimed to obliterate Jewish people, culture, faith, history, and heritage (106–108). Levinas rejoices in van Breda's response to the saying command of responsibility for the "destiny" and "second life" of phenomenology (108). Levinas notes that often the unfinished works of even the most prolific thinkers "undergo the eclipse called purgatory" when their authors die (108). He suggests that van Breda had the opportunity to "open a window to what is most valid today . . . in a world athirst for rigorous knowledge and justice" (108). Levinas recognizes the saying trace in van Breda and the Husserl Archives as "a well-spring of life, a rallying-point for scholars" (108). In "the form of unfinished words," van Breda and the Husserl Archives have shed light and life on a trace of saying (109). Van Breda rescued "a thinking that was still trying itself out on paper" in the unpublished works as traces of the saying (109). The Husserl Archives opened a place for interhuman connection by demonstrating and upholding the call for responsibility to an Other.

Arnett (2017) summarizes Levinas's tribute, describing van Breda as a witness that "preserved the Said of manuscripts and conferences on phenomenology, which housed traces of Saying" (108). Arnett highlights implications relevant to communication and dialogic ethics, which he finds

"housed in the Said of life, the footprints we leave behind" (65). However, these footprints simultaneously act as the vessel for the trace of the saying, which has the power to bring communicative partners into dialogic engagement as we recognize our responsibility to and for the Other. By establishing the Archives, van Breda enacted Levinas's dialogic ethics as he preserved traces of the saying in the said of Husserl's *Nachlass*; in doing so, van Breda offers an institution that continues to house dialogic possibilities for future generations of scholars.

Van Breda's efforts to found the Archives demonstrate interhuman interaction consistent with Levinas's perspective of dialogic ethics. In preserving the Husserl Archives, van Breda took responsibility for the trace of saying in Husserl's work, expanding phenomenology's reach and influence in a post–World War II philosophy. As Baring acknowledged, phenomenology spread from Catholic roots that have invited opportunities for interfaith applications as both religious and secular thought shapes contemporary phenomenological inquiry. Moreover, van Breda's work safeguarding the Husserl Archives demonstrates interhuman connections with dialogic potential. Consistent with Levinas's view of dialogic ethics, these interhuman connections rely less on temporalized interpersonal exchange and more on the interplay of the saying, the said, and the trace. Arnett (2017) and Lipari (2004) point toward the close connection between Levinas's dialogic ethics and his articulation of the saying, the said, and the trace. The next section explores this connection as articulated in Levinas's ([1974] 1991) *Otherwise than Being*.

Levinas's Dialogic Ethics: The Saying, the Said, and the Trace

Levinas studied phenomenology at Freiburg University under Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger from 1928 until 1929.[26] Levinas ([1994] 2004) noted that he would arrive seven hours early to lecture halls to ensure his seat in the audience (57, 64). During this time, Husserl, who had recently retired but continued to teach, often referred to his unpublished works in lectures, which Levinas ([1982] 1985) noted may have been lost if not for the efforts of van Breda (33). Levinas's appreciation of phenomenology and the Husserl Archives inspired his friendship with van Breda. This section moves toward considerations of dialogic ethics through the dynamic interplay between Levinas's notions of the saying, the said, and the trace.

Although Levinas ([1961] 1969) introduces a brief discussion of the saying, the said, and the trace in his first magnum opus, *Totality and Infinity* (269), these themes become central to his subsequent work, *Otherwise than Being*. For Levinas ([1974] 1991), ethics begins with a pre-originary saying that calls one forth in

26 In an interview with Philippe Nemo, Levinas ([1982] 1985) noted that in 1928, Husserl addressed phenomenological psychology, and during the 1928–29 term, he addressed the constitution of intersubjectivity (33). In 1930, a year after concluding his studies at Freiburg, Levinas published his thesis, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*; this work was influential in directing French phenomenology.

responsibility. He associates the saying with signification, which resists the sign game of rhetoric and emerges in the one-being-for-the-other (5). Levinas explains that, unlike being, saying is not a game. While the said relies upon verbal signs, linguistic systems, and language conventions, the saying exists prior to and outside of these constructs, yet, nonetheless, is dependent upon them.

For Levinas ([1974] 1991), the saying exists in "subordination" to the said (6); the saying relies upon the vocabulary of the already said to appear. In his search for *otherwise than being*, Levinas explains that the saying is "betrayed" and "dominate[d]" by the said at the moment it is "conveyed" (7).[27] The pre-original saying is primordial, anarchical, and antecedent, always prior to the present moment of a said. However, this temporalization of the saying escapes the ontological perspective of being conceived as essence. For Levinas, the saying contains "the enigma whose secret it keeps" in making possible the transcendence of saying (10). At the same time, the saying relies upon temporalization in the said to allow the call of responsibility to be heard. The mediating and transcending force between the saying and the said is the trace. Within the said, the trace of the saying announces my responsibility for the Other "against my will" and "substitute[es] me for the other as a hostage" so the subject acts "despite-me, for-another" (11). The trace's transcendent nature carries the saying power of responsibility without materializing as a phenomenon. In its fleeting and ephemeral presence, the trace appears in the revelatory nature of the saying without permission, invitation, or demand (cf. Arnett 2017, 12, 33–34, 88).

For Levinas ([1974] 1991), substitution becomes an expression of self, prior to any said. The substitution prompted by the pre-originary ethical call to responsibility "is not the work of negation and no longer belongs to the order of being" (15). This substitution occurs without consent as one becomes a hostage to the Other, held in ethical responsibility. Levinas aims to introduce the subject in saying; he relies upon the saying to articulate an understanding of subjectivity beyond being and attentive to the pre-originary call to responsibility (19, 26). Through substitution, one acts purposefully attentive to the saying call of responsibility, disregarding a self-centered logic for an other-centered orientation.

Levinas ([1974] 1991) acknowledges language's ability to move beyond meaning toward naming, reifying, identifying, and temporalizing. As the said names, it prompts the emergence of a *phenomenon* that brings forth the *already said* as a vocabulary of "historically constituted" words (37). The saying is absorbed by and simultaneously extends beyond the said. While the saying transcends temporality, the structure of the said materializes through a system of nouns, a system of signs, and a system of verbs. Despite its reliance, Levinas is careful not to "give priority" to the said over the saying, reiterating that the said carries forth a trace that "awakens" a saying (43). As the saying announces one's responsibility,

27 Here, Levinas ([1974] 1991) points toward a "methodological problem" (7). The saying must remain unsaid in order to maintain the otherwise than being housed in the saying; however, to mandate the simultaneous presence of the saying and the unsaid "reduce[s] being's other to being and not being" (7).

it both affirms and retracts the said as it resists being, disrupts essence, and emphasizes disinterestedness. The trace of the saying in the said pragmatically necessitates that one act with disinterestedness as one encounters a particular Other. Levinas describes this encounter as one's "exposure to" another (48). This perspective frames his view of communication as not the circulation or transmission of information but "the risky uncovering of oneself" with "sincerity" and "vulnerability" as one approaches the Other (48). The trace reveals the ambiguity of the face that exposes one to another via the saying.

For Levinas ([1974] 1991), the face of the Other carries forth a trace of the saying call to responsibility within an "empty space of what could not be collected" (91). This trace initiates the call to responsibility that holds one hostage by the Other; Levinas explains that the face "is not the absence of a yet non-revealed, but the anarchy of what has never been present, of an infinite which commands in the face of the other, and which, like an excluded middle, could not be aimed at" (98). The face positions the saying embodied in flesh and located in time and space without denying its immemorial nature. The face preserves the trace that announces the responsibility of the *for* in the substitution of one-for-the-other (100). This *for* emerges in proximity that signifies and commands before showing and betraying itself in the said. The responsibility of the *for* emerges antecedent to dialogue and prior to linguistic exchange.

Levinas ([1974] 1991) warns against efforts to reify the trace, which would encourage one to mistake "the monstration of the signified in the signifier" as a trace and move in the direction of politics rather than ethics (121). Levinas emphasizes the trace as a "*Saying* of a *Said*" but rejects the assumption that the saying can be minimized to nothing more than the said (141). For Levinas, any saying reduced to the said mimics a problematic form of rhetoric that seeks to totalize the Other through eloquence and persuasion. Instead, the everyday language of the said speaks from the *already said* vocabulary of the pre-originary saying that moves one to a recognition of responsibility.

Levinas ([1974] 1991) contends that sincerity keeps the saying open "without excuses, evasions or alibis, delivering itself without saying anything said" (143). The openness of the sincerity of saying occurs through revelatory traces housed in a temporalized said. From his perspective, the saying "is without dialogue" (145); it is our responsibility to the Other rooted in a pre-originary saying prior to and beyond time. The saying resides in "a past that was never present" (161). The ability to house a trace of saying in the said allows dialogic ethics to occur across temporal communities that attend to the no longer living, the contemporaneous, and the not yet born. For example, books and other written and printed materials carry forth a trace of the saying. He describes them as "interrupted discourse" that "belong to a world they do not include" as they call forth interpretation and response (171). This possibility opens up the connections between Levinas's dialogic ethics and his notions of the saying, the said, and the trace.

Levinas announces the intertwined relationship between the dialogic engagement of the saying, the said, and the trace that actualizes the practical enactment of ethical action despite its ambiguity. Levinas's ethical philosophy hinges on interhuman encounters that recognize a trace of the saying in a face that

holds one in responsibility to and for the Other. The story of the Husserl Archives exemplifies the ongoing recognition of the ethical call in the pre-originary saying. This story recounts the preservation of the said in the unpublished works of the founder of phenomenology; these works continue to preserve a trace of the saying that fuels ongoing research enacting Levinas's ethical encounter. The final section considers implications for dialogic ethics emergent from van Breda's founding of the Husserl Archives.

Implications for Dialogic Ethics

This essay reviewed the story of van Breda, who established the Husserl Archives at the Catholic University at Leuven. Husserl's Jewish heritage led to persecution by the Nazi Party and put his unpublished works and philosophical legacy at risk after his death. Van Breda recognized the significant traces housed within these documents and thus worked alongside Husserl's widow, son, and research assistants to ensure their safety during the war. Likewise, he spent the remainder of his life working to secure wide access to these materials for researchers interested in Husserl's phenomenological project. Van Breda established a leading research center that continues to host some of the most influential phenomenologists and philosophers. Due to van Breda's efforts, phenomenological inquiry continues as a dominant trend in contemporary philosophical traditions. Inherent within this story lie implications for religious identity, interhuman possibilities, and dialogic ethics.

Although motivated by his own faith commitment, van Breda worked to build a research center open to interfaith and secular interests. The establishment of the Husserl Archives documents Catholic influences in expanding recognition of phenomenological inquiry as well as providing opportunities for the growth of phenomenology beyond the bounds of Catholicism. Van Breda connected the Archives to global institutions, expanding access to Husserl's *Nachlass.* This effort aided van Breda's commitment to interhuman exchange in the preservation of the Husserl Archives as he built a space for phenomenological inquiry attentive toward his responsibility to Husserl and to a community of scholars interested in his work.

Van Breda's attentiveness to this responsibility enacts the dialogic ethics conceptualized by Levinas's interactive engagement of the saying, the said, and the trace. Husserl's *Nachlass* constituted the said that carried forth a trace of the saying. Prompted by this trace, van Breda accepted responsibility for these documents despite the inevitability of difficulty and the potential for personal harm. His efforts carry forth a trace of the saying still housed within the said of the Archives' collection. As Levinas explained, the saying relies upon the said. Without van Breda's efforts, the said of Husserl's *Nachlass* may have been forever lost along with the traces of Husserl's phenomenology preserved within these documents. For Levinas, dialogic ethics moves from the abstract to the practical as one pragmatically responds to the face of an impersonal Other. Van Breda enacted the interhuman possibilities of Levinas's dialogic ethics, which remain vibrant as

the Archives' collection continues to be available for ongoing research and inquiry. Due to van Breda and those who collaborated with him in founding the Husserl Archives, the trace of the saying held by the collection lingers on for response from current and future generations of scholars.

While this account demonstrates dialogic ethics with interfaith and interhuman implications, it also exemplifies the potential for dialogic ethics within sites of public commemoration. Public memory has always been a context for controversy and contention as it carries forth implications relevant to politics and power (Blair, Dickinson, and Ott 2010). Just as the Nazi regime may have destroyed Husserl's *Nachlass* due to his Jewish heritage, contemporary public memory accounts exercise expressions of power that work to limit the presence of historically marginalized communities from dominant memory narratives. Levinas ([1975] 1996) concludes *Proper Names* with a chapter titled "Nameless"; this conclusion honors the victims of the Holocaust whose names we do not know. Levinas's dialogic ethics pertains to sites of public commemoration as we attend to our responsibility to consider justice obligations that move us beyond dominant memory narratives that form a said void of the saying. The dialogic exchange of the saying, the said, and the trace interact within the disruptive nature of memory and forgetting. Just as his project understands ethics disrupted by justice, van Breda's account points toward what could have been lost in an intentional destruction of the said and what has been gained in the preservation of the saying trace of the Husserl Archives.

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Understanding Communication

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Abstract: Without adding one more theory of communication, this article explores how we understand communication. There is an abundance of theories defining practices and processes in their own way. Through a discussion of miscommunication, the archaic, and dialogue and monologue, this article emphasizes the hermeneutic circle in meaning making as interpretation, which does not provide access to the way things are. The language we use is constructed, not real. The task of philosophy involves maintaining dialogue in which all claims can be tested and contested. This article outlines requirements of dialogue involving the co-presence of communicators engaged in a common venture capable of leading to transcendence.

Keywords: inter-subjective, monologue, polylogue, meaning, reflection

Introduction

There is no denial that we are in the age of communication appearing in most diverse media and technical innovations. And there is no denial that there are numerous theories of communication. Given this context, it would be redundant to add one more theory or metatheory to the crowded field of contenders. The questions in this discussion are simpler and more concrete and the answers more resilient to any efforts to cover them over with traditional or even advanced theories of communication—even if the latter would employ the latest data from global surveys. It is simpler insofar as it seeks to disclose who are the "communicators" or who is the "last interpreter." This is not to say that the presumed simplicity need not be explicated, specifically by arguments which challenge the many and silent assumptions of numerous theories. Testing of assumptions has one requirement: each theory posits principles which are proposed as explanations of all phenomena. This means that it cannot introduce phenomena through "the back door" which such principles would have to deny. But if such phenomena are introduced, then there must be "more" than a given explanation can account for. In this sense, the "more" must also be accepted as a given in order to obtain a fuller understanding of our world and who we are as communicators, specifically in the current context of "many truths," or a "post-

truth" world, a world of multi-discursivity, and even multi-culturalism. This is the context of all "post" claims, including post-modernism. Although this situation might appear laudable, it has one fundamental flaw: rejection of *human essence*. The rejection appears in various forms: death of the subject, death of author, death of truth, God, and all premised on the claim that who we are depends on a specific discourse, or a specific cultural framework. Thus, "subject" is a "product" of modern Western discourses delimiting what is "objective" and what is "subjective." If everything can be explained by scientific discourses, physically, then subject disappears. He is a biological, chemical, physiological creature, a bundle of vital desires, requiring no meddling subject hindering scientific objectivity. Meanwhile, each culture also defines who we are differently, leading to the conclusion that what is called *essence* is one Western discourse among many others, and any effort to demand that it ought to be recognized as universal is identical with post-colonial imposition of one Eurocentric story on the rest of the world. All such stories are "constructs" which do not represent anything, although they define everything in their own ways. Even philosophy is one more constructed story, leading to the conclusion that philosophy should become creative and construct more interesting stories, including one more construct: logical construction of reality—but none of such constructs have a subject who does the constructing, since even he is just another construct as would be human essence. As will be seen shortly, no one can accuse a person of being a "racist," since "race" is one more construct, just as a Jew is another discursive product—and no Nazi need apologize.

There is another effort to abolish the presence of human essence and the modern subject; it is premised on ethnology, a special place in the human sciences, not for reasons of anthropological research but as a methodological ploy. Its task is not to decipher the historically established cultural experiences, but to extricate the unconscious compositions and norms which enable the cognitive experience of cultural beings. For example, for Foucault, ethnology is distinguished from the older humanities, and from the current social sciences, insofar as it investigates the human not as something given, but as something that is produced by the cognitive and normative codifications of a culture. Ethnography is regarded as more fundamental, since it brings to awareness the cultural conditions of science, seen as the "cultural unconscious." The latter must not be confused with any of the psycho-analytic schools, simply because such schools, as scientific, presuppose the codes of the cultural unconscious. Indeed, even psychiatry as a science depends on cultural codes.

The difficulty of such an undertaking is the problem of methodology. Ethnography as a method is a structural component of Western modernity to which any researcher belongs, and yet a method that emerged in the analyses of alien, non-Western cultures. If ethnography is a science, does it not code foreign cultural phenomena in terms of modernity? It seems that a resolution to these paradoxes must be found at another level, perhaps the social. To accomplish a methodological feat, the task is to take an "external" position to all culturally produced phenomena in order to note the process of their emergence. But, ethnology as a method must also be investigated with respect to its emergence in another constellation, in modern society. What one attempts to accomplish is to treat his cultural phenomena that

define him equally from an external vantage point from which ethnology treats all foreign cultures. Yet a full cognizance must be given to the fact that ethnology as a method applied to his own and other cultures is concurrently a social phenomenon. The presumed theoretical advantage of this move is a promise to treat one's own culture as any other culture. Obviously, one must demonstrate the possibility of taking such an external view, specifically in light of the claim that one's own comprehension and categorical framework is intimately connected with one's own culture which one attempts to investigate. The problem can be avoided only when one can show that sociology in a given society can repeat in principle the same scientific achievement which must be generated by ethnography in its confrontation with alien society. Such a premise leads to those social theories which contend that within one society there can be social groups with such disparate conceptions of reality and daily affairs, that they would face one another as alien cultures. Given this theoretical postulate, it is assumed that a social research encounters the "second" culture as equally foreign, as ethnography would encounter some archaic culture. The pitting of cultures as different from each other is not yet sufficient to "alienate" oneself from one's own modes of thought in which one finds oneself.

The impetus to take up an ethnology of his own culture stems, for example, for Foucault, from literary texts of Blanchot and the convergence of French avantgarde literature which was seen by Foucault as "external thinking." Such thinking maintains itself apart from any subjectivity and, by revealing its limits, shows a dispersion and finally an absence of subjectivity. The avantgarde of that time is bent on showing the vanishing of the subject. The world is depicted in an alien way where the human is submitted to the libidinal anatomy, the silent rules of a language, or a nameless sequence of daily events. Once events become detached from the subject, the latter appears to dissolve under the weight of alien forces in whose context the subject follows predetermined vectors. Such literature constitutes aesthetic alienation wherein the events are detached from the horizon of human meaning and are made into a meaningless succession of objectivities. Every cross section of social activity appears to resist any interpretation.

This literature seems to reveal a possibility of a speech which excludes the subject. Here the events no longer allow a privileged position to the individual subject, a center of experience. No longer surveyable, the active cultural events make of the subject a contingency of processes which he cannot master. This would be the case with a given language. The concept that the human subject is subordinated to discursive rules which surpass human capacities is a key permitting a distanced view toward the Western cultural system. Distance from the subject shown by literature offers a theoretical possibility for assuming a viewpoint outside culture. This might be plausible for persons who are not familiar with French society and its cultures. Any intellectual, artist, writer, "philosopher" must be "alienated" in order to have any status. Alienation belongs intimately to French society. Given this understanding, the use of alienated writers as a ploy to have an external view is precisely what guarantees one's inherence in this society. This is one of the theoretical difficulties: in order to estrange oneself from a culture so that the latter appears as any alien culture, one must propose methodical access to all cultures which also would be in a position to purify one's own theory from the culturally given modes

of thought and to yield a character of neutrality. One could justify such a claim by showing that his method has the ability to assume such a neutrality, i.e., an ability to exclude his own cultural epistemic and discursive categorizations, frameworks, and codifications.

Apparently, the authors of these explanations are either subject to their theories—principle of self-inclusion—or assume a position of a Self, which is a transcendental subject capable of surveying the cultural unconscious, its codes, and telling the rest of us what they are. In brief, they assume a position of "non-participating observer," capable of disclosing the truth. Such a distance must be founded on the classical notion of an essential self: a rational person, free from prejudices, searching for unmediated access to anything, any subject matter, even one's own culture, and even oneself. Such a self constitutes a reflexive view of the phenomena of all cultures. Our engagement so far comprises this type of reflection. Moreover, the method of this reflexive view is the domain of human studies, leading to the positing of the different types of cultures, theories, histories, languages for analyses without accepting a commitment to any. The analytic engagement with them is a traversal, a going through all of them in order to disclose their invariants, variations, and, if available, interconnections. This is what comprises the essence of rationality and freedom. Freedom is not to "do what I want," but precisely to reveal the very Being of the world. For philosophy freedom is being open toward the world. It is the ground of *theoria* as a "presentational thinking": to think is to think the presence of the very Being, given in its immediacy, untainted by any hint of utility. Wisdom is the effort to capture the world, for its own sake, in a "carelessness" that overlooks any interest in knowledge as a useful weapon, as power, a means to preserve oneself in face of a threatening tomorrow. In brief, it has nothing to do with modern representational mode of understanding. Wisdom for the unconcerned gaze is capable of knowing the richness of the teeming world and Being and its conjunction with beauty. The revealed beauty of the world and the acquired wisdom lend only joy and fulfillment. Free spontaneity is enhanced by well-worked-out rules which not only do not restrict creativity, but, to the contrary, lend creativity its variations. Thus, the engagement in dialogue is both spontaneous and respectful of sensible rationality and, above all, the essential limit of any given subject matter, entity, topic, whether it is a just society, the origin of the world, the nature of humans, or the presence of Being. Thus, true dialogue is "light" and "dancing," appearing quite effortless because it embodied a complete mastery of form and rules. Only a complete mastery lends thinking its ease. For example, true Socratic dialogue seems to be "playful" and contentious, challenging, daring, and all the while mastered by good form that was present in things. This means that philosophical reflection depends on the world as a medium and not a subject, dominated by all sorts of media for interpretation of the world.

When knowledge either looks only toward itself and becomes enamored with its own play of constructs, or restricts itself to social pragmatic purposes, both so well exemplified in modernity, it forgets its own source from which it stems: freedom to dare, to challenge, and a duty to act responsibly. Knowledge can be fruitful as long as it reminds itself of the source from which it has originated. To the extent that free knowledge is cognizant of its essential source, the striving for knowledge requires

little reminder of its responsibility to tell the truth and to accept responsibility for mistakes. Such a knowledge becomes a motive for preservation of freedom and its defense. In brief, knowledge has a precise relationship to freedom. When the seekers for knowledge elevate their free mode of being as an origin of their knowledge, then their knowledge is a *theoria* which discloses the essential forms of worldly beings. Without freedom there is no knowledge. It is to be recalled that when Socrates defended his right to philosophize, he was not making a choice between philosophy and Athens; he was claiming that to forbid philosophizing is equal to the destruction of Athens. The allegiance to the Athenian *polis* cannot be separated from free philosophizing in the public arena. Of course, for us, the latecomers of this classicism, the burden of such a thinking is almost too difficult to bear.

The question of responsibility of fallible humans is *the* philosophical question of freedom. In brief, it is impossible to practice philosophy, to engage in communication, and not to raise this question. As mentioned, Socrates stood his ground unto death with the demand that he and others have a duty to interrogate all claims to truth regardless of their origin. Intellectual honesty was for him a requirement to keep open the dialogical domain wherein the search for truth could be pursued. This means that the task of philosophy as such is identical with the maintenance of dialogue wherein all claims and propositions can be tested and contested. But responsibility is coextensive with freedom. A person who is determined by causes of any kind cannot be responsible. The latter also requires clear knowledge of the nature of the world of things within their limits in order to treat them responsibly.

Mis-Communication

Is there some common feature among such claims which, in fact, lead to all sorts of global confrontations, ethnic violence, racism, Nazism, communism, terrorism, and mis-communication? From scientists to all sorts of "culturalists" there appears an ambiguity: Are humans free or completely subjected to strict laws of causality? If the latter is granted, then even this discussion is determined by such laws and whatever we say is not our free expression. Meanwhile, the view of causality has indefinite variants, including the so-called post-modern "philosophy." For example, "all language is fascistic," or "we are determined by our cultural unconscious," or we are mere play-things of "discursive powers." Even the claims that, unbeknown to us, we are manipulated and controlled by all sorts of mass media, relieves us of talking about freedom and responsibility. If this is accepted, then we are living an innocent and infallible life—certainly causes do not make mistakes—and hence we are not responsible for our expressions, and resultantly there is no need for free *society and its laws which include responsibility*. But we are confronted by peculiar phenomena: if we and various others are subjected to discursive parameters, then there is no communication. After all, I have not been subjected to their discourses and hence cannot understand what they wish to say, just as they cannot comprehend my discourse. It is like speaking different languages without the possibility of translation.

The issue is similar facing all empirical explanations. If we are a biological system, reacting to stimuli from our environment, then no two systems can understand one another because it is, in principle, impossible for them to be in the same place at the same time; one system cannot transmit its "experience" since it reacts to different stimuli at a different place and time. In short, if someone wants to see what I see, then she will have to step into my position to get the same stimuli. But that is impossible, since for her to step into my location, I will have to move and hence she will be at a different point in time and miss what I have experienced. This is the dilemma of perspectivity and multi-perspectivity extended to discursive and cultural perspectivity: from Hindu perspective, from physical perspective, from aesthetic, ethical . . . perspective, suddenly suggesting, as if by miracle, that there is a presence which understands this multi-perspectivity without positing one more perspective, and yet engaged in dialogue with the proponents of multi-perspectivity about a theme which is limited "by essence" to multi-perspectivity. Such proponents, before recognizing that, as dialogical partners, they too are not positing their "perspective" and are cognizant of the issue of "multi-perspectivity," suggested above. Who are these communicators engaged in a dialogue, despite their theoretical stance which makes such dialogue impossible?

At the outset, it is necessary to explicate and—hopefully—to resolve a central issue of awareness, first, framed as culture, premised on the primacy of a historical tradition and its language, composing the context of a life world, or, second, as a human, as a subject. The latter can be called "transcendental subjectivity." This issue is most relevant for communication studies due to the prevalence of modern and post-modern conceptions of languages or discourses as grounds for all life worlds. While it may be that there is no unified view of "awareness" and no resolution concerning the basic linguistic theory, the requirement for communication studies is to demonstrate that language-based claims of cultures and awareness positions maintain certain principles without which they could not be understood. Any discussion of such positions is possible within essential limits; otherwise, communication "about" such positions would fail. Meanwhile, within the understanding that language is primary over awareness, there is an assumption that a historical tradition is inescapable. Hence, we shall have to address some of the basic issues facing "language" that dominate the thought of the twentieth century. There are numerous schools of language, from the field of linguistics, through language games, to semiotics and even to deconstruction, and various hermeneutics. Despite their differences, the common claim is that all meaning and sense, all understanding, inhere in language. In this sense, the awareness question seems to be surpassed, since there is no need of a subject who can claim of being a source of making sense of events. We find the sense of events in our linguistic tradition. This is to say, there is no longer any requirement for the last vestiges of essentialist metaphysics located within the sphere of "transcendental subjectivity."

Whether this is a solution or a mere postponement and a relocating of the question of sense will be seen in the development of the problematic of theories and methods. Counter to the claims that all sense inheres in a historical tradition

and language, there is the transcendental argument purporting to show that all awareness, even the linguistically laden positions, are premised on an essential moment of reflection whose presence cannot be denied without the denying thesis becoming nonsensical. If this holds, then it could be said that any thesis, any position is, in the final analysis, transcendental. This appears in a tacit introduction of awareness into every position, theory, or method. It can be claimed that such introduction fails to notice what can be called "attentional modification." If one states that it is possible to look at mathematics as at any other subject matter, one will also recognize that "looking at . . ." as a subject's intentionality does not look like the subject matter that is being intended—in this case, numbers. Yet how easily the sense of "looking" or awareness can be modified in cases when one states, "Let us look at things mathematically." This suggests that mathematics becomes a mode of perception that is very distinct from the things or subject matters that this mode intends. Here, the medium becomes the way that all events in the world are understood. Without such medium, sciences could not communicate. Other modes are just as available: we can look at things theoretically, practically, theologically, aesthetically and realize that such modes are not at all "subjective" in the sense of mental or psychological states. In this way, we can also say, "Let us look at language," whereby the looking or awareness of language is not part of language, or we can say, "Let us look at the world linguistically," and make a transcendental claim that all awareness is linguistic—forgetting the subject who makes this claim and thus assumes that there is no subject apart from the linguistic medium.

What would be the consequences for communication if media, of whatever kind, is the sole mode of awareness? The communication scientist, as cultural and historical, is also a factor in the domain of investigation. If he/she is a part of his/her own history, he/she cannot claim to obtain the phenomena of the world as they are without changing the very media of research. The theoretical explanation that assumes a historical or cultural position will itself transform the subject matter of such explanation. While being shaped by historical and cultural contexts, the explanations offered will also change the contexts. In turn, if a theory is part of a culture and a history and is shaped by them, then no theory is sufficiently broad to encompass and offer a position as a final interpretation. It is only one aspect of a historical tradition, a culture, or a language. If positivism were to offer two contesting meta-languages, each claiming to account for all the usages of a given language, then the debate between them would involve an awareness of both meta-languages, without the need to introduce another such language. Indeed, this can also be said of historical-philosophical hermeneutics that posits a historical tradition as the unsurpassable ground of all understanding of things and being itself; it too is one historically contingent position that may belong to a specific historical period of a specific tradition and hence cannot offer a universal claim. Another context, of the same tradition, might not have a historicizing language and hence no such understanding, not to speak of entirely different traditions.

Perhaps the most pronounced way of this manner of theorizing, i.e., proposing a universal explanation that intends to overcome the problems of

inherence in a historical tradition or linguistic culture, was offered by positivism and is still offered by mainstream analytic mode of theorizing. First, there is an a priori position that posits a reality in itself that is untainted by historical traditions and can be accessed by "objective" method. This reality is physical (composed of parts) and inaccessible to qualitative perception. But this means that all experiences in and of the world have to be discarded or reduced to the posited reality. Yet these positions do not escape the issue of the communicating subject to the extent that the method, formulated as mathematical logic, does not in any way imply a direct access to the posited physical reality. The method must be applied from a valuative position which, for these trends, is pragmatic. What works for human benefit, at the price that humans must also be reduced to the same reality. In brief, such reality does not offer itself in its purity but in terms of what we can make of it, and thus to transform it through our pragmatic intervention. The mathematical method which, as mentioned above, has become mediated mode of awareness: Let us look at things mathematically, and mathematics became reduced to "instrumental rationality."

All that we have attained so far is that a given communicative theory or a selected method cannot be by themselves the last moment of interpretation, since they are either one aspect of a given historical tradition, or are interpreted by some valuative point of interest which might be seen as the last point of interpretation. Moreover, the very objectivity that is being sought is not attainable since every effort to reach it results in changing the "object" (as another medium). Indeed, the very process of application of mathematically constructed theory to "reality" is radically selective of what will count as objective among the various options of reality and thus posits an a priori decision of what will be the data of a given theory. This is to say, all other data will not be tolerated as objective and dismissed as theoretically redundant, perhaps subjective. But such a position will not include a justification for the principle of selectivity of the required reality or its own position. If an explanation is to be universal, then it must be explained by the selected reality and the prescriptive methodology. If not, then neither the theory nor a methodology, posing as a theory in its formal and quantitative language, can be all-encompassing and provide the domain of the final communicator.

From what has been said so far, it can be concluded that the communicative subject, or the last interpreter, who constructs theories, correlates them to selected phenomena, and evaluates such correlation, cannot be, in principle, investigated by any of the empirical sciences. If this were the case, then the very subject of selectivity, correlation and interpretation, would be selected as an object of another subject of selectivity and interpretation, leading to an infinite regress. In brief, the communicating subject, as the selecting and correlating awareness, cannot be a subject matter of any specific objective or subjective science and theory, and resultantly it is inaccessible to theories and methodologies of any science. Of course, the communicating subject might show up in many other forms which are tacitly present but are submerged in the constant assumption of the priority of media—the priority such as "let us look at things mathematically."

To state this issue in terms of a general hermeneutical principle, any theory, any method, any meaning of anything, including the subject, emerges as an aspect

of its historical tradition and in turn points back to it, thus forming a hermeneutical circle. Any theory that offers an explanation of everything converges into the historical horizon of that tradition; the latter is vaster than the explanatory theory. But such a circle also intimates—one more time—that all awareness is a result of a language, culture, customs, and even prejudgments of a historical tradition within whose horizons the human dwells. All is interpretation, and even the most admired strict sciences do not offer an access to the way things are. After all, if one looks at scientific language, one notes that its logic and structure is not derived from experienced phenomena. In brief, it is different from such phenomena and thus when applied, it becomes an interpretation. Of course, we must make a note here: If one claims that a given language is distinct from the experienced phenomena, then one must also admit that she has an awareness of things that is not bound by language; otherwise, the distinction between language and things could not be made, and "things" would belong to one more linguistic construct. Let us leave this issue aside for a moment and point out that the hermeneutical circle, interpreted as language or tradition, claiming to be the last interpreter, cannot be cognizant of itself. If language is the medium in which all events, theories, methods are understood, in which selectivity and designation of what is real, unreal, objective, and subjective appears, then language cannot be a subject matter of any philosophy or theory, since the latter would be one aspect within the vast linguistic tradition. If a tradition and its horizons comprise the dimension in which we dwell, then such a tradition could not be grasped by any theory about a tradition, since such a theory again would be a minor aspect of it. It could be said that even the very notion of a hermeneutical circle and convergence of horizons of a tradition and of an interpreter would have to be one claim within a given tradition. All these claims, by virtue of their self-destruction, become essentially contingent. And yet, left to their own devices, they seem to be incontestable.

The constant appearance of the communicating subject who is irreducible to any modern materialist and even cultural explanations is the background condition for the proclamation of Universal Human Rights, including the right to free speech, and the numerous celebrations, organizations, and debates promoting and defending such rights. Still we face the current psycho-babble in "philosophical" rhetoric about human reality as a bundle of desires, and even the "neo-neo" army of neo-Freudians, or neo-Marxists, marching against human rights as a "subjective" construct of white dead men. Having discarded human subject and more fundamentally, human essence, they have to contend with the rights of "others," of other cultures to have their ways of life without Western colonial impositions of rules and customs. West can have its culture and the others theirs. Since "human rights," including free speech and even tolerance, is a construct of the West, then the others need not accept such a construct. Even the designation of "philosophy" of other civilizations must be avoided; Western tradition is in principle philosophical, and it would be inappropriate to burden other traditions with such designation. To call Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, shamanic pronouncements philosophical would be an imposition of external and thus unfitting terms—one could even say it would be an insult and just another form of colonialism. The dilemma is obvious: We, just

as the others, are subject to our cultural "unconscious" or "unconscious drives," "economic" causes, and yet we also want rights, including the rights of the others to be subject to their cultural unconscious, and at the same time we negate the communicating, dialogical subject. Not only for ourselves, but for the others. After all, the others do not speak; it is their culture and their discourses that speak and thus negate the other as being essentially a human.

The More—The *Archaic*

The constant appearance of a communicator who does not seem to belong to any explanation suggests that there is a "presence" which is more to the extent that it "escapes" the great varieties of scientific, cultural, discursive parameters, and yet communicates about science, culture, being dominated by discourses, and does so in dialogue. How are we to understand this presence without making it into an object or even a modern, solipsistic subject? Is it possible to discover something essential which cannot be denied? Aristotle contended that all thinking requires principles—*archai*—by whose presence an entire region is delimited for explication. The delimitation allows everything in a region to be seen in its essential configuration. The most astounding result in Aristotle's exhausting efforts to justify such principles revealed that they are not only unjustifiable, but that any means of justification are based on these principles. The awareness of *archai* is very different from knowledge that requires justification. They are not groundless, since they are not arbitrary; all justifications necessarily rest on them. They have a necessity that is distinct from the necessity of any other justification. They must be, then, self-warranted to such an extent that every truth claim is based on them. It seems that at the very beginning of philosophical quest, a dimension is disclosed which is in excess of any specific thing—indeed it does not even look like anything. Yet it is a primal condition of communication—even if it is unnoticed.

To attain the *arche* of the world and ourselves, we must point out that the appearance *of arche* is a primal reflection, provided by visuality and vision. Without any distance, visuality reflects vision as a dimension pervading, but not identical with visuality. Vision is not only visuality, but also "seeing as" something that reflects the many events, the visual variants, which would otherwise be "flat," without depth, simply empirical, without suggesting anything more. The worldly events, even those which seem to be stable, change. They have no necessity. Yet change evokes permanence without which change would not be perceived. The mentioned disclosure of *arche* not as some entity, but the very condition for recognizing not only things, but "things as . . ." encompassing a great variety of things, has a philosophical background. The latter shows up in the dialogues of Plato. Going through the fire of debates in Plato's writings, one discovers interesting and necessary domains for the understanding of communication in terms of the visual phenomena and their "intentionalities." One should immediately notice that the term "intentionality" has been shifted from human positional awareness to other features of awareness. Plato traces various levels of

transcendental awareness comprising the ways that experienced phenomena become "intentional."

In the Allegory of the Cave—present in Plato's work *The Republic*—there is a depiction of an empirical world, experienced by normal people. This world is given as "figures" on a wall—nothing more. Such figures do not imply anything more; they are flat, and no matter how the observers behave, they will see flat figures without depth. Even if the figures are turned, one will simply see another flat surface. Elizabeth Stroeker, in her work *Investigations in the Philosophy of Space*, has argued that empirical awareness of anything, such as a tree, is equivalent to Plato's flat figures on the wall. All one has empirically is a flat surface and, by going around to see the "other" side, one will still have another flat surface. Meanwhile, the flat figures on the wall are the only reality for the observing entities. Yet there appears an awareness which discovers something "more," and turns the flat, empirical figures into "shadows." To say "shadows" is also to say shadows of . . . ; to have an awareness of . . . requires a reflective moment which allows them to be shadows. It is interesting that at this level of awareness, the images contain both reflection of . . . and intentionality—pointing to . . . or meaning something or other. The reflecting shadows "intend" some sort of original. In this setting, Plato sees through the shadows and correlates them to the original and discloses the original as a different level of reality which is in excess of the shadows. The more, as depicted by Plato, are statues carried behind a wall, and behind the statues there is a fire which allows the casting of shadows seen by persons tied to the wall. Meanwhile the statues, for Plato, intend what they are of . . . and thus efface themselves and disclose some original—whether it is a human, an animal, or a plant. The disclosure is made obvious once we leave the cave and, for a moment, are blinded by the sun, till finally we see the original reality intended by shadows and the statues—there are people, animals, plants, buildings, all different from each other and constantly changing. This is obvious and should not be of any concern. Among the variety of specific kinds of things, there appears an identity setting a limit to each thing in such a variety and the limit comprises an essence of such things. Thus, having exited the cave, one is aware of a great variety of changing things, but also, one is aware of the distinctions among things which allow one to see more than the empirical variety—*to see things in terms of their essential limits—to have a vision. The latter does not look like any empirical variant, and yet it is required to set a limit to what distinguishes empirical things into their essential compositions.*

It is at this level of awareness that the classical controversy of intentionality unfolds. Having ascended to the region of sunlight among real things, Plato is troubled. While moving through various levels of intentionality, showing how each level requires specific awareness of given phenomena which suddenly shift to a reflective "image" disclosing something more. This also shows that such a shift belongs not only to Plato's awareness, but in its own right. After all, the experienced phenomena become images signifying something other, something more which, while "absent" in visuality, is given to vision. In other words, empirical phenomena become transparent, reflecting and "intending" the more. Even after ascending to sunlight and gaining awareness of all sorts of things, there

appear diverse identities despite changes and differences among specific things. Among different sizes, shapes, colors, abilities, occupations, we encounter a "human," an identity among differences, one among many, permanent among changes.

The disclosure of the one among many, of the identical among differences, of the permanent among changes, requires another intention, another awareness which makes all the encountered things into "examples of . . ." reflecting an invariant as a dimension, an *arche*. Despite the concrete fact that the described events are presented by an individual Plato, it led him to this discovery of a complex domain: a "transcendental shift" as a condition for reflection—shadows become of . . . —and thus intentional in their own right without admixture of psychological, human-all-too-human sophistry. The awareness called transcendental simply means the disclosure of an awareness of things as they are and reflect or "mean" an *arche*. In other words, transcendental awareness, enacted by Plato and by anyone who would read Plato, is a "reflection" on the phenomena from another domain, shifting the phenomena to images and finally examples of . . . , disclosing *archaic dimensions*. The latter do not look like anything, are not images, and are not derived from empirical generalization or rational deduction—they are *archaic and are present as vision through visuality, such that the latter are transparent with the vision. While visuality might be explicated empirically, vision is noetic.*

The latter is reserved for the quest to disclose the basic principles—the *arche* that constitute the very essence of nature, including humans and even a just society. The latter has been a debate within and among major Greek philosophers, yet all of them, despite variations, understood all natural events from their limits (*peras*). Every being is determined to be a specific kind of being by the limit which cannot be transgressed. Whether the limit is located in *topos noitos* (the place of mind), or is the *morphe* (the inherent form of a thing), in each case they are *the very essence* of a given thing, its *arche*. The essence of a being is what comprises its intelligibility. This means that the necessity of all beings is inherent in them. *Arche is a principle* which cannot be denied without a contradiction, and the proof for it had to include it in the very demonstration of its validity. In brief, in its denial and its affirmation it is a given presence—a vision. Despite the tsunami of all "explanations" of who we are—multi-cultural products of material and other conditions such that if conditions will change, there will be a "new man" (ala Marx) or an Uebermensch as long as we purge ourselves from those racial others who have not yet fully evolved to be "pure" humans, there is always a flash of the *arche.* Greeks would ask a more fundamental question: across all the variations you say that "humans" can and do define themselves in variety of ways, except that there is an assumed *arche—human.* This is also the question in all sorts of evolutionary and historical theses where man emerged from other creatures, or man is a product of historical conditions and if we change such conditions, we shall get a "new man." Curious—What is this constant appeal to "man"? In the background is *arche* as a limit without which one could not speak of different definitions of "man" or evolution. *The limit "human," by its own admission, is fallible and thus responsible for his mistakes and their correction in public dialogue.*

Dialogical Requirements

By now there might be a question from the side of contemporary "thinkers": What does the "story" told above have to do with "communication"? In light of the various methodologies in currency, ranging from qualitative to quantitative, from neo-positivistic to culturally relativistic, we maintain that any subject matter requires an articulation of its own access. This is to say, it would be not only inadvertent, but also arbitrary to "apply" our favorite method, dogma, or theory on all phenomena. The above "story" disclosed what is required in any communication: discussion of any theme, subject matter, issue involves a principle, an *arche* which sets a limit as to what is being discussed. If we are discussing mathematics, no need to obfuscate the discussion with brain physiology—looking for 2 + 2 = 4 in brain cells. And the discussion of brain physiology need not involve mathematics. Current discussions of democracy and autocracy accept the difference between them and hence allows for the notion that they are *essentially* different. If that were not the case, we would run a gauntlet of mis-communication, leading to a question: "What are we talking about?" Thus a discussion, purported to argue against anything *essential*, is *essential.* To say that "there is no *essence*: everything is contingent" is to make an *essential* claim. As argued in the above "story," the negation of *arche involves its inclusion*. Messages are understandable to the extent that they efface themselves in order to signify, point to, delimit some "subject matter." The latter may be cultural, physical, theoretical, psychological, mythical, science-fictional, etc., yet in all cases it is required as a dialogical focus. Despite the disagreements that may occur concerning the delimitation of a subject matter, the latter is a required condition for the continuity of communicative engagement. If the common subject matter is lost, the question will arise: Are we talking about the same thing?

The "story" also disclosed that all "explanations" of the communicator by its exclusion, inevitably assume its presence—the human *arche recognized both as self and as another self*. Both may be present to each other in their social designations as a doctor and a mechanic, or in different cultural categories as "ghost hunter," an "eagle" but in all cases they are transparent with a vision of human *arche*. There are numerous stories, apart from philosophical disclosure, of this transparent presence of a *vision of an arche* which should both please those claiming a cultural variety, and amaze them by constant communication of such a vision to all essential denials of essence. While mentioning such social designations, it must be noted that they belong to different societies and cultures as "values." The latter provide categorical differentiations of hierarchy of functions which persons assume in their life worlds. In fact, an identity of a person is associated with such valuable function. She is a doctor, he is a conservative, they are coal miners, and still others are students. Personal status and pride are closely tied to such functions and social "competition" is premised on climbing to a higher position—without leaving this value hierarchy. Communication between persons and even groups assumes an understanding of what is being said by someone due to her functional expertise. The Self—which nonetheless is "more" than any functional value—is, in

most cases, reduced to such a function and thus is deemed to be valuable and respected. In modern philosophy, the Self—the *archaic vision, was reduced to an Ego, leading to solipsism and individual egoism*. "Philosophers" are still debating whether I know that the other is a human or another mechanical body.

Apart from values, the presence of the communicating partners shows not only their social, categorically defined functional values, but through them the *transcendental self-worth given as a vision—an arche*. We are human and, in our engagement with a subject matter, an issue, we expect mutual respect, honor, truth, justice, not as categorical values of a given life world, but as activity. There is a mutual requirement: to be honorable, one must honor the others, just as to accept truthfulness, one must speak the truth, to respect oneself is equal with respect for others. Some examples of *self-worth* and its negation can be found across ages and cultures. While for modern ontology, values are subjective constructs, *self-worth is disclosed as the most objective and absolute presence*. This must be made clear: our awareness is always world oriented and our orientations, or intentional directions find, in their life world if not total, at least partial perceptual affirmation. This is an epistemic aspect which takes for granted the division of our life world into categories and the way they are concretized or given perceptual fulfillment. But the fulfillment of our taken-for-granted intentions and the categories to which they correlate, including the numerous value gradations—the epistemic understanding—leave out the legitimating question given in live awareness that something is not fulfilled, something that no value can account for: *self-worth*. To reach the latter, one must suspend her life world and explicate an access to the transcendental lived awareness that correlates to *self-worth* which demands legitimation of the life world in which one has so far lived in full belief and affirmation. The lived awareness and its intention toward *self-worth* asks whether the life world offers any fulfillment and confirmation of this intention. At this level of awareness, the categorical and epistemic understanding fails, and an existential question of action becomes preeminent. Can I act, as I have always acted, and fulfill the intention of my *self-worth*? The latter embodies such requirements as honor, honesty, dignity, self and other respect, and justice. If honor, honesty, dignity, and respect cannot be fulfilled in my activities, then the legitimacy of this life world is placed in absolute question, revealing at the same time the awareness of *absolute self-worth*. At this level, it is a person who speaks and not a valuable discourse. The latter not only obfuscates but also degrades the *self-worth* of oneself and the others.

Yet we cannot degrade a creature in its life world and demand of it to justify its actions and to choose another life world. In other words, to call dog a dog is not a degradation. Degrading and despising is possible only in light of recognition of the *worth of another and self as noble, honorable, just and truthful*. This recognition founds numerous contemporary phenomena, inclusive of racism, ethnocentrism, and ideologies. Degradation of others by self-elevation, reveals the other's elevation, and our anxiety in face of the other's *self-worth*, his/her significance—beyond any social value. This logic leads all the way to condemning the other to death: unable to withstand the presence of *self-worth* of the other, we condemn him to death and thus reveal that we have denied our *self-worth*, have degraded

ourselves, and thus hate the other not only for exhibiting his/her dignity, but also for revealing our own self-degradation. This is well depicted by Victor Frankl's experience in a concentration camp. If a prisoner would show any self and other respect, treat oneself and others with respect, he would be either beaten or immediately eliminated; he was a reminder to the camp guards as "valuable" and socially "respected" functionaries that they have lost *self-worth*, specifically visible in their obscene pretense to be "superior." This is to say, the very presence of the other who is aware of her *self-worth* performs a tacit phenomenological bracketing and hence challenges a blind inherence in this life world. One can then raise a question whether such a life world is worthy of one's *self-worth*.

Self-worth, as a discovered given, appears not only through degradations and oppressions, but also through actions demanding mutual recognition of self and other. And it appears irrespective of culture, historical period, or social standing. Gandhi angered colonial rulers by his bearing, his dignity, his dignifying those who were at the lowest social rung, his demand that the colonial rulers have truthfulness and honor and thus made them recognize their own *self-worth* and not merely their value for the empire. Gandhi reminded all that the life world of an empire is illegitimate because it does not allow the fulfillment of the lived awareness of *self-worth*. Hence he asked for legitimation of his own value in such a life world and whether he must rise to a transcendental level and reveal a crisis in his own life and that of the empire based on recognition of what is the ground of final human self-awareness and all the values. While being an object of derision and quixotic depictions, he took the blows with dignity, demanding dignity from those who administered the blows. It is to be noted that he did not claim *self-worth* as a value of a specific culture, but as an unconditional and absolute ground that raises the question of legitimation of any life world and demands the active fulfillment of transcendental awareness that correlates to *self-worth*. In face of *self-worth* of this slight person, the British Empire lost all its moral, political, and military superiority and lost to, what Churchill, in a demeaning way called, a "naked fakir." In face of proudly strutting military might, this empirical nobody was transparent with human *arche* for the world to see and ponder. He communicated what are the primary and most fundamental communicators: self and other respect, truthful, honorable and honoring others, and just.

Two more examples from world literatures might make the point quite clear. In the writing of Cervantes—*Don Quixote*—we find an impoverished gentleman, Quejana, reading books about knights and their honorable deeds and comparing their world to the emergent modern, iron age, in which honor is bought, lying and cheating are wisdom, exploiting and oppressing others is good business, slavery is profitable, and every value is for sale. Recognizing that knighthood as activity is honorable, respectful of others, just and truthful, he assumes a name, Don Quixote, and seeks to reveal the crisis of the modern age. Of course, knighthood, as a symbol of *self-worth*, is completely out of context in the iron age, indeed a comical caricature, and yet a presence which comprises a transparent awareness of what is present, even if covered over by some dark and incomprehensible forces. To reveal *self-worth*, Don Quixote must reveal *self-worth of others*, whether it is a noble, honorable Dulcinea seen through a garlic-smelling bar maid Aldonsa,

or a knight transparent through his humble neighbor Carcaso. They all are present as *self-worth* and thus Don Quixote's *self-worth*, as a noble, truthful, just, and honorable knight, is and must be confirmed by others of equal nobility. Led by his search for *self-worth*, he finds it even in the degraded others, even disclosing their self-degradation and challenging the life world concerning its legitimation with respect to human *arche, human essence as absolute self-worth*.

The same issues of truth, honor, justice, respect, dignity appear in Russian literature which deals with profound metaphysical, social, economic, and moral issues. Russian literature reveals a struggle between the immediately lived, even if not thematized intentionality toward *self-worth*, expressed in sacral and secular modes of writing and the world of modern Westernizing values. The great Russian literatures faced this Westernization and "modernization" and hence were written between two life worlds: one that was maintained as an established tradition, the other as a construct of Scientific and Political Enlightenments of the West. The former, the feudal-aristocratic, was deemed to be decadent, corrupt, specifically its serfdom. The latter, the West, while partially unknown and alien, was regarded as the bearer of ideas that would transform Russia and bring it into its proper place as a European nation. The price: acceptance of fundamental understanding that everything is premised on constructed values, above all the *labor theory of value dominating capitalism and Marxism*. Fundamental human value is labor, producing technological progress and the environment as material resource—including humans as such resource; capitalism and Marxism agree on this basic point: humans are labor implements and with changing technologies, they must be constantly "retooled." The entire Marxist-Leninist "experiment" was to make a "new soviet man," i.e., a more advanced tool for production.

It is at this juncture that the transcendental lived awareness in Russian literature recognizes that the world of values, constructed by Enlightenment and the world of decadent aristocracy requires evaluation as to their adequacy for human *self-worth*. Such a question is one of principle that required an essential delimitation of the constructs of both worlds and whether they could be adjusted, discarded, or become open to the absolute requirement of transcendental awareness of *self-worth*. We are in a position now to attempt our venture into lived awareness that is led by the intention correlated to *self-worth* and thus place itself at the point of crisis. While a tradition demands respect for customary rules and social hierarchies, but respect for them implies something more basic, some lived awareness that connects to the *self-worth* of a singular person beyond his/her value and demands a treatment of oneself and the others in an honorable, noble, truthful, elevating manner *for its own sake*. It is, then, the task to unfold the lived awareness that is compelled to bracket, to place out of action, the life world of tradition and enlightenment and to note the presence of this lived awareness across diverse phenomena. All the intentional orientations toward a life world in which she has been immersed appear to be groundless constructs; the life world of functional values without human essence cannot be maintained in light of the presence of *self-worth* even in its denial. Thus, which life world would provide actual fulfillment of the *arche* of *self-worth*? For Dostoevsky, the traditional life world where the master's favorite dog is more valuable than a child's life is not

acceptable. Dostoevsky's rejection is an affirmation of human *self-worth for its own sake*. He raises an absolute question: Is life worth living in a world where such a degradation of human *self-worth* is a standard? The entire corpus of Dostoevsky's writings is a striving to disclose this awareness. In *Brothers Karamazov*, the main figure, Karamazov Dimitri, insults and degrades an impoverished elderly captain who no longer has any social value; yet toward the end of the story, Dimitri attempts to apologize by offering the captain money; impoverished as he is, the captain refuses to be bought and thus degraded again. He reveals his *self-worth* as being above any price, above any social value, and "compels" Dimitri to recognize his own *self-worth* in face of the other and his nobility, dignity, and honor. In short, it is "illegitimate" to attempt to place a monitory value on *self-worth*. This is the place where *self-worth* of both persons is disclosed, accepted, and recognized. In this context, it should be obvious that reducing humans to functional values, Marxism-Leninism betrayed the true Russian revolution advocated by daring writers.

Dialogue and Monologue

These considerations suggest that the requirements to understand communication are human *arche exhibited in action of self and other respect, truth telling, justice, honor, and responsibility*. This also suggests that before any theory, explanation, degradation, *self-worth appears in dialogue*. This is to say, the dialogical understanding is a principle, *an essential arche*, which is involved even in the very explication of dialogue, and even if denied, it is included. In this sense, any method, any theoretical controversy, any question of the racially or culturally other, are dialogical. What is required, then, is to delimit the dialogical awareness and to show what types of dialogue attempt to negate the other, even though the other never leaves the dialogical setting, and what are the dialogical requirements which form communication. There are numerous thinkers who have done a great service in exploring the dialogical region, and there is no need to repeat their contributions (see Mickunas 2019).

At the outset, the notion of dialogue will be extended to include the "others" whom we never met and will never meet, but who are "present" to form a deeper understanding of dialogue in terms of "polilogue." The latter includes numerous others to whom we refer in a discussion of a specific subject matter. Thus, in this writing, we were already engaged in polilogue by communicating with Plato and Aristotle about "vision" and *arche*, and speaking with Cervantes and Dostoevsky about honor, dignity, and transparency, not to speak of the anonymous language and culture theorists; we borrow their "awareness of . . ." these subject matters, fully understanding them in their limits without which neither dialogue nor polilogue would be possible. Having all necessary factors in place, the world of communication can be unfolded.

In dialogue, the other is not present as an object, a given entity, a mind inhabiting a body, but as a co-presence engaged in a common venture. One speaks with someone about something, some topic, concern, subject matter, prior to

regarding the other as other. The commonality, here, is a subject matter in which we are engaged, which we confront, dispute, or agree upon. There is granted an orientation toward something prior to an orientation of a self to the other. Just as was the case in discussing the shift of flat figures to shadows of . . . and finally solid beings—variety of humans—as examples of an *arche*, with Plato as our dialogical partner, we always face a subject matter with the other. Thus, the dialogical partner is not merely the currently co-present other, but the others whose orientations toward the world, their perceptions of the topic, the subject matter, are equally co-present. The books I read, the conversations I had with others—perhaps long forgotten—comprise an extension of my perceptions and constitute a policentric dialogical field. I perceive with the perceptions of the others, perceptions that contest, extend, and modify my own regard of a given subject matter. The same is true of my current dialogical partner; she too is founding of and founded by a policentric field, and in our dialogue we mutually involve our policentric awareness and hence extend our policentric participation. This also constitutes the basis for transcendence of one's own limitations and resultantly for openness and freedom. Without the other, and without our being co-present to a policentric field, we would lack the transcending movement.

The most significant feature of dialogue is that the co-presence of the other not only decenters mutually absolute positionality, but also constitutes the initial awareness of human situatedness as well as a reflective self-identification, each through the other. One recognizes oneself only due to the difference from the other in modes of awareness of a subject matter. This is the transparency principle: I know myself to the extent that I reflect from the other, from how she articulates a specific theme. I see myself through the different perceptions offered by the other that connect us by way of a common theme, task, subject matter, and allows us our recognition of our own positions. Even if we engage in a dialogue about the other, we shall find that she cannot be understood apart from her perceptions of something, of some concerns inherent in her world. We shall understand her only to the extent that she is engaged in some task or concern, and thus is an aspect of our own policentric field. After all, to discuss Virginia Woolf is to discuss her views about something and thus introduce her as our dialogical partner. Even if we were so crude as to intrude into her "private feelings" we would still understand them as "feelings about something." She, and we, are comprehensible only with respect to the world we address, contest, and share in our different ways.

The debates concerning the "final communicator" included many claims of human subjection to discourses, cultural unconscious, economic forces, bundles of desires, biological, chemical, psychological explanations which assume a principle of monologue. It is not we who communicate, but the "genes which want to propagate themselves," or "libidinal drives," or Dialectical Materialism," and so on. In each case, the subject, the human *arche as self-worth*, disappears. He/she becomes innocent and thus irresponsible. They do not speak the truth, respect others and themselves, and are without honor, dignity, and even existence. Yet, an all-encompassing, undifferentiated, homogeneous thesis would not be recognizable, would not possess an identity, and would cease to be dialogical; it would be a speaking without any co-presence of the other. It would be a denial of

the other's existence as co-presence through difference. But, at the same time, it would destroy the presence of the proponent of a monologue, since he/she too would become a function and not a communicating self proclaiming the knowledge of the sole truth. Without introducing the other *as arche, there is no archaic self who could claim a monological awareness*.

Postscript

We reached a juncture at which the founder of Western philosophy—Socrates—can make his entrance. Although scholars locate Socrates as the relentless seeker of truth, i.e., categorical epistemologist, we must also recall that the first condition of the search for truth is the good and a life world where a person can live in accordance with the demands of the good as one expression of intrinsic worth. Only under these conditions can Socrates search for truth as another aspect of intrinsic worth. After all, the search for truth was, for Socrates, a practical-existential commitment and activity of a good and truthful life. Thus, Socrates, like many others, was an object of derision and caricatures. In short, he was a person without a social value, since he had no position, and raised strange questions of unsuspecting citizens, challenging them to search for truth and justice in mutual respect. He accepted the Athenian verdict of death in order to show that his and others' *self-worth* demands a life world in which the search for truth cannot be forbidden. He placed his *self-worth* as the good above his personal life and could demand that such a good should be a part of his life world. The decision by the jury to forbid Socrates his daimon, his eros, to "philosophize" was equivalent to a destruction of a life world in which his *self-worth* once had a place. Socrates is compelled to face a crisis and reveal a crisis of his life world. He reaches and lives an awareness that places his entire life world into question and demands a decision: Is the life world, offered by Athenians, adequate to fulfill his *self-worth*? In turn, are the Athenians, by their own action, degraded themselves to a level of social value where truth, dignity, honor will have no place? After all, such a degradation to social value is obvious from the trial when Socrates is offered a chance to surrender his troublesome quest and thus become a valuable citizen, and when Socrates offers, ironically, to accept a pension from the state for "whatever little services that he might render." Here appears a depiction of the first crisis of democracy and Socrates reaches a lived awareness which demands a legitimation of the life world which is being offered to him. Can his lived awareness, correlated as it is to *arche as self-worth*, have any perceptual affirmation in such a life world? The latter, after all, demands self-degradation and thus the denial of *self-worth*. Socrates resolves the crisis by accepting the verdict of the Athenians with a warning: *If you condemn me, my fame will spread far and wide; do not do this, because it will be forever a black mark on Athens.*

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200 articles in five languages. He co-founded the International Circle of Husserl Scholars in 1970 and the International Circle of Merleau-Ponty Scholars in 1976. In 1980, he was appointed to the board of directors for the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and to the Council of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. In 1983, Mickunas formed the International Gebser Society for the study of histories and transformations of consciousness. In 1996, with professor Hiroshi Kojima of Niigata University, Japan, he established a Japan-West consortium of scholars to discuss West-East thought. In 1999, with professor Bienvenido Argueta, he established a program of conferences on the study of globalization at the Universidad Rafael Landivar in Guatemala City. In 2007, the Lithuanian Ministry of Culture awarded Mickunas an "outstanding foreign contributor to humanities and social sciences in Lithuania" prize. In 2008, he was appointed to the Lithuanian Academy of Science. He has read approximately 300 conference papers in Japan, India, France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Lithuania, Guatemala, Peru, United Arab Emirates, Canada, and the United States. Mickunas has received four honorary doctoral degrees from Klaipeda University, Lithuania (2000); Universidad Rafael Landivar, Guatemala (2009); Vilnius University (2011); and Mykolas Romeris University (2012). In 2017, Mickunas was awarded "Knight of the Cross" by the president of Lithuania and given "Laureate Fellow" status by the International Communicology Institute. Vilnius University Library and Mariaus Katiliskio Pasvalio Biblioteka contain copies of the archives of Algis Mickunas.

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Home-World: Moral Memory and Disposition as Habits of Mind

Richard L. Lanigan

Abstract: Contemporary thinkers tend to be *analysts* of discourse, matching up *categories* to name parts of a judgment process (explanation). The experience is usually frustrating as demonstrated in the constant "breaking news" (= "revised judgment") of American (USA) and other global news media companies. As a first view, such analysis is largely the French legacy of Descartes's phenomenalism or objective *doubt*. The experience creates an *ontological gestaltung*, i.e., the creation of *objectivity as* inter-subjective *expression* (intelligibility). In comparison, other thinkers (German) were *synthesizers*, matching up *processes* to clearly describe the linked categories of experience (the past), but now displaced in time (the present), as the new description (explication) of an emergent, transcendent category (the future). The achieved dynamic consciousness is usually *satisfying*, as demonstrated in one's media loyalty to the synthesizer (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, CNN, FOX, MSNBC). This second view is basically the heritage of Kant's phenomenology or objective *judgment*. The experience constitutes an essentially *epistemological gestaltung*, i.e., the creation of *subjectivity as* inter-objective *perception* (relevance). Human beings favor the complete choice process (*gestaltung*) description of conscious experience as the *memory* sense of "home" in the *disposition* of living "in-the-world" called *happiness*. I discuss the "home living model of axiology" as the combinatory *discourse* perspectives of *mood* (1) Person (morality) and (2) Culture (aesthetics) known by the *urban trope* of "Home-World" counterposed with the *attitude* perspective of (3) Community (ethics) and (4) Society (politics) known by the *rural trope* of "Home-Land." The discourse model is an account of how *mood* becomes *attitude* in a practiced agency of *belief* wherein *judgment* is the operative, practical agency of humans in communication. The discussion is contextualized by modern German sociology and communicology (Tönnies, Weber, Schütz, Jaspers), with historical, linguistic, and visual examples of *chiasm* (value shifts) from Herr Hitler's Germanisms and Mr. Trump's Americanisms in rhetoric as counterfeit polemic [πολεμικός].

Keywords: chiasm, epicaricacy, happiness, home, polemic, *Schadenfreude*, urban

"The Home-World is fundamentally determined by language."
Edmund Husserl (1973, 3:225)

Breaking News: An Incident Witnessed

On the morning of March 25, 2021, I opened my just delivered print copy of the *Washington Post* newspaper. I saw the headline for a story written by Travis Andrews:

Internet to Ship Stuck in Suez: You Are a Mood.

> Admit it—we're all lifelong rubberneckers. The bigger the pileup on the side of the interstate, the better. *Schadenfreude* might as well be marrow; it lives in our bones.
>
> Sure, some only want to watch the world burn. But when it gets cold enough, everyone enjoys a little fire. And, boy, is the world cold right now. An ongoing pandemic. Crisis at the border. A spate of mass shootings. A White House dog that bites.
>
> So, yeah, we could use a little warmth. And early Tuesday morning, someone (or someones) piloting a more than 1,300-foot-long ship, now known to the Internet as the "Suez Canal boat captain guy," was kind enough to provide it, when he somehow managed to jam one of the world's largest boats sideways in the Suez Canal—a jam he couldn't manage to unjam.

The force and impact of this incident story is dependent on your recognizing the German *Schadenfreude* (meaning "joy in the suffering of others")[1] as a pure example of habitual *mood*—where one's *moral* view is an *ethic* disposition, an *attitude* applied to others, i.e., a first *judgment* of the connection (a second judgment = *attitude*) between right and wrong, good and bad, normal and abnormal, conventional and deviant, comic and tragic (Colapietro 2021).

Yet, the hidden *chiasmatic norm*[2] (the *value reversal* as between positive and negative = manage / not // jam / un-jam) in the story comes last as an applied *attitude*: "A jam he couldn't manage to unjam." The ***unforgiving*** (mood) ***norm*** (attitude) is a shift from (1st) aesthetic to (2nd) political judgment—*you* should be able to *manage*, as *I* see it: *no jam*! Your personal failure is my public (polemical) success. For many Americans, *this* instant gratification of *witness entertainment*

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[1] ***Schadenfreude*** is the satisfaction or pleasure derived by someone from another person's misfortune; it is the experience of happiness, joy, or self-acknowledgment (sense of "fair play") that comes from learning of, or witnessing, the troubles, failures, or humiliation of another person, especially another viewed as a competitor or rival. The common aphorism is "Happiness is the Unhappiness of Others"; see Gruber et al. (2011). The German word is a close translation of the classical Greek ἐπῐχαιρεκᾰκῐ́ᾱ [*epikhairekakíā*] [genitive ἐπῐχαιρεκᾰκῐ́ᾱς]. By contrast, the English transliteration as *epicaricacy* is seldom used. First authored by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* [2.1107a.9–10], "epicaricacy" is a *mood* of degree falling somewhere between *envy* and *spite*. In this context, *happiness* is somewhere between *satisfaction* and *fairness*.

[2] **Chiasm** is a rhetorical trope with a ratio structure of **A : B :: b : a** that is valanced as Self : Other :: Same : Different, with the ontological referents of Substance : Whole :: Part : Attribute. It is commonly known as A. J. Greimas's "Semiotic Square," derived from Aristotle's "Logic Square." See Lanigan (forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b, 2018b). Technically speaking, Travis Andrews is giving us a *Chiasm Zeugma* to be read as (**A**) Manage **:** (**B**) Jam **::** (**b**) Unjam **:** (**a**) Not Manage.

experience (*Schadenfreude*) was probably *either* on Facebook, perhaps, Twitter *or* on CNN/FOX cable channels. It became a mature second judgment by the time it saw print. A case in point is the emergence of *Schadenfreude* as various media awards (by vaccinated social media users) for "antivaxxers" who die of COVID (Judkis 2021).

This *habit* [*Sitte*: embodied custom] sequence of *moral proof* moves in stages from (1) *mood* [*Stimmung*] to (2) *attitude* [*Haltung*] to (3) a *belief* [*Glauben*]. Herein, belief is a *reverence* for creating the norms or *mores* of social preference (reasonableness) framed by an *inference* of cultural practice (rationality) that we *claim* to see *in others* as right, true, proper, normal *comportment* [*Volkgeist*: a *belief* as *value judgment* embodied in group behavior] (Tönnies 1908, 45). Concomitantly in the context of rhetorical theory applied to ethics, we have the sequence of polemical argument wherein *purport* (mood) leads to *conduct* (attitude) and then to *comportment* (belief)—an *impulse* toward action. We are concerned with the *chiasm* or value *reversal* involved from positive to *double-negative* as a new "false" positive (i.e., *stopping* at stage 2 below = the paradox of being either a "Do-Gooder" or an "Evil-Doer")[3], whereas the usual process is the complete three stage process of knowledge [*Vernunft*] for Immanuel Kant (Lanigan 2019a):

(**1**) Normal moral judgment is the *differentiation* of Good from Bad, i.e.:

Páthos **(Mood / Positive)** > ***Ḗthos*** **(Attitude)** > ***Logós*** **(Belief)**
= ***Logimós*** **(Discursive Judgment)**

(**2**) Abnormal moral judgment is the *distinction* of Bad *as if* Good:

Allo-Páthos **(Mood / Negative)** > ***Ḗthos*** **(Attitude)** > ***Logós*** **(Belief)**
= ***Héxis*** **(Habit).**

(**3**) Moral [1st] judgment is the pragmatic act of [2nd] *judgment* in consciousness:

Kant Model:
Persuasion **(Mood/perception)**
> ***Belief*** **(Attitude / Imagination)**
> ***Conviction*** **(Belief / Apperception)**
= ***Judgment*** **(True / False Act of Reason).**

[3] Where and when this judgment spreads beyond one person to a group of people, we observe the creation of a *Discourse Cult* stuck in the communal modality of Imagination that is inherently voiced as a polemic [Trump: "Make America Great Again"]; further motivation, e.g., a new tweet, another public rally, etc. is required to move from *agency belief* [comportment/mood] to *embodied action* as Habit [disposition], e.g., one last rally to start/incite the 6 January 2021 insurrection/sedition at the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, DC.

In this three-stage presentation, I am applying Maurice Merleau-Ponty's ethic of a new humanism, a comparative compromise between Aristotelian and Kantian ethics, previously published as Lanigan (2018c). More particularly, I am adopting Edmund Husserl's (1973) methodological perspective on communicology as the envelopment (world) of subjectivity (self) by intersubjectivity (other) shown in **Figure 1**. An exceptionally good analysis of this Kantian direction in Edmund Husserl's communicology, especially the function of communal imagination, is Ruthrof (2021).

COMMUNICOLOGY PERSPECTIVES
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ONTOLOGY	PHENOMENOLOGY METHOD	EDMUND HUSSERL	AXIOLOGY	SEMIOTICS
SELF	DESCRIPTION	ARCHAEOLOGY	MORALITY	LIFE (LABOR)
OTHER	REDUCTION	GENEAOLOGY	ETHICS	LANGUAGE
WORLD	INTERPRETATION	CONSTITUTIVE (INTRA-SUBJECTIVITY)	AESTHETICS [WORLD] { CHANCERY }	LOCATION [HOME] { EQUITY }
		GENERATIVE (INTER-SUBJECTIVITY)	POLITICS [LAND] { LAW }	LAND [HOUSE] { EQUALITY }

Figure 1. Edmund Husserl's Methodology in Communicology.

The Home-World

A particularly good example of the just mentioned *unforgiving norm* is the value claim embodied by people who view *home* as the choice between *urban* and *rural* cultural mores. *Home-World* is the consciousness of your personal *Life-World* constituting an *environment* or *milieu* (*Mitwelt*; genealogy of contextual time), which differentiates both a rural [out-going] and an urban [in-coming] *belief concept* of lived-space (*Lebenswelt*; archaeology of contextual space) (**Figure 2**; historical example in **Figure 9**).

A particularly relevant analysis of the contemporary American (USA) Home-World is a recent essay by David Brooks (2021, updating 2000) wherein the genealogy of lived-time is in a contest (*agon*) with the archaeology of lived-space as a *generational mood* is represented by the respective absence or presence of "BoBos"—*boorish bourgeoisie* selves, who formerly were *bourgeois bohemians*. In general, the BoBos are *third*-generation persons who are characterized by their choice to *leave* home, *rebel* against their family situation, and become *independent* in a new activity/job (**Figures 3 and 4**: Hewitt Model).



Figure 2. Urban and Rural Civitas: The Home-World Model in Communicology.

By comparison to the Bobos who leave home for "better parts," those persons who *stay* "in these parts" tend to admire *conformity* and the mutual *dependence* of their family, friends, and neighbors. These are "home-stead" persons who have stayed long-term with the land and its local institutions. They are the praised PePos—*petulant proletariat* selves, who used to be merely *pensive*.[4] They are typically *second* generation (**Figures 3 and 4**: Mead Model) and *family/peer group*

[4] **PePos** is my neologism for the *Pensive Proletariat* (absorbed in thought, mildly anxious about the future) morphed into the *Petulant Proletariat* (annoyed, entitled, impatient, and ill humored) as the chiasmatic counterpart to David Brooks's (2000, 2021) BoBos. I am using the same Marxist/Leninist semantic markers for, respectively, "middle class" (BoBo) and "lower class" (PePo). Brooks's thesis is that Bobos are a ***third*** generation (see Mead in **Figure 3**) of "meritocracy" who have become the **new** *la grande/haute bourgeoise* (upper class) whose third-generation *negative* values ["critical"] are replacing their first-generation grandparents' *positive* values ["analytical"]. Cf. the parallel analysis by Anne Applebaum (2021a, 2021b) and George Will (2021a, 2021b).

oriented in their purview (**Figure 2**: Tönnies Model). If they move at all, it is perceived as "nearby," but "local" (e.g., in the same county; see **Figure 5**).

HOMEWORLD HUMAN SCIENCE MODELS
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EXPERIENCE Categories Ecology [*iokos*]	LABOR (*Family*)	LANGUAGE (*Communication*)	LAND (*Property*)	LOCATION (Household)
CONSCIOUSNESS Categories Ideology [*eídos*]	Mutual Behavior (*Border*)	Mutual Speech (*Tinge*)	Idiosyncratic Speech (*Fringe*)	Idiosyncratic Behavior (*Boundary*)
Margaret MEAD	POST-FIGURATIVE (*PAST* / Ancestors)	CO-FIGURATIVE (*PRESENT* / KIN = Family & Friends) © 2021, RICHARD L. LANIGAN		PRE-FIGURATIVE (*FUTURE* / Progeny)
Alfred SCHÜTZ	PREDECESSORS	ASSOCIATES	CONTEMPO-RARIES (Sozialwelt)	SUCCESSORS
REVELANCE Categories	Share SPACE, Not TIME	Share SPACE, And TIME	Share TIME, Not SPACE	Do NOT Share SPACE And TIME
Experience Edmund HUSSERL	ZWISCHENWELT (Intermediate-world)	ALTAGSWELT (Everyday-world)	FREMDWELT (Alien-world)	MITWELT (Social-world)
Consciousness	VORWELT (Pre-world)	LEBENSWELT (Life-world)	HEIMWELT (Home-world)	NAHWELT (Near-world)
Samuel P. HUNTINGTON	NATIVE IDENTITY	KIN IDENTITY	ETHNIC IDENTITY	DIASPORA IDENTITY
John P. HEWITT	INDIGENOUS	CITIZEN	EMIGANT	IMMIGRANT
CHOICE DILEMMAS	STAY	CONFORM	DEPENDENT	*SOCIOCENTRIC* (Organic Group; Space Bind)
	LEAVE	REBEL	INDEPEN-DENT	*EGOCENTRIC* (Aggregate Group; Time Bind)

Figure 3. Human Science Models of the Home-World as Experienced.

In more current political rhetoric, the PePos are the "deplorables," a seeming replacement for the term "takers"—who are not "makers" (*bourgeoisie*). However, BoBos and PePos are equally *shunned* (Applebaum 2021a) by the great "middle class" that *negatively* perceives a cultish elitism on *both* the Rural political right ("QAnon"/"Anti-Woke" deplorables) *and* the Urban political left ("Cancel Culture"/"Woke" deplorables).

In all cases, we are dealing with *mood* in an analogue scale of more/less proportions that suggest a set of process, agency values (moral, ethical, aesthetic, political), wherein group civility [*civitas*] is both practiced and spoken, placed and positioned—a "city of"—as an embodied, felt *choice of home*[5] (**Figure 2**), i.e., bounded in time/space by (1) the type of *labor* (physical/intellectual), and (2) a style

[5] Reminiscent of the analysis of the City of Rome by Augustine of Hippo in his ***De civitate Dei contra paganos*** [On the City of God Against the Pagans], c. 1470. See Arnett (2021) for an example of Augustinian analysis.

of *language* (common/elite) that has perceptive borders set by (3) the *land* (owned/rented) as opposed to (4) the *location* (permanent/temporary); the dynamic is explicated in **Figure 3**. Although of historical origin in the teaching of *orthoepy* (correct speaking) and *orthography* (correct writing) (Hunt 1859, 278ff.; Willis 1920), these distinctions are particularly relevant to our current political "culture wars" inasmuch as they are what Stephen Pepper calls the ethical *root-metaphor* designators (Lanigan 2018a) for issues of *immigration* (**Figure 3**: Hewitt & Huntington Models). I mention this paradigm case since it foreshadows and indexes the more general axiology model in **Figure 7** and the historical exemplification in **Figure 8**.

THE HOMEWORLD MODEL OF CULTURAL COMMUNICOLOGY © 2021, RICHARD L. LANIGAN				
MARGARET MEAD MODEL		JOHN P. HEWITT MODEL		
CULTURE FORMATION Value Creation: Morality, Ethics, Aesthetics, Politics	CULTURE TRANSMISSION Generational and Social Change in the Constitution of Persons.	CULTURE LOCUS (Sense of Place)* Shared Experience { Community of Practice }	AND	CULTURE FOCUS (Sense of Time)* Shared Consciousness { Community of Mind }
LABOR	*LANGUAGE*	*LAND*		*LOCATION*
AMBIVALENCE (CONFLICT)		RESPONSIBILITY	VS	FREEDOM
AMBIGUITY Self vs. Individual [Analogical Differenitation] { Psychological Anxiety }	PARADOX Family vs. Peer Group [Digital Specialization] { Sociological Alienation }	(FOR) IDENTITY [EQUITY] { SELF / OTHER }		(OF) CHOICE [EQUALITY] { SAME / DIFFERENT }
❸ GREAT SEQUENTIAL DILEMMAS THAT CONSTITUTE THE CULTURE OF A PERSON				
Post-Figurative Culture 1st Generation (Grand-*Parents*)	Children Learn From Ancestors (HOME PRACTICE) [Cooking Preference]	❶ STAY (SENSE OF STABILITY)	OR ? AND	LEAVE (SENSE OF MOBILITY) © 2021, RICHARD L. LANIGAN
Co-Figurative Culture 2nd Generation (*Parents*)	Children & Adults Learn From Peer Group (HOUSE PRACTICE) [Food Preference]	❷ CONFORM (SENSE OF PAST)	OR ? AND	REBEL (SENSE OF FUTURE)
Pre-Figurative Culture 3rd Generation (*Children*)	Adults Learn From Children (SOCIAL PRACTICE) [Technology Preference)	❸ BE DEPENDENT (SENSE OF LOYALITY, FIDELITY)	OR ? AND	BE INDEPENDENT (SENSE OF IDENTIFICATION)
* FERDINAND TÖNNIES MODEL *CULTURE TYPOLOGY*		CHIASM Cross-Overs of Each Choice { a MOOD } Constitute the Values Held { an ATTITUDE } by Each Person When They ACT on a BELIEF.		
EGOCENTRIC SELF / INDIVIDUAL	PERSON VALUE CENTERED [*Gemeinschft*] *	LIBERTY (SELF) [AGGREGATE GROUP]	⬅	JUSTICE (SAME) [TIME BOUND]
SOCIOCENTRIC FAMILY / PEER GROUP	GROUP VALUE CENTERED [*Gesellschaft*] *	LIBERTY (OTHER) [SPACE BOUND]	➡	JUSTICE (DIFFERENT) [COLLECTIVE GROUP]

Figure 4. Home-World Culturology: Labor, Language, Land, Location

Comportment Is Community: Choosing Yours

Recall the Hewitt Model in which community is a cumulate set of choice dilemmas: Stay or Leave, Conform or Rebel, Be Dependent or Independent (**Figure 3**). As cultural sets, the linear progressions are a long-term *cultural orientation*. The Stay—Conform—Dependent set favors a *sociocentric* culture where *organic* groups (family, workplace, etc.) are bound by a *sense of place* (land, location; relation to the *Other* as caste, lineage) typical, e.g., of most Asian and southern European countries. Yet, the Leave—Rebel—Independent set promotes an *egocentric* culture where *aggregate* groups (individuals, subjects, etc.) are associated by a *sense of time* (labor, language; relation to the *Self* as agency, uniqueness) typical, e.g., for many American and northern European countries (Lanigan 2009).

Nonetheless, people do not follow linear cultural models. They tend to have short-term *social preferences*. They vary the sequence of choices according to life's circumstances, usually a so-called "existential crisis" in living situation, such as marriage, pregnancy, birth/death of child, loss of a job/retirement, death of a family member, crop failure, war, and so on. This is to say, *individual preference* accounts for repeated choice making and frequent "changes of mind" from one moment or event to the next. My basic point is that the *cultural code* sets a dominant *context* that is either sociocentric or egocentric, yet the subordinate human being as *choice* maker—producer of choices—is constantly (in time) confronted with the need for *preferences*, which are carried in *memory* and displayed in *dispositions* in the *moment* and *event* of need (crisis situation). The embodied carrying mechanism is what we call a *mood* remembered and a *disposition* to express it again, which is an *attitude* (a ready-made but *imagined* choice). The question, therefore, is the level of commitment to the *memory of choice* uttered by Others (in many places) or spoken by your Self (on many occasions). Culture automatically gives you a first choice, but in crisis, you use your *disposition to choose*—and you call it your *belief* in this or that. Applebaum (2021a, 2021b; Lanigan 2019a, 2019b) characterizes this second judgment choice as a legitimation preference—a "censoriousness" in which language becomes the vehicle of authoritarian discourse (Foucault's *monarchic parrhesia*; Lanigan 2021a, 2021b).

Much of my perspective, as I have articulated it, is drawn from the philology of Indo-European languages conducted by Émile Benveniste (1969, 303). In his description of the concept of "cities and communities," he specifies that the base human experience is one in which there is a familial gathering of "those who speak together." This is the sense of *home-world*: "It designates a man of the same people as the one who speaks about him—He is never confused with a barbarian." The group is known to commune, to "sing together" and, hence, shares a "hymn" about life. One is reminded of the Alfred Schütz (1964, 2:159–78) essay "Making Music Together: A Study in Social Relationship."

Indeed, one of the more poignant examples of human communicative agency, in the sense of Greek middle voice (self-responsibility for speaking), that I have encountered, is Alfred Schütz's (1964, 2:106–19) essay "The Homecomer."

The concern is the combat soldier returning from war.[6] He wrote the analysis after observing the American GIs returning from World War II. His theme is the intra-personal, inter-personal, and intra-group exchange of identity emotions experienced in situations with family and friends (see Lanigan, forthcoming-b). He tags the communicological dynamics as the dialectic of relevance and intelligibility lived by *homecomers* (those returning from the Alien-Land) and *welcomers* (those living in the House-World) wherein existential and group feelings of "Home" are engaged, understood, and misunderstood as an all-encompassing, yet conflicted, meaning. The entirety of moment and event are captured in the *notion* of *family* [Kant's sense: Notion is a *rule* you know before you experience it as a result], especially the ensuing, agonizing *contest of loyalty* to, between, the *alien-family* ("war buddies" *left* behind) and the *home-family* ("civilians" who *stayed* behind). The chiasm of staying and leaving is profound for both the home-comers and the well-comers (see **Figure 3**).

Such a notion of community, argues Tönnies (1887; Carter 2011, 89), has two basic and inter-related types of human agency: (1) a community of *mind* (*Gemienschaft*) suggesting the sense of *family home*—the *site* of values (self's morality) and (2) a community of *practice* (*Gesellschaft*) suggesting a sense of *family house*—the *stead* of norms (other's ethics). These are essentially *private* perceptions, but when made *public* they become *imaginations* of intersubjective reciprocity (Ruthrof 2021, 24), respectively (3) aesthetics as the value of things (think economy, money) and (4) politics as the norm for social action (think practical, productive).

Community constitutes the cultural record of social preferences exercised by groups of people with regard to shared experience (ecology) and consciousness (ideology). Experience is *socially* constructed with private and public domains of context typified by (1) Labor (family livelihood), (2) Language (family communication), (3) Land (family property), and (4) Location (family household). Consciousness is *personally* constituted as well by both private and public domains of contexture typified by (1) mutual behavior (borders for comportment; "red line"), (2) mutual speech (tinge of phonation [accent]), (3) idiosyncratic speech (fringe of articulation [lexicon]), (4) idiosyncratic behavior (boundaries of civility; "red light"). This four-part phenomenological schema explicates what Edmund Husserl calls the "communicative consciousness" with an "emphasis on the social ground of language in communal life not only a *being-with-one-another* (*Miteindersein*) but crucially a *being-within-one-another* (*Ineinandersein*)" (Ruthrof 2021, 31).

Margaret Mead (1970) helps us with the magnitude measurement of culture—the time extensions of consciousness into the space of human embodiment marked as a generating agency (constituting) and produced group-community (founding) wherein communicative consciousness resides as

[6] There is tragic irony as I write this essay (1 September 2021) inasmuch as the USA completes its formal withdrawal from the twenty-year war in Afghanistan and, as a country of "Welcomers," must now confront the *identity* problematic of all four classes of "Homecomers" (Native/Indigenous; Kin/Citizen; Ethnic/Emigrant; Diaspora/Immigrant) anticipated by Samuel P. Huntington (1996); see **Figure 3**.

institutional memory. In general, three biological generations (forebearers, parents, children) make a family, and measure a decade. Ten social decades make a century of culture (the "body politic").[7] The most visible, immediate changes are in social preference (e.g., style of clothing [private choice]) among the three generations. The more invisible, institutional stabilities are in cultural *norms* (e.g., which body parts are covered by clothing [public choice]) among ten generations or a century. We should note the American fascination with *marking* each generation with a *value name*.[8]

Mead's model of *intergenerational communication* is a focus on social preferences calculated by the dialectic of Self learning from the Other. The temporal consciousness of a family begins with Grandparents' generation or living elders, the *voice* of family ancestors, and the forebears of group *practice*. They constitute the (1) *Post-Figurative* paradigm wherein Children learn from Adults. Here, figuration means the structure or code of judgment for the group: what is reasonable and practical knowledge derived from the experience of those no longer living. Home practices are learned from the "grand" living elders, usually best illustrated by dress codes and cooking rituals; a family speech lexicon of preferred phraseology is learned in part by each succeeding generation. Language records memory (lexicon), e.g., Chinese, to mark all social roles and rules for the child who learns to speak *in the family*.

Schütz calls this generation the *Predecessors* because they share space (land, location), but not existential time—only *memory time* (language, labor). As Huntington (1996) suggests, the ideology generated is one of *native identity* borne by the *Indigenous* person. Keep in mind the caveat that as an "ethnic origin," the person's ideological identity is perceived typically as just two generations when it comes to political judgments by immigrants. In other words, it takes at least *three* generations to achieve "native identity" in a *new* place, usually marked by the grandchild's *refusal* to learn/speak the grandparents' first language.

Next comes the generation of Parents or primary adults. They constitute the (2) *Co-Figurative paradigm* wherein both Children and Adults learn from their Peers. This is the advent of generational *conflict* in all cultures as children mature. As noted by Hewitt (1989), the changes that come with age afford both Adults and Children the opportunity (several times over as "life crises" emerge) to make existential family *membership* decisions. They are existential *dilemmas*, offering ambiguities of combination with, or *paradoxes* of division from, others. The sequential choices in time/space are: (1) to stay or leave, (2) to conform or rebel, and (3) to be dependent or independent. On a global level, egocentric (individual-centered) cultures promote leaving, rebelling, and being independent, whereas

[7] Western cultures typically use one century as a unit, Eastern cultures use more, e.g., in China, the measure is ten centuries (10,000 years).

[8] Currently in use are: 2000 to present: New Silent Generation or *Generation Z*; 1980 to 2000: *Millennials* or Generation Y; 1965 to 1979: Thirteeners or *Generation X*; 1946 to 1964: Baby *Boomers*; 1925 to 1945: the Silent Generation [Silent Majority]; 1900 to 1924: the G.I. Generation [1900 to 1949: the *Greatest Generation*; hence "greatness" evokes patriotic military service for families, especially "Gold Star" families].

sociocentric (group-centered) cultures prefer staying, conforming, and being dependent.

Schütz calls this generation the *Associates* because they *do share* both space (land, location) and existential time (language, labor). As Huntington (1996) notes, the ideology generated is one of *kin identity* borne by the *citizen*, especially if "naturalized." By direct contrast, some persons are just *Contemporaries* because they *do not share space* (land, location), yet *do share social time* (language, labor), e.g., in a diaspora community. As Huntington (1996) suggests, for this place/location *excluded group*, the ideology generated is one of *ethnic identity* borne by the *emigrant* (who leaves for a *new* land/location).

The third generation is the Children, who are marked by the biological distinction of survival—they are the Grand[9] ones continued! They constitute the (3) *Pre-Figurative* paradigm wherein Adults learn from Children. This third generation tends to align *emotionally* with the first generation, inasmuch as they are rebelling against their parents' values, which represent rebellion against the grandparents. Double rebellion brings the double negative in view as a positive, but partial, shared value system. The differential value that marks the third generation is typically to be found in an association with *technology*, always outpacing the learning curve of the first and second generation. The children teach everyone how to use the new "labor-saving" devices, whether it be an iPhone, a chip credit card, a robotic appliance, a piece of seamless clothing, or a freeze-dried food. Recall that home and house practices evolve constantly, but dramatically, fundamentally, and quickly so, if emigration is involved.

Schütz calls this generation the Successors because they do not share space (land, location) or time (language, labor). This is to say, the children are always the end of "culture" and the beginning of "civilization" (hence, the double position of *City* in **Figure 2**). As Huntington (1996) summarizes, the ideology generated is one of *diaspora identity* borne by the *immigrant*. This is to say, the three generations are back at the start point, except that now the culture rules are ambiguous and contingent, variously being followed (assimilation), partially followed (diaspora), or ignored (resident alien).

And this contingency is the moment of *Schadenfreude.* The failure to find or accept new rules causes a mood and attitude problem among the generations about *believing* in the *old* rules. In a cryptic sense, the ambiguity and contingency of a *happiness norm* becomes a dilemma of *value reversal* wherein the "discontent" choice is between either (1) a *double-negative* ("I can't be unhappy" = Ir-Rational), which amounts to the Stay—Conform—Dependence sequence choice, or (2) a *positive-negative* ("My happiness is your unhappiness" = Not Un-Rational), which, in turn, amounts to a chiasm reversal creating the sequence Dependence—Conform—Stay, i.e. "I need your failure for my success" (Gruber et al. 2011). For a current American example: "In recent years, however, happiness has been

[9] Hence, in Chinese culture, for example, a grandson is often lovingly called by the name "The Little Emperor."

elusive for this dyspeptic nation, in which too many people think and act as tribes and define their happiness as some other tribe's unhappiness" (Will 2021b).

However, keep in mind that *civility* and the *common-good* are a preference for (3) *double-positive* ("We the People of the United States, in Order to form a *more perfect* Union . . ." = Rational) or (4) at least a *negative-positive* ("Ask *not* what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country" = Un-Rational[10]). Options (3) and (4) are an example of *positive new* choices to escape the dilemma posed by *Schadenfreude*. They constitute choice forms of *Tolerance*: "Self Sadness in the Other's Suffering"—a form of the Care of the Self of the Other (Lanigan 1984; see **Figure 8** for theory, **Figure 9** for application).

Tolerance is an example of what the phenomenological sociologist Peter L. Berger (1969; see Carson 2012) calls a "plausibility structure", i.e., a cultural belief that sets the norm for all thinking about a particular *thought-judgment*, e.g., the pros and cons of *happiness* (Robertson 2021). In classical rhetoric, this is a *tópos* [τόπος]—a *topic*, an already believed maxim or aphorism of argument that instantly *locates* a *belief* for the listener, i.e., a *trope* [τροπή]. When questioned about such a belief, the listener will invariably recount a "story" to support it, which is an *allegory* [αλληγορία]. In our ongoing analysis, our concern is to track the conceptual movement of a *mood* (topic) to an *attitude* (allegory) to a *belief* (trope), especially if the trope functions as a social preference to *reverse* a cultural judgment. The key notion is the enduring cultural allegory[11]—the *moral memory*—that is, the motivation for (1) getting from mood to belief and (2) using the *negative* value of that *memory* as a *positive justification* for a second judgment constituting a current *disposition* —a valence shift known as *chiasm* (Gruber et al. 2011; Lacorne 2016).

Two Cultures: Urban and Rural

While "urban" and "rural" are all-inclusive "digital divide" designations in most cultures, the practical reality of the term beyond general "value" designations (respectively, "liberal" and "conservative") is highly misleading. First, it is not a simple binary choice of *opposition* by kind (Either/Or), but rather an *apposition* with a binary analogue (Both/And) of gradient dispositions by degree—a range of choices. It is a range where *one* position is "more or less" like the other *two* positions adjacent to it in a long series of choices. The best relevant example for our discussion is the designation of *land use* (Winchester 2021), indexed by a

[10] Please recall that Un-Rational means an *alternative* logic model to the usually accepted model of "rationality," i.e., "reasonableness" is an acceptable, satisfactory different *social preference* choice from the usual *cultural rule* choice prescribed as the "right reason for." Most people experience this contrast when they make a first-time visit for dinner at the home of new acquaintances where "eating" seems a series of mistakes made. In almost every culture, *reasonable* means "morally right" (even if "legally wrong") especially in the context of *social justice*. A contemporary example of reasonableness is the famous aphorism of John Lewis: "Get into Good Trouble."

11 Trump example: Enduring Cultural Allegory of Frontier = "Making America Greater," Current Social Preference = "Once Again" (value-interpreted allegory as variations on the theme of "race privilege"). See Figure 9 for a German parallel.

synthesis of demographic data, e.g., population density, roadway type, the amount of food grown, presence of livestock, etc. As depicted in current U.S. Census data, **Figure 5** is a designation of land use by *county* in each state according to the Department of Agriculture.



Figure 5. U.S. Department of Agriculture Land Use Designation as of 2013

In logic, appositions precede oppositions; thus, **Figure 5** has three position categories: (1) ***Metro-politan/Core*** [Urban; *City*, see **Figure 2**], (2) ***Micro-politan/Non-metro*** [Suburban; *Town*], and (3) ***Non-metro, Non-core*** [Rural; *County/Farm*]. Because *counties* are also U.S. congressional districts, the oppositional contrast between Core and Non-core counties mirrors, respectively, Democratic Party versus Republican Party political preferences. However, the analogue differentiation of "liberal" versus "conservative" occurs *within* each county, hence the practice of "gerrymandering" the boundaries of the county. The point to be made is simply that "land use" becomes a *disposition vagary* for those who call it "home."

The vagary is resolved by most people as a communicative strategy that adopts a simple either/or value system for the eidetic feeling of *being-at-home* (Buckley 1971; Donohoe 2011; Eckartsberg 1986; Karolin and Aden 2021). **Figure 6** suggests the resulting belief system that home is defined by either the Urban Model or the contrastive Rural Model. Two contextual comments are required for **Figure 6**, namely, most cultures privilege the Urban experience as *positive* (+) and the Rural experience as *negative* (-), e.g., this is the presumption for data in **Figure**

5. Also, the *City* in **Figure 2** is the "core" concept describing the value "Urban," while City as *Country-Side* boundary is the "context" concept depicting the value "Rural." In short, there are also two ways to perceive the urban/rural models as value systems. First the linear, causal model that sequences *categories* as the hierarchy of Self/Other/Same/Different as either positive (Urban) or (reverses it as) negative (Rural). Second, **Figure 6** can be viewed using the diagrammatic model of Boolean Algebra to indicate the relative overlap of analogue/apposition categories in the actual *process* of living.



Figure 6. Two Cultures Chiasm: Dilemmas of Choosing and Switching Values

The Boolean diagram is especially useful from a semiotic perspective because it allows the mapping of activity/agency *icons* that both *index* and *symbolize* conceptual alternatives to assumed categories of meaning. For example, it is typical for *urban* people in a given county to assume that the largest population city is also where the county seat of government is located. Yet, *rural* people know that the county seat is where the county courthouse is located because the square in front of the courthouse is also where the farmers market is held on weekends. Somewhere on this same square is the original county bank that makes "seed-crop loans." The agency office of the county agricultural extension is nearby (they administer state, federal, and international research grants, usually as part of a nearby university). Typically, the U.S. Post Office building is opposite the courthouse; in 1893, Rural Free Delivery ended the need to "come to town for the mail." It is easy to understand how stereotypic significations attach as contrastive values to concepts like urban and rural (Lanigan 1970, 2008, 2011a, 2011b).

We can now turn to the troubling presence of the *Schadenfreude* in the community. Communicative time and space map out the eidetic shifts in *home* and *house* constituting the empirical meaning of *world* and *land*. In **Figure 7**, I explicate by application Edmund Husserl's (1973) basic process thematic of the Home-World: "Subjectivity is Intersubjectivity." He was concerned with exploring the communicative and communal domain of discourse as between subjectivity (speaking/listening) and intersubjectivity (encoding/decoding) as a *shared, communal, imagined world* (Ruthrof 2012; Steinbock 1995; Waldenfels & Steinbock 1990; Zahavi 1997, 2001a, 2001b). Choices displayed in human communication are a verbal and nonverbal record of *first* judgments made (e.g., as spontaneous speaking; "slips of the tongue"). But the *utterance* of these discourse items depicts a *second* judgment—a disposition of memory—constituting a *belief* immediately recognizable as delimiting *signification* (Self/Other) and meaning (Same/Different), e.g., embodied as "think before you speak," excused by "on second thought," or rationalized by "I changed my mind."

The Home Model is designed to analyze the basic problem of Home-to-World dispositions versus House-to-Land memories. Simply put, most people describe their sense of "home" as associated with a particular *house*, an icon, that indexes certain activities ("Mom cooking in the kitchen"), which symbolize "happiness." The house sits on *land*, "still in the family" or long ago "sold"—but "still visited." The person typically prefers to evaluate their *world* by the standard of this concrete belief in happiness. Because the belief as uttered is a double judgment, it constitutes a chiasm, or value cross-over, as suggested in **Figure 7**. This is to say, Home becomes the World, and it is measured by the House on the Land. This is the birth of the Urban and Rural divide, the moment of *crisis* and the birth of the *native* ("Us") versus the *alien* ("Them") derived largely from the sense of voice tone distinguished as *Greek* (insider) or *barbarian* (outsider)[12] (Lanigan 1970).

12 An excellent example of insider/outsider valence chiasm is the common American expression for a "barbarism," namely, the voiced choice: "It is Greek to me!"



Figure 7. Memory Chiasm: The Home Model of Axiology

The communicology is quite clear. What was the **in-group** *mood* of *positive time* for the Home-Land (Life Is Land) and the **out-group** *mood* of *negative time* for the House-World (Language Is Location) chiasmatically shifts valence in space as a *disposition*. Subjectivity becomes the *crisis* of the *Home-World*, where the *person* exists in a moral moment (Life) remembered as political event (Location) in *society*: Aliens are in the *House*. By comparison, Intersubjectivity becomes the *crisis* of the

House-Land, *culture* presents an aesthetic space (Language) remembered as the *community* that constitutes ethical choice (Land): Aliens are in the *Home*.[13]

Subjectivity is the crisis of Self versus Other, while intersubjectivity is the crisis of Same versus Different. Take any current moral, ethical, aesthetic, or political issues and compare your Self view to the differential view you assign to the Other. Perhaps the best current icon would be "Aliens at the U.S. border." You will be confronted with two *existential crises*: (1) You will perceive an Alien-in-the-Home-Land [moral/ethical crisis] or (2) an Alien-in the House-World [aesthetic/political crisis], or both [paranoia]. While my analytic interest is in the value choices made in *crisis communication* (Lanigan 1970), I need to emphasize that that the *perception of expression* is a key factor in understanding the dynamics of discourse in the social and cultural context. For that reason, recalling Husserl's discussion of *world* constitution is critical (**Figure 1**).

Culture is an ontological constitution of the self, other, and world, lending itself to parallel description, definition, and evaluation as a matter of methodology. *Description* is an archaeological project that examines the sedimented and signified layer of choices made. These are the *signification* that we know as a morality displayed in the problematic labour of *life*. *Reduction* is the second step, a genealogical process of defining the authentic and signifier *meaning* of our choice-making process—the *language* that carries the ethical typology in our act of choosing. *Interpretation* is a double judgment. For the Self, evaluation is *constitutive* of aesthetics—the value of *objects* encountered where I am located (*Mitwelt*). *First judgment*, first choice, is existential, authentic, and intra-subjective consciousness (our self-awareness; conscience). First judgment is always about equity, the expectation of a relation to the world of things called *desire*. The icon of desire is indexed by things in the world that symbolize a *home* (Eckartsberg 1986).

For the Other, evaluation is *generative* of politics—the value of *people* where I am located [*Umwelt*]. *Second judgment*, second choice, is essential, sedimented, and inter-subjective consciousness (our awareness-of-awareness; imagination). Second judgment concerns the notion of equality, the expectation of a relation to the community of persons called *power*. The icon of power is the *law*, which indexes land that marks ownership by the symbol of a *house* (Winchester 2021).

World names the noetic domain of *consciousness* that combines with the noematic domain of *experience* we call practical *living*. Husserl distinguishes among the practices of Life-World (Self), Alien-World (Other), Home-World (Same), and Everyday-World (Different). All these *immediate* perspectives of *expression* (first judgment; mood) in the Near-World (moment/event) are yet a *mediate* perspective of *perception* (second judgment; disposition) in the Far-World (situation/environment). When and where we lose sight of the *double mediation*[14]

13 It is not a coincidence of language that the Transportation Security Administration of the U.S. Department of Home-Land Security methodically looks for Aliens, while the U.S. Border Patrol looks for their Location.

14 "Breaking News" is a deceptive Chiasm, i.e., if the "news" truly "breaks" the situation, it is very easy to conceive of the new "news" as a mediation of the former "immediate" facts (now "old

(e.g., the misdirection of "breaking news"), we create what the Greeks called the "forgetfulness of rationality" (*agōnia mermēra*) (Lanigan 1994).

If such a memory becomes a disposition, it creates itself as an *irrational* practice of judgment—a *heuristic* turned *habit* turned *belief*— within the Intermediate-World (e.g., the Internet), a collective phantasy best described by such terms as *cult*, *conspiracy*, *sect*, etc. The human science descriptors are *anomie* (Sociology), *anomia* (Psychology), *angst* (Psychiatry), *alienation* (Political Science), and *polemic* (Rhetoric). It is important to note the chiasmatic shift at work here. That is, conspiracy cults (e.g., QAnon) *reverse* the typical imaginative, positive world of *reasonableness* where *rationality* is the sequence of *belief*, confirmed by practice as a *habit*, thus heuristic for future *judgments*—better known by the term "learning." "Internet to Ship Stuck in Suez: You Are a Mood" is a *learning-moment*, not a *phantasy-event* of conspiracy.

The Home-Land Chiasm

Recall my previous mention of *orthoepy* (correct speaking) and *orthography* (correct writing), inasmuch as the *wisdom* (correct thinking as logic) of that learning appears missing in our time. The concern of the "culture wars" with "political correctness," "gender identity," "preferred pronoun," and so on seems to signal a forgetfulness of rationality that emerges in polemic discourse meant to "cancel culture." One immediately thinks of the perennial bestseller, George Orwell's *Nineteen-Eighty-Four* (1949, 312ff.), in which the chiasm "Newspeak is Oldspeak, because Oldspeak is Newspeak"[15] is thematic: "But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought." The resulting valence shift is total: "War is Peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength. Two and Two makes Five. God is Power" (Orwell 1946, 29, 290). My case in point is the event of the Donald Trump presidency that stimulated a communicological analysis of the authoritarian personality and autocratic politics with particular reference to Nazism (National Socialism in Germany). The comparison is suggested in large part by the historical use of *polemic language* and its *reverse ecology* of social discourse in speech and text. Here are some examples:

news"). The new mediated facts truly become "alternate facts" compared to the former, now "fake news"! No wonder the American news media outlets were confused about their own reporting and the inability to find their ethical norm for judging "facts" (versus "opinions") also known as "objective, true" news. The "forgetfulness" is simply that "facts" are general interpretations, whereas "opinions" are individual perspectives. Where you make Deduction into Induction, there is trouble.

15 In the novel, the totalitarian nation of Oceania has a political ideology of three principles: (1) Newspeak {conversion of all words [denotations] to situational meanings [connotations]}, (2) DoubleThink {conversion of all values from negative to positive}, and (3) the Mutability of the Past {conversion of past facts to match present propaganda opinions}.

Mood and Disposition	Trump's Polemic Americanisms	Hitler's Polemic Germanisms
HISTORY	**"Manifest Destiny"** {*American Progress 1872*}	**"Blood and Soil"** {*Blut und Boden 1930*}
ECOLOGY	"Only I Can Save You."	"Only I Can Save Germany" [*Nar ich kann Deutschland retten*]
Labor	"What Do You Have to Lose?" { Family }	"Work Will Set You Free" [*Arbeit macht frei*]
*Language**	"Fake News"/ "Alternate Facts" { Communication }	"Lying Press" [*Lügenpresse*]
Land	"Build the Wall" { Property }	"Space to Live" [*Lebensraum*]
Location	"Make America Great Again" { Household }	"Spirit of the People" [*Volkgeist*]
**A People Who Sing Together*	"The Star-Spangled Banner"	"Germany, Germany above All" [*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*]
**Flag Symbol*	STARS & STRIPES {Red—White—Blue}[16]	SWASTIKA {Red—White—Black}

Nonetheless, Trump seems to evoke an American mood that predates him by a century. Trump is a *disposition* that is surely comparable to the Nazis, yet has a deeper source than World War II. I want to suggest that the disposition is borne of an older *mood*, albeit a rejected *belief* (Manifest Destiny in the nineteenth century). As Anne Applebaum reminds us, "Profound political shifts like the one

16 In the current world of commercial advertising, Colors have these assumed meanings: White = peace/purity; Red = urgency/impulse; Blue = trust/stability; Black = power/aggression.

we are now living through—events that suddenly split families and friends, cut across social classes, and dramatically rearrange alliances—have happened before" (2021b, 172). For example, the main result of "manifest destiny" having two different values ("slave" and "free" states) was the American Civil War (12 April 1861 to 9 April 1865). With **Figure 9**, I attempt a historical comparison that suggests why the *mýthos*[17] comparison of Trump and Hitler comes so easily to mind as a discourse *trope* (*τρόπος*), like chiasm (**Figure 8**). This is to say, I am focusing on the *envelopment* of history as an *ecology* (οἶκος)[18] where the cross-over value of spoken discourse becomes *polemic* masquerading as *family virtue* and *communal cause*. Alexander summarizes the axiology perspective that founds cultural discourse:

> I propose to understand cultures as "spiritual ecologies" that sustain that basic need for meaning that I have called "the Human Eros." A cultural identity of self and world. The narrative mode I call "Mythos," while those core meanings and values that determine the dominant patterns cultural self-understanding I call "Tropes," which are embodied in Mythoi, symbols, and the spectrum of cultural practices. They function as dominant modes of cultural self-interpretation." (2013, 393)

Before turning to the interpretation of historical examples, we should be aware that language always has two speakings and listenings, two writings and readings, thus, two senses and two references. The language will always be both certain, yet contingent, as a positive encode for the Addresser. Language is alternatively, both un-certain, yet ambiguous, as a negative decode for the Addressee. Messages are inherent *chiasm*s: reversible, reflexive, and reflective. So, my *trope* use of "ethnocentric exception" has *both* a simultaneous positive valence *and* a negative valence, depending upon whether you perceive yourself to be *entitled* as *either* the speaker (subjectivity) *or* as the listener (intersubjectivity), *further entitled* as either the native or the alien, in the communication situation of *métissage* (Claude Lévi-Strauss's term for "the mixing of cultures").[19]

17 Recall the Greek system of Voices: (1) mýthos = Voice inside the Mind = Thought/Conscience; (2) lógos = Voice outside the Mind = Speaking/Tone; (3) mystos = Voice of Silence = Listening/Perception; and (4) magikos = Voice of Practice = Acting/Gesture.

18 Note that the Greek word οἶκος means "household" and designates the location of the family activity and that is my applied use of the term ecology.

19 Métissage is displayed in any current TV commercial depicting a "family"—the allegory will feature two adults and two children. There will be no duplication of race, gender, ethnicity, etc. as an icon of "diversity"; of course, there are pointed exceptions, but only "politically correct" ones.

CHIASM VALENCE CONCEPTS FOR MEMORY IN A FOUR TERM LOGIC DOMAIN OF COMMUNICOLOGY

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

Legend:

DISCOURSE / CATEGORIES

LANIGAN JAKOBSON JASPERS

FORGETFULNESS Ranges from [A] "mental reservation" to [B] "delusion" to [a] "repression" to [b] "habit". Double Negative as Alternative Positive, Choice displayed by Silent Gesture.

⌘ Chiasm Ratio: A—B—b—a
⌘ Learning Stages:
BATESON:
1 — Proto [A]; 2 — Deutero [B];
3 — Tetrato [a]; 4 — Trito [b].
PEIRCE:
1 — Identity; 2 — Biidentity;
3 — Teridenity; 4 — Quateridentity

Figure 8. Chiasm as Memory and Disposition Domains of Rationality

A Mythos of America: Ethnocentric Exceptionalism

Let me begin with an interpretation of the American Myth and its chiasm trope of *manifest destiny*, since it is the most relevant to American readers (**Figure 9**, right side). The later part of the nineteenth century was a fantasy mood of *frontiers* and a disposition to cross them into "the promised land" (Lacorne 2016).[20] Recall,

20 The historian Frederick Jackson Turner invented his famous Thesis of American Frontierism in a paper titled "The Frontier in American History" (1893). This was likely the inspiration for John F. Kennedy's "New Frontier" slogan.

America was the promised "New World" across the Atlantic frontier from the Old World. One hundred years on from 1776, America's colonial East Coast had become "old." Now the American West was the moving frontier, a generational challenge to leave the old folks behind and discover the new home of children to come as the future of civilization. As Winchester (2021, 137) summarizes, by 1876, "the new Americans unleashed themselves on the territory with improvident glee. It was after all their Manifest Destiny—the stirring phrase was coined fifty years after the United States was born [1776], but it was keenly *felt* almost from the get-go—to sweep the civilizing light of the new nation through every dark corner of the continent." The industrial might of eastern *urban* America was marked by the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia, opening on July 4, 1876. Clearly, the *wild* western frontier of *rural* America had to be crossed and *civilized* by *urban* values.

From a communication perspective, the *iconic* expression of manifest destiny as a cultural value is the 1872 painting by John Gast titled "American Progress."[21] The painting is a semiotic summary of the comparative *positive* meanings of Urban and Rural civilized *East* that contrasted with the *negative* significations of uncivilized Wild and unsettled (beyond the frontier border) *West*. In the painting, people and things *index* the status of labor, language, land, and location. Human and animal situations are *symbols* of values sought and shunned. The *background* of the paintings displays the West Coast (wild, natural shoreline, no human or animal life = the boundary of the frontier) and the East Coast (bays with bridges and harbors, ships coming and going). The East has houses, domesticated farm animals for food, oxen teams that pull plows and wagons, farmers with manufactured clothing and forged steel tools). The West has Indigenous people, walking and riding bare-back horses, clothed in animal skins, wild animals—deadly buffalo, bear, and wolf—all of them fleeing for their lives.[22] The painting *foreground* is the frontier image, Lady Columbia floating on the wind in a flowing white dress, wearing a "golden *star* of empire" on her head. In one hand she carries the telegraph line (industry) that advances westward; in her other hand she carries a schoolbook (literacy). Beneath her, we see the advancing Pony Express mail, the stagecoach, and the Conestoga wagon. Civilization is communication—the transportation of ideas and goods (see **Figure 2**: Telcomnet and Transcomnet).

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21 The 12-by-16-inch oil painting is in the collection of the Autrey Museum of the American West in Los Angeles, California.

22 The emblematic American Bald Eagle (symbol of peace/life vs. power/death) is conspicuously absent from the painting; Lady Columbia with her "Gold Star" is more mythic for suggesting desire/life (perhaps the source for the proverbial "gold star" given to approve children's schoolwork?). However, the official Great Seal of the USA does feature the eagle.

While manifest destiny was polemic fantasy and had some popular support, it was not universally accepted. It caused division right down to the family level. It was favored by some states and not others and, subsequently, was a factor in the start of the American Civil War. The principal ideological opponent of the doctrine was one Abraham Lincoln.



Figure 9. Home as Schadenfreude: German and American Sources of Polemic

A Mythos of Germany: Ethnocentric Exceptionalism

As a counterpoint to the "American Progress" painting, I am using a photograph of Richard Walther Darré during his original speech announcing the official *icon* (emblematic seal in the background behind him) of the Nazi party (**Figure 9**, left side). The official party motto of "Blood and Soil" is held in the claws of the German eagle with the circular seal depicting a sword parallel to a branch of wheat.[23] The sword *indexes* "blood" (racial purity, labor, language) and the "wheat" (life, family, land, location). The sword also *symbolizes* power (urban industrial might), while the wheat signifies the equal might of desire (rural life and community of purpose). There is no need to recount the deprivation of the German people after World War I, yet that situation was the context for Hitler's successful polemic. The trope of *Blut und Boden* was music to the ears of a people desperate to become exceptional once again. For example, German was viewed as the language of the exceptional people (think Kant, Hegel, etc.), so the need to have more land for growing crops was best found in German-speaking locations *outside*

23 Note the contrast to the American seal, where the eagle's claws hold olive branches (for peace) and arrows (for war).

Germany (notably Poland, the Czech Republic, and France); *Lebensraum* [room to live] became the trope of expansion by invasion—a frontier version of "making Germany great again."

Homecoming in the House of Being

In his famous *Letter on Humanism* written in 1946, Martin Heidegger (1998, 239; emphasis added) famously wrote,

> *Language* is the *house* of being. In its *home* human beings dwell. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of being insofar as they bring this manifestation to language and it in preserve language through their *saying*.

Please note, Heidegger constructs the trope of *chiasm* as the intentionality of being human:

(A) Language : (B) House :: (b) Home : (a) Saying

This trope, it seems to me, in the context of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *new humanism* (Lanigan 2018c), is a clarification of Edmund Husserl's observation with which I opened my analysis:

"The Home-World is fundamentally determined by language."

Here, I must remind non-German speaking readers that in German "language" is rendered *die Sprache*, while the act of speaking [saying, speech] is simply *Sprache*.[24]

Thus, to read Heidegger properly in the context of the *Volkgeist*, there is a ready-made cultural *polemic* in understanding that *speaking* German is to live in the *world* (*Lenenswelt*) *of exceptional people* who *voice* the first language, *sing* the language of origin, embody the "home" language—*die Sprache*, which constitutes the Home-World (*Heimwelt*) (see **Figure 7**). While this is clearly the case for evaluating (Ir-Rational/Not Un-Rational) the *invoked* polemics of Adolf Hitler, I have been attempting to demonstrate the parallel for Americans—wondering how "the other guy" (the current media nomination for Trump) got elected as president because his *evoked* polemic of "manifest destiny" was mis-perceived as "positive" (Rational/Un-Rational). Trump's false positive[25] was the *negative* **memory** of

24 This subtly of German is clarified in French by Merleau-Ponty's "authentic" parole parlante [speech speaking = saying/speech] versus the "sedimented" parole parlée [speech spoken = language]. With a view to "tolerance", it is worth noting that in common usage "parole parlée" means "I'm sorry!"

25 The historical term for my "false positive" is counterfeit, first defined in this political sense by Thomas Paine in his Rights of Man (1791): "Toleration is not the opposite of Intolerance, but is the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms." (Lacorne 2016, 4). Be aware that in Payne's time "tolerance" was "the leave of the King to command something," not unlike Trump's view of being president.

"Revolutionary American Colonies" as Rational [immigrant revolt = good] turned into the *positive* **disposition** of "Frontier Colonization" as Un-Rational [Indigenous resistance = bad]. The negative polemic of "Making America Great Again" is simply the inverse, obverse instantiation of the more recent *positive* **memory** of *The New Frontier* (Kennedy 1960).

In both historical cases, Hitler and Trump, a *polemic* of negative cultural exceptionalism proved to be successful persuasion (mood) in the short term, albeit corrosive and toxic unsuccessful conviction (belief) in the long term. In both circumstances, the polemic exposed a pre-existing fantasy, a long-term cultural *Schadenfreude* ("joy in the suffering of others"). Awareness that is *mood* persists as a *disposition* among generations of persons is an analytical first judgment. The critical second judgment is to hold the aberrant *disposition* in check by the pragmatics of *tolerance* as a *belief* (Alapack and Alapack 1984; Lacorne 2016; Robertson 2021). Nonetheless, a caveat is necessary. Every value, including tolerance, is susceptible to a chiasm shift, which is to say a *polemic of tolerance* can be easily become an *ideology of intolerance* (Applebaum 2021a, 2021b; Rorty 2021a, 2021b; Wills 2021). I stress this point by way of saying that a polemic maxim like "cancel culture" becomes confusing precisely because, like all values, it has a bi-valent (positive/negative) signification possibility in discourse. Two other toxic examples are "defund the police" and "critical race theory." In contemporary America, as in Germany today, the chiasm challenge is the practice of a positive *second judgment* of cultural *beliefs*. We must do so in the context of the incidental *moods* we experience as negative first judgments borne of *dispositions* toward Others who are the *voice* of an Alien-World (*Fremdwelt*). In short, we require positive second judgments of *logimós*—the discursive reasonableness of the *common good*—as that *positive* tolerant *disposition* of the Wellcomer's *civility*—being at home in anybody's different house.

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Perhaps Payne also foresaw something of Trump when, in debate with an opponent, Payne commented: "But as the points he wishes to establish may be inferred from what he abuses, it is in his paradoxes that we must look for his arguments." In this context, we may view moral dilemmas (mood; "culture wars") turned into political paradoxes (disposition; "cancel culture") by Trump's counterfeit polemics (i.e., counterfeit "alternate facts" usually announced on Twitter as "real news" = Orwell's new-s-peak).

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