The Journal of Dialogic Ethics: Interfaith and Interhuman Perspectives 4, no. 2 (Fall 2025): 116–36.
DOI: 10.5840/jde20254210

Rethinking the Value-Ladenness of Interaction and Dialogue: A Ventriloquial Exploration

François Cooren

Abstract: In this article, I propose to explore the value-ladenness of interaction and dialogue by conceiving of communication as an act of ventriloquation. By ventriloquation, I mean that whenever people speak to each other, or more generally express themselves, many figures can be heard as expressing themselves too. This ventriloquation, as I show, implies, by definition, a form of attachment, which can take the form of constraints and desires. Interaction and dialogue are therefore laden with values to the extent that they express these various attachments, which constitute the accountable character of what we say and do. As vectors of these values, we can therefore position ourselves in our discussions and lend weight to what we say and do.

Keywords: ventriloquism; value; dialogue; interaction; attachment

When we say that a certain definition, depiction, or terminology is "laden with values," we usually mean that it is far from being neutral and that it implicitly expresses ideologies, biases or prejudices, which are folded, so to speak, in what is being said. But if we can metaphorically speak about something as being laden with values, it means, by definition, that these values are *lending their weight* to what is being said or, more generally, communicated. So, what does "lending weight" mean when we speak about values in the context of a discussion or dialogue? Of course, one could be tempted to respond that this is just a metaphorical expression and that values, as abstract figures, don't really have any weight. By using this formulation, we just convey the idea that they implicitly express themselves in what is being said, written, or more generally done, whether this expression is recognized or not by the interlocutors or readers. This is, after all, just an image! Another interpretation would, however, consist of noting that even if a metaphor always has its limits, this vehicle, as we call it (Richards 1936), is also supposed to convey its part of truth about the tenor it claims to describe. This would be the interpretation defended by a ventriloquial perspective (Cooren 2010, 2012, 2020b).

© *The Journal of Dialogic Ethics: Interfaith and Interhuman Perspectives*, Electronic ISSN 2998-7326. This Open Access article is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.

According to this way of conceiving of interaction and dialogue, expressing a value consists of *making it say* something that goes along the same line as what we are saying, an interpretation that would then explain why the idea of *weight* makes sense. Values lend their weight to what we are saying because we end up not being the only ones saying what we are putting forward. By positioning ourselves as vectors of values (Brummans et al. 2021), we give them a way to express themselves, which means that they end up *coauthoring* our stances or positions, that is, acting as their other sources or origins, hence the weight they add to what we are saying. In this article, I will highlight the mechanisms by which the ventriloquation of values takes place in the context of two excerpts of a mediation session. In particular, I will show to what extent their ventriloquation can be said to make a difference in the way these sessions evolve.

Values

To address the question of value is certainly intimidating as this notion has been explored by countless philosophers (Harman 2000), economists (Marx 1951), psychologists (Smith 2017), sociologists (Spates 1983) and anthropologists (Graeber 2001). From the difference between intrinsic vs. extrinsic values (Rønnow-Rasmussen 2015) to the distinction between universal vs. particular values (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969), innumerable debates have explored and continue to explore their characteristics as well as the roles they play in our lives. Although my take on values could be said to be close to John Dewey's (1939) theory of valuation, I propose here to start naively from dictionary definitions as my goal is not to debate about their characteristics, but to explore the role they play in our conversations and dialogues.

So how do dictionaries define values? Oxford Languages offers the following definitions: "the regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of something" as well as "a person's principles or standards of behavior; one's judgment of what is important in life." As we see in these characterizations, values, and this should not surprise us, correspond, of course, to what we value or valorize, that is, what we consider to be important or significant. There is, however, a distinction that the dictionary highlights here between what we could call values in themselves, which correspond to the second definition, and the values of something or someone, which correspond to the first one.

When we typically talk about values in everyday discourse, we refer to principles, qualities or standards such as honesty, loyalty, equity, integrity, freedom, truth, health, effectiveness or generosity. These values are important as they are often presented as implicitly or explicitly *guiding* our conducts and behaviors. For instance, when we say, "This decision is terribly unfair" or "this option is not practical," we are implicitly invoking principles – respectively, equity and practicality – that are supposed to say something about a decision or option that we are now commenting or denouncing. What are these principles saying? That a decision or option is wrong, as the principles of equity and practicality

would normally *dictate* that we proceed differently. When we evaluate a situation or option, such as a decision that has been made or an option that has been chosen, we typically mobilize values that are presented as *saying something about it*.

But why can principles, qualities or standards be considered values? Because we precisely value them, that is, because we consider them to be important, significant or essential. They are supposed to play critical roles in our lives. We are therefore more or less *attached* to them. Even if they appear, at first sight, abstract, they express, and this is an important point, *qualities*, *traits* or *characteristics* that we are supposed to recognize in various things or persons in our daily lives. In other words, they are qualities, traits, or characteristics that we deem important, and it is because of this importance that we invoke them in our discussions. Interestingly, we find here the first dictionary definition that we identified earlier, that is, "the regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of something." It is indeed through its specific qualities, traits, or characteristics that we value something, that is, that we ascribe some importance to it.

We could at this point mobilize Peirce's (1955) phaneroscopy to the extent that qualities express what this American philosopher called *firstness*, that is, "the being of positive qualitative possibility" (75), while principles or standards express what he proposed to call thirdness, that is, "the being of law that will govern facts in the future" (75). Between these two categories, he also identified what he called secondness, which he defined as "the being of actual fact" (75). Whenever we experience values, Peirce can therefore help us identify this phenomenon—in his own vocabulary, this *phaneron*—in terms of firstness, secondness, and thirdness: We experience the quality of something or someone (firstness) through the effects this thing or person produces (secondness) because of the habits, reasons, or laws that govern their behavior (thirdness).

Applied to a decision that we deem unfair, we are therefore inferring this *quality* of unfairness (firstness) from the *effects* this decision is supposed to have, according to us, on various people (secondness), possibly because this decision was, we believe, *animated* by a lack of concern for them (thirdness). As we see here—and this is, I believe, an interesting point—values inform our evaluations and discussions not only as firstness, but also as thirdness: we recognize them as qualities (firstness), but they also express what animate our conducts and judgments (thirdness): evaluating something or someone consists of identifying in them specific traits that matter to us, which means that this mattering also guides our conducts and judgments. If unfairness is identified in a decision, it is because we don't find *in* it a specific trait: fairness, a trait that matters to us and supposedly does not matter to the people who made this decision—a lack of concern that therefore also guides our own judgement, since this value matters to us.

Given what Garfinkel (1967) would call the accountable character of what we do and say, we see that values are indeed constantly at stake in our discussions as they are supposed to inform, of course, our conducts (they guide our behavior because we are supposedly attached to them) and our judgment (they guide how we evaluate a situation). For instance, if someone cuts in line while we are waiting in a queue to be served, chances are that we will object by invoking the "first come,

first served" principle, which is itself more generally based on a principle of fairness and impartiality (Livingston 1987). In terms of *authority*, we therefore see another important aspect of values, which is that they are supposed to *authorize* or *allow* us to say what we say and do what we do. I can object to someone cutting in line because I can invoke the "first come, first served" principle, which itself *dictates* that people systematically enter a queue by the end.

In other words—and this is an important point—it is not only we who are objecting to someone butting in line, but also this rule, which we are implicitly or explicitly invoking (we therefore become its *vector*, so to speak). As Garfinkel (1967) points out, we are not judgmental dopes; that is, we are able to judge situations by ourselves, but judging situations precisely amounts to evaluating whether what matters or counts to us—a principle of fairness or equity, for instance—is respected by others. Budging in line is a conduct that, for us, does *not* display a specific trait that counts or matters to us (fairness or equity), which, at first sight, authorizes or allows us to object to this behavior. It is indeed not only we who are objecting to this conduct, but also a principle of fairness or equity that we implicitly or explicitly express through our intervention.

This example also allows us to examine another important aspect of values, which is that they are hierarchized (Fisher 1978; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969). If we are not judgmental dopes, it is indeed also because we can assess situations *on their own merit*, as we say. For instance, we could imagine a situation where someone butting in line would justify her action by invoking an emergency. This is, for example, what sometimes happens when passengers are waiting to be checked for security at the airport, as a person could indeed put forward that she is about to miss her plane. In this case, the principle of equity appears superseded by another principle, solidarity, which dictates that this person be allowed, in this specific case, to break the line. One could also claim that the principle of equity is still active here, as it could be said that we would hope to be treated in the same way, should we be in the same situation as this person. In other words, it seems fair that this person be allowed to butt in line in this specific case, given the circumstances.

Dialogue and interaction are therefore value-laden because whenever we conduct or express ourselves, we do things that are, by definition, going to be valued or evaluated. These values are supposed to guide what we say or what we do (hence their thirdness), but they are also what is supposed to be expressed and recognized in what we say and what we do (hence their firstness). This explains why what we do and say is constantly judged or evaluated: *Guided by our own values, we constantly evaluate others' values*. Between the general character of these two modes of being (thirdness and firstness), we find the particular character of action (secondness), which is both guided by and therefore expressing values. We also note that values are, by definition, always *relational*, not only because we compare them with each other (for instance, solidarity vs. equity), but also because they always express a form of *attachment* (Cooren 2016; Gomart and Hennion 1999; Hennion 2007). We are more or less *attached* to them, a form of attachment that defines their hierarchy but also defines us as individuals and communities.

As abstractions, values such as honesty, loyalty, equity, integrity, freedom, truth, health, effectiveness or generosity, are, we could imagine, more or less universal. Whether we are Taiwanese, Kenyan, or Chilean, they more or less matter or count to us, and we all have a word to name each of them. What might differentiate individuals, groups, communities or nationalities from each other, though, is not only the way in which these values express themselves in what we say and do, but also the *degree* of their mattering—that is, what values matter the most in specific situations. Even if they are abstract, an abstractness that defines their firstness and thirdness, they have very concrete effects—that is, they *materialize* through our conducts and communications (secondness), which also implies that some values end up mattering or counting more than others (Bencherki et al. 2021; Brummans et al. 2020; Cooren 2020).

This idea of materialization is potentially interesting as it shows how various cultures can be concretely studied. Instead of thinking of a culture as something shared by a given speech community, we should rather think of cultures as more or less *cultivated*, that is consciously or unconsciously nurtured by a group of people (Bencherki et al. 2020a; Cooren 2010, 2012; Cooren and Sandler 2014). Even if I recognize the pleonastic nature of this definition (culture as what is cultivated), I think that it still deserves our attention to the extent that it enjoins us to identify, as analysts, what values appear to be iteratively expressed in what people say and do. Yes, for sure, these values are shared, but if they are shared, it is also because they are cultivated through their materialization in our actions and discussions.

Ventriloquation

So, the question then becomes: How can we study the value-ladenness of dialogue and interaction? In other words, how can we study values in action, so to speak? I would contend that we need a methodology that allows us to identify concretely how values manage to express themselves in and through what we say and do. This methodology therefore needs to acknowledge that we are not the only ones who are saying things when we speak, but that there are other things that do so too, in particular values. If these values can lend their weight to what we say, it is indeed because they are supposedly saying the same thing we are saying. When, for instance, we claim to speak in the name, on behalf of, or for other people, we become potentially more powerful precisely because it is not only we who are now speaking, but also other people that we present as speaking *through* us. They are therefore *lending their weight* to what we are saying (Bergeron and Cooren 2012; Cooren 2010; Matte and Cooren 2015).

The same logic applies, I would contend, to values: When we speak implicitly or explicitly in their name, that is, when we invoke, evoke or convoke them in our talk, we add their voices to ours—that is, we add, to use another metaphor, their weight to ours. What is their weight? Well, this cannot be said in advance, as this is, by definition, an empirical question. If we materialize them in our talk, it is because we believe that they might also matter to our interlocutors

(or at least to the people who are listening to us), which means that they might ultimately make a difference in the way the discussion evolves. This is what the image of weight is supposed to convey: by adding their weight to what we are saying, values might change the way people see a situation, as this weight could unbalance or unsettle what previously appeared as established or founded or, on the contrary, confirm it.

So, what could be this methodology, which would also be a theory of communication? I would contend that a ventriloquial theory of communication appears as an excellent candidate (Cooren 2010, 2012, 2020). According to this theory, any act of communication can be seen as an act of ventriloquation, that is, an act that consists of making oneself and other things or persons say things. These other things and persons can be called *figures*, as this term is sometimes used by ventriloquists to speak about the puppets that they are manipulating and animating (Goldblatt 2006). For instance, if a master of ceremonies invokes a protocol to enjoin participants to proceed in a certain way, it is not only this person, the master of ceremonies, who is talking. It is also, according to the ventriloquial thesis, the protocol that expresses itself in this situation.

What does this protocol say, according to this person? That the participants should proceed in such or such way. As we see in this example, the protocol and the master of ceremonies are therefore supposed to say the same thing, which means that the protocol *lends its weight* to what the master of ceremonies is saying. They are speaking *in unison*, so to speak, to enjoin participants to act in a specific way. As mentioned earlier, we are also dealing here with questions of authority and authoring (Bencherki et al. 2020b; Benoit-Barné and Cooren 2009; Vásquez et al. 2018). The master of ceremonies certainly is the author of what is being said, but she is, in fact, a *vector* and *coauthor*, as the origin of what is being said can also be traced back to the protocol itself and to the people who designed it.

We could even go back further and say that the person who designed this protocol was probably acting in the name of the institution to which this protocol is associated. Technically, the master of ceremonies is the author of what she is saying, but she is especially what Goffman (1981) would call an *animator*, while the real authors are the people who wrote the protocol, and the institution, the *principal*. Thinking about communication as an act of ventriloquation consists of acknowledging these effects not only of coauthorship, but also of authority. When this person speaks, it is not only Ms. Smith who is speaking. It is also, and maybe especially, a master of ceremonies, who is herself speaking on behalf of a protocol, which is itself acting in the name of the institution (Taylor and Van Every 2000, 2014).

All these figures—the master of ceremonies, the protocol, and the institution—are supposed to be saying something when Ms. Smith is speaking, which means that they each lend their weight to what is being said. There is an increase in author-ity because there is an increase in author-ing (Koschmann and Burk 2016; Wright et al. 2023). As Latour (1986) pointed out almost forty years ago, the power of what we say and do comes from the *associations* we are able to make or express (see also Latour 2005). In this specific case, this power comes from Ms. Smith's association with her status (master of ceremonies), the protocol she is

ventriloquizing, and the institution she represents. This power or authority is, of course, *relational* as it has to be recognized by her interlocutors, otherwise nothing will happen as she wishes. In other words, it is especially the other participants who have to recognize that when she speaks, it is the master of ceremonies who is expressing herself, as well as the protocol and the institution.

In Latour's (2005) parlance, she is an actor-network—that is, she is both an actor, that is, someone who is doing something (here, speaking), and she is a network to the extent that we can trace back, as participants or analysts, the other actors that or who are speaking when she speaks. She is therefore also a vector. While theories of dialogue and communication seem often stuck in the here and now of a specific event (a communicator/speaker/writer communicating/ speaking/writing to a recipient/listener/reader), conceiving communication as an act of ventriloquation amounts to freeing ourselves from this straitjacket—temporally speaking, spatially speaking, but also *actorially* speaking (if I may use this neologism). It does not mean, of course, that everything goes and that ventriloquation is a sort of "free for all" activity, but it means that communicating is not only about what the actor who is pronouncing words or writing lines is saying; it is also about *what or who is recognized as expressing itself/himself/herself through him or her*.

Importantly, whenever we ventriloquize a figure (a protocol, for instance), this figure can also be said to ventriloquize us, an oscillation or vacillation already identified by Goldblatt (2006). When the master of ceremonies invokes the protocol, one can infer, by definition, that she is animated by her attachment to it. This protocol *matters* to her, and it is because of this mattering that she is led to invoke it to enjoin us to act in a specific way. As we see in this illustration, the figures that we ventriloquize ventriloquize us in return through our attachments to them. The idea of attachment is key here, as it positions us as *puppets* ourselves. We are, to some extent, at the mercy of our attachments, these strings that relate us to what matters to us (Caronia and Cooren 2014; Poroli and Cooren 2023), transforming us in their vectors.

It is because the master of ceremonies *values* the protocol (it matters to her) that it has a chance to be invoked by her at a specific point. Interestingly, we find here again the notion of value. The protocol is not per se *a* value in the traditional sense, that is, a principle like fairness, effectiveness or justice, but it *has* a value, and it is because of this value—because it *matters* to the master of ceremonies—that it can eventually be heard in what she is saying. If we then wonder what kind of value this protocol has for the master of ceremonies, she might answer that it has, so to speak, a *value of obligation*. It is something that she is supposed to follow as a master of ceremonies. In terms of firstness, this protocol thus displays, to her, the quality of being mandatory, what could be called a form of bindingness or compulsoriness.

Whenever we study an interaction, dialogue, or discussion from a ventriloquial perspective, values can therefore be unveiled at least under two forms. First, they are values in themselves, so to speak—that is, as principles that can be recognized in what someone is saying because these values are explicitly (as in "Justice requires that we give due and equal consideration to all

individuals") or implicitly (as in "This is terribly unfair!") invoked. Second, values appear through anything that or anyone who is invoked and therefore express a form of *attachment*, whether we are talking about things as diverse as a protocol, a rule, a fact, a situation, or a person, just to name some examples. These are not values per se, but they are *valued*, and it is because of this value that they can be ventriloquized in a specific situation.

Although this attachment could be faked, what matters is that it is *expressed* through an invocation/ventriloquation. In other words, my point is not to claim that people are *really* attached to the values they implicitly or explicitly invoke in an interaction (in other words, they can certainly be hypocrites and strategic in their invocations). What I am claiming is that this attachment is always tacitly expressed when this happens, whether or not it is consciously experienced by the person who appears ventriloquized by the principles they invoke. This is why it can indeed be said that dialogue and interaction in general are value-laden. They are value-laden because they express values in themselves (principles) or because they express, more generally, everything that appears to be valued by the interlocutors. These things constitute matters of interest, preoccupation, or obligation, and it is to this extent that they materialize in our discussions.

An Illustration: Two Excerpts of a Mediation Session

The beauty of a ventriloquial approach to communication, in my opinion, is that it not only seems to make sense from a theoretical perspective but also allows us to analyze the dynamic of concrete interactions. In order to analyze the key role that values play in our conversations, I therefore propose to show how they can be unveiled from a ventriloquial perspective. To do so, I propose a brief examination of two excerpts from a mediation session that took place between a young man, fictively named Curt, and a Canadian administration about his disagreement with a decision made by this institution. Curt grew up in Canada and moved abroad for a while, where he was the victim of a serious car accident ten years before the mediation is taking place. He has since returned to Canada, disabled. He permanently walks with crutches.

Very recently, the governmental institution gave him "permanently disabled" status, which allows him to receive benefits. However, he challenges this decision, for he claims that he has been disabled for ten years and that this status should apply retroactively from the time of his return to Canada. In the fieldnotes of my PhD student, who recorded this session, it reads, "Curt is an angry young man. He is accompanied by his mother. He seems frustrated and is holding folded papers in his hand. He keeps his hat on and his mother her coat." This frustration is interesting from a ventriloquial perspective, as it shows how the value of justice appears to play, of course, a key role in this situation. What is frustration after all? It is, according to Oxford Languages, "the feeling of being upset or annoyed, especially because of inability to change or achieve something." As we will see, Curt looks and sounds indeed frustrated because, as the representative of the institution will even point out later, the situation appears indeed frustrating to him

and her: Curt has been disabled for ten years, but these ten years haven't been recognized by the institution. A form of justice would normally require that Curt be allowed to receive his benefit from the moment he returned to Canada as a disabled person, but this disablement has just been recognized ten years later.

But what is even more interesting in my opinion is how this frustration, which marks both his attachment to a fair treatment and the impossibility of getting it, appears to come into conflict, at the beginning of the session, with another attachment, that of his lawyer and the mediator to the procedure. A mediation session is supposed to work according to the following protocol: It starts by (1) the presentation of the grievances by the mediator, followed by (2) a period during which these grievances are discussed. The session is then finally punctuated by (3) a period of negotiation, which potentially leads to a resolution. Although this procedure has not been explained by the mediator at the beginning of the session, we can surmise that she is taking for granted that it has been explained by Curt's lawyer, who accompanies him.

Note that at no point does the representative of the Canadian administration intervene in the two excerpts I analyze here. She only listens to what the mediator, Curt, and his lawyer are saying, and she will only start speaking later to present how her Ministry sees the situation. Here is the first excerpt:

27	Mediator	OK (.), so, eh, you're contesting two decisions, eh?
28	Curt	((nods))
29	Mediator	We have two files. (.) One is regarding hm, hm (0.5), with the institution refused (0.2)
30		I'm with the file eh, 25###, OK?
31	Lawyer	OK
32	Mediator	The one that is, actually that the institution says that they already rendered a decision.
33		((Looks up to Curt)).
34	Curt	OK, but I DID not know that. All I know is (.) I CAME here, I was born here, I came back
35		here handicapped. When I came back here handicapped, I've been filing these papers with
36		my doctors, left and right. ((Taps fingers on papers in front of him, looking at them as he
37		speaks. The mediator is looking at him and even takes her glasses off to see him better))
38	Lawyer	((lifts her hand up, turns to him, looking at him only)) We're just gonna explain, and after
39		we're gonna ((Curt has lifted a paper he's looking at while the mediator is speaking))
40	Curt	Yeah
41	Lawyer	Explain our point of view
42	Curt	OK
43	Lawyer	OK
44	Mediator	Thank you ((puts her glasses on)). So that's one file (.) where the institution says that
45		they already rendered a decision, and uh (0.5) Sorry (1.0) ((opens a file on her right-

46		hand side)) I just want to leave it open. The other one, hmm, it's a, the other file, you
47		are contesting three decisions of the institution, hmm, where they, hmm they are
48		refusing (.) to allow you the permanent (.) disability, and instead they're giving you
49		like ((clearing her throat)) pardon me, the temporary constraint.
50	Curt	They were
51	Mediator	Mm. They were. Now you have the?
52	Curt	Yes
53	Mediator	OK. But at the time of the decision, that's what you were contesting.
54	Curt	Yeah, I know ((flipping through his documents with his right hand)), like, she
55		((pointing to his lawyer)) told me I've got to speak after, but yeah.

As we see, the mediator is doing what, according to the procedure, she is supposed to do at the beginning of the session, that is, presenting Curt's grievances. As it is usually the case, she presents her comprehension of the situation, a comprehension that she regularly asks Curt to confirm, which he does on line 28. However, on line 34, we see how Curt emphatically reacts to how the mediator continues to present her comprehension of the situation by claiming that he did not know of the decision taken by the institution until recently and then proceeds to tell his own story and what happened to him (the fact that he was born in Montreal, that he came back to this city handicapped, and that since then he has been filing papers with doctors to be recognized as such). While he says that, he is tapping his fingers on the papers that he has brought with him and that are now lying on the table. A form of exasperation or frustration can thus already be heard in his tone, facial expression, and gestures.

Ventriloquially speaking, Curt can be said to be presenting a series of facts that are supposed to show that even if this institutional decision was indeed made, he has done everything, since his accident, to get the benefits he thinks he is entitled to. In other words, the facts that he is presenting at this point (and that he obviously values) are supposed to *speak for themselves*. What do they say? That he has done what he thought he had to do to get the benefits he thinks he deserves and that he has been therefore unfairly treated by the institution. Although the term "justice," "equity," or "fairness" is not used explicitly by Curt in this turn of talk, it is this principle, and therefore this value, that can be heard as lending its weight to what he is saying at this point: He has been unfairly treated, which explains his frustration. When he speaks at this point, he is not only ventriloquizing facts that are supposed to show how unfairly he has been treated by this decision, but also a principle—namely, justice, equity, or fairness, whatever we want to call it—that is implicitly mobilized in this demonstration.

Interestingly, we see that Curt's lawyer then intervenes to point out to him indirectly that his intervention is out of order. After raising her hand and turning to him, she says, "We're just gonna explain, and after we're gonna . . . explain our point of view" (lines 38–41). Two types of "we" are staged in this intervention: the first "we" is inclusive and concerns the fact that the situation is going to be

presented by the mediator to all the participants, while the second "we" is more restrictive and refers to Curt and herself, as they will be later able to present their viewpoint on the situation. Although the procedure is not explicitly invoked in what she is saying, she is implicitly recalling for Curt what is supposed to happen procedurally. A certain tension can thus be felt here between what the procedure requires or dictates, which is implicitly put forward by Curt's lawyer at this point, and the thirst for justice that expresses itself when Curt intervenes from lines 34 to 37.

Two values thus express themselves in this situation. On one side, we can feel the weight of the procedure, which normally dictates that the mediator be allowed to present the grievances to all the participants. This procedure *is* not a value per se but *has* what I called earlier a value of *obligation* for the mediator to the extent that she is supposed to follow it at the beginning of the session. On the other side, we can feel the weight of Curt's attachment to justice, which appears to lead him to break the procedure and express his frustration while he was not supposed to do so. Everything thus happens as though he cannot help expressing this frustration, although he is supposed to know that he is not allowed to do so at this point. Two values can therefore be said to be in conflict in this situation: a thirst for justice (and all its equivalents), vectorized by Curt, on one side, and the procedure, on the other side, vectorized by the mediator.

Note that these two values—justice and the procedure—are contradicting each other not in and by themselves, but because they are respectively animating Curt and the mediator in ways that appear incompatible at this specific point. In other words, Curt's thirst for justice leads him to voice his grievances as the mediator is still following the procedure by presenting the case, a procedure that normally *requires* that the two parties listen to what the mediator is saying at this point. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that we are dealing here with a question of degrees: the procedure is indeed still something that Curt himself minimally values. As we see, he ends up complying with it not only in lines 40 and 42, when he marks his willingness to postpone the presentation of his grievances, but also in lines 54 and 55, when he explicitly says that as "[his lawyer] told me, I've got to speak after."

In phaneroscopic terms, we also see how Curt's frustration functions both as a *feeling* (firstness) that can be recognized in his *conduct* (secondness) and as what *animates* him in this situation (thirdness). Firstness, as we recall, corresponds to qualities, while thirdness corresponds to habits, reasons, or laws that govern our conducts. Curt appears frustrated (firstness), but this frustration can only be recognized if it is communicated into being (secondness), a communication that then displays how his conduct is (at least partially) governed by this frustration, which functions here as one of the reasons for his behavior (thirdness).

This frustration, as pointed out before, appears itself caused by his thirst for justice, a value that, as we presume Curt believes, has been flouted in his case. His thirst for justice is therefore itself a quality (firstness) that expresses itself through his intonation, through the fact that he is tapping on the documents he brought with him, and through his facial expressions (secondness). But if this thirst for justice can be felt in his conduct, it is also because it is what *explains* his

behavior, that is, it is what governs his conduct, among other things (thirdness). Ventriloquation, as we see in this analysis, thus expresses itself through the three fundamental categories of phaneroscopy. This is expected, given that it is a theory of communication, which therefore concerns action (secondness), but also a theory that highlights what animates us (thirdness), an animation that can be recognized through the qualities, attributes, and properties (firstness) that express themselves in what we say and do.

But let's look at what happens just after:

59	Mediator	OK ((coughing)) I'm sorry hm I'm sorry actually, I- I just want to make sure (.) I- I want
60		to make sure we have the right address for you, OK? (0.5) and I'll do it now because
61		otherwise I might hm forget. Are you still at ##
62	Curt	Yes
63	Mediator	Apartment 4 and phone number ### [is good?
64	Curt	[Yes.
65	Mediator	OK, thank you, sorry about that. Hm OK, so yeah so hm, now you have the- the permanent-
66	Curt	I've been recognized exactly three years after I made my first demand.
67	Mediator	OK
68	Curt	This is why I don't understand how (0.5) they tell me "contest," I didn't contest at the
69		right time. I never had a lawyer ((Taps fingers on the papers in front of him, looking at
70		them as he speaks)). I don't know how the law works over here ((tapping his fingers
71		on his papers)). My doctor told me what to do ((tapping his fingers on his papers)), and
72		this is what I did ((tapping his fingers on his papers)). So, everything else, that is going
73		on, I have no clue what's going on, this is why I got a lawyer.
74	Mediator	Uhm uhm ((nodding))
75	Curt	In January to help me represent me, because I came here handicapped ((tapping his
76		fingers on his papers)), I'm still handicapped ((tapping his fingers on his papers)).
77	Mediator	Yeah
78	Curt	And there are things that are owed to me and I don't understand where I'm going left and right
79		with this and I tried to fill out ((tapping his fingers on his papers)) every paperwork ((tapping
80		his fingers on his papers)) the way I need to ((tapping his fingers on his paper multiple times)).
81	Mediator	OK. ((nodding)) So now you= ((removing her glasses))
82	Curt	=I don't want to waste nobody's time; it's just what is due to me, and:: I think it's really unfair.
83	Mediator	Uhm uhm ((nodding)). OK so you met with your lawyer and you explained (.) the situation?
84	Lawyer	Yes
85	Curt	Yes
86	Mediator	OK.
87	Lawyer	I think

88 Mediator So, we'll try to see (.) you know, if there is something possible, this afternoon.
89 Lawyer ((smiling and nodding)) Yeah (.) When you're finished
90 Mediator No go [ahead
91 Lawyer [introducing
92 Mediator Go ahead, yeah yeah
93 Lawyer We don't want to cut you
94 Mediator Go ahead
95 Lawyer OK, so ((turning to Curt)) anything that is being said here, like I told you, is confidential
96 Curt Yes
97 Mediator Yeah, your lawyer explained to you
98 Curt Yes
99 Mediator What the:: conciliation was
100 Curt Yes
101 Mediator There's, usually there is no re- recording uh, it's only for the study
102 Curt I know, I know, [she told me, she told me
103 Mediator [OK? Contrary when uh when we have a hearing it's recorded, but
104 here in conciliation, nothing, OK.
105 ((Both Curt and his lawyer are nodding))
106 Mediator It's just sitting around the table to discuss, with the minister
107 Curt OK
108 Mediator OK? (0.5) So, it's your time, you know, to- (0.5) to ask question and to discuss and to=
109 Curt =I don't have any questions; like I said [me, I think it's a waste of time
110 Mediator [Hm
111 Curt that we are here (.) doing this like this, when like I said, I came here ((tapping his fingers on his
112 papers)) handicapped. Doctors told me what steps to take ((tapping his fingers on his papers))
113 Mediator hmm
114 Curt I got to offices some people don't want to treat me because I speak in English ((tapping
115 his fingers on his papers)). I don't understand what is going on ((tapping his fingers on
116 his papers)) I- I just want this resolved. That's [all I want
117 Lawyer [I don't think it's a waste of time, as- as I
118 explained to you, we're gonna know, because the [xxxx
119 Curt [No, for me, the way I am and I
120 perceive things, I don't like to waste people's time
121 Lawyer Oh OK
122 Mediator Oh no, no don't [worry about

123	Curt	[and right now, the way I see it, is I have to run left and right, sign
124		papers, you have to come here, this and that, when, to me, the way I see it is a clear cut
125	Mediator	[Yeahhhh
126	Curt	[And even my doctor sees that
127	Mediator	OK
128	Curt	it's a clear-cut case. (.) I came here handicapped, I'm still handicapped
129	Mediator	Yeah
130	Curt	I'm in therapy, now I'm going to see a therapist because, mainly (0.5) I can't function
131		like this ((putting his right hand on the side of his head))
132	Mediator	Mmm
133	Curt	I mean that, I'm in debt, it makes things nonsense, so I'm really so sorting out in therapy
134		because my, my body is affected ((showing his body with both hands)), I came here
135		with my body affected
136	Mediator	Yeah
137	Curt	But ever since I came here and I'm going through this ((putting hand on paperwork)),
138		now my mind is getting affected ((pointing to his head))
139	Mediator	So, we'll try as much as possible that when you leave today, you'll have answers and
140		it will be more clear for you, OK? (.) I hope you know, you'll go out
141	Lawyer	Yeah
142	Mediator	With some answers

As we see at the beginning of this excerpt, Curt's frustration keeps expressing itself, especially from lines 68 to 80, where we see him repeatedly tapping his finger on the documents, as if to mark everything that he has been trying to do to solve the issues he is confronted with. Although it is difficult to transcribe what intonations sound like, his tone is also clearly one of frustration, which can be heard as sounding like someone who has kept doing things that led him nowhere. As a frustration is supposed to express an *incapacity* to do something one wishes to obtain, we can also recognize in what he is saying what frustrates him: his lack of knowledge of how bureaucracy works, which, according to him, prevents him from getting the benefits and therefore the justice he deserves.

Regarding the lack of knowledge, this can be heard especially in "I don't know how the law works over here" (line 70), "I have no clue what's going on" (line 73), "I don't understand where I'm going left and right with this" (lines 78–79). As for the feeling of injustice, it can clearly be heard in "And there are things that are owed to me" (line 78) as well as in "It's just what is due to me and:: I think it's really unfair" (line 82). The feeling of frustration and injustice also appears exacerbated by his positioning himself as having done what needed to be done and as having got a lawyer. As he indeed points out, "My doctor told me what to do and this is what I did" (lines 71–72) and "This is why I got a lawyer in January

to help me represent me" (lines 73 and 75). Facts are also presented by Curt as speaking for themselves when he says, "Because I came here handicapped, I'm still handicapped" (lines 75–76).

Throughout his rant, which again, according to the procedure, should not be taking place at this point of the session, we can therefore hear the principle of justice expressing itself. As in the previous excerpt we analyzed, Curt's frustration thus seems so strong that he appears once more like someone who cannot help venting what he has to say. However, we also see how, this time, he expresses his care for others in this situation. As he points out at the end of this intervention, "I don't want to waste nobody's time" (line 82). In other words, if he values (like we all do) justice for himself, he also mentions his valuing of people's time. Another value can thus he heard here in this part of his intervention, which we could translate as a *concern for others*.

As Curt portrays the situation, two values appear therefore in conflict here: justice for himself vs. his concern for others, a conflict that can be explicitly heard when he says, "I don't want to waste nobody's time, it's just what is due to me, and:: I think it's really unfair." As he implicitly says, he wished he would not have to waste people's time on this, but everything happens as though he had no other choice but to be here to claim what is due to him. Again, we see how the value of justice is implicitly positioned as superseding everything else: not only the procedures he is flouting at this point but also his concern for other people, especially their time, which is here presented as spent for nothing, given what he considers to be the obviousness of his case.

Interestingly, we see that this concern for others is also implicitly expressed throughout his intervention by the mediator as she positions herself as paying attention to what Curt has to say, that is, as *valuing* his take on the situation. Although she could have pointed out that it was not the time for Curt to express his recriminations, given the procedure, she lets him talk and even welcomes what he has to say by nodding and acknowledging his points (lines 74, 77, and 81). This concern is also expressed when we she says, "So, we'll try to see (.) you know, if there is something possible" (line 88) to mark the openness of the situation, as well as when she tells Curt's lawyer that the latter can present his case. While the lawyer says that they are going to let the mediator finish her presentation (line 89) without cutting her (line 93), we hear the mediator repeatedly saying, "Go ahead" (lines 90, 92, and 94), as if to mark that she is willing to depart from the procedure to allow Curt's case to be presented by his lawyer.

A certain alignment is therefore taking place here to the extent that the mediator positions herself as valuing Curt's stance, which ultimately leads her to prioritize the presentation of his case over the compliance with procedures. Ventriloquially speaking, a certain concordance between their respective values thus expresses itself through this move on her part. As she also says in line 108, "Ok? (0.5) So, it's your time, you know, to- (0.5) to ask question and to discuss and to." As we see, however, Curt reacts to this invitation by saying that he has no question (line 109) and repeating what he previously said: that he "think[s] it's a waste of time" (line 109), that facts speak for themselves ("I came here handicapped," lines 111–12, see also line 128), that "doctors told [him] what step

to take" (line 112, see also line 126), that "[he doesn't] understand what is going on" (line 115). His only addition this time is that he "got to offices some people don't want to treat me because I speak in English" (line 114), which adds to the expression of his frustration.

Interestingly, we see his lawyer then interjecting by saying "I don't think it's a waste of time as- as I explained to you, we're gonna know because the xxx" (lines 117–18) as to mark that she herself *values* what they are doing at this moment. In other words, they are not wasting their time defending his position as it might result in his winning the case. This intervention then leads Curt to specify what he actually meant: "No, for me, the way I am and I perceive things, I don't like to waste people's time" (lines 119–20). In other words, he reaffirms that he himself *values* his interlocutors' time, even if he thinks it is objectively a waste of time, given that his situation is, for him, a clear-cut case (lines 124 and 128). This concern for others is reassured by the mediator when she says, "Oh no, no don't worry about that" (line 122).

At the end of his excerpt, we see how Curt also positions himself as *affected* by this whole story, not only financially ("I'm in debt," line 133), but also physically ("my body is affected," line 134) and mentally ("I'm in therapy," line 130; "now my mind is affected," lines 137–38). To justice, Curt then adds here the question of his own health, something that everybody is supposed to value and that is presented as jeopardized by this unfair treatment. To the weight of justice, which he presented as completely flouted by the way he has been treated so far, Curt then adds the weight of his own financial, physical, and mental health, which also requires, according to him, that this situation be solved in his favor.

Conclusion

So, what can be learned from this analysis? First, we saw how discourse and interaction appear governed by various forms of attachment that can be heard and recognized in what people say. If Curt presents and defends his position, if his lawyer reminds him that he has to follow the procedure, and if the mediator welcomes what he has to say to the detriment of the procedure, I was able to show that many other things could be heard as expressing themselves in this situation: not only the doctors and facts that Curt ventriloquizes in his interventions, but also his frustration, his concern for his own health, and his feeling of injustice. All these figures, which he implicitly or explicitly stages in his interventions, are presented as *dictating* him to present his case in the context of this mediation, even if he also cares for others, another concern that he also voices during the second excerpt.

As for the lawyer, we also saw how a concern for the procedure could be heard in her interventions, a concern that the mediator ultimately addresses by leaving the procedure aside to allow her and her client to say what they have to say. Finally, I also showed how in doing so, the mediator is also displaying a concern for Curt's situation, which ultimately aligns her with the values he is trying to put forward. The procedure dematerializes in this situation to the extent

that the mediator appears to decide that it should matter less than Curt's capacity to express his frustration.

As mentioned previously, two types of values can thus be heard in what the participants are saying in these two excerpts. On one side, you have what we could call "values per se," which, in this session, mainly take the form of principles such as justice, health, and care. These are values in the traditional sense of the term, as they function as principles that people, in general, tend to be attached to, especially but not only when these principles concern themselves. Etymologically, the term "principle" indeed comes from the Latin *primus*, which means "first," and from *capere*, which means "to take" or "grasp." Principles, by definition, are supposed to be what *guide* people in their decisions and actions, which explains why these principles are ventriloquized by the participants and why the participants ventriloquize them. These principles constitute, in many respects, the sources, origins, or roots of what these people are saying and doing, hence their status of *primus*.

On the other side, we identified figures like the procedure, the doctors, or the facts that are explicitly or implicitly presented as *valued* by the participants. They are not values in the traditional sense of the term, but they *have* a value for the people who ventriloquize them. For instance, we saw that it is apparently *out of a concern* for the procedure that Curt's lawyer intervened to ask her client to let the mediator present the grievances. We also saw how Curt appears to value what his doctors told him to do, as he refers twice to them to lend weight to his position. Finally, I also showed how Curt let facts speak for themselves (the fact, for instance, that he arrived in Quebec handicapped and that he is still handicapped today) to demonstrate what appears to be, according to him, a clear-cut case. In other words, he values these facts because they prove, in his opinion, that he deserves to receive benefits retrospectively that he should have received over the past ten years.

As we see, all these values, whether they are values per se (principles) or figures that are valued by the participants (doctors, facts, etc.), actively participate in what is happening in this mediation session as they appear to guide and govern what the participants are saying—participants that, as we saw, become their vectors. Dialogue and interaction more generally are value-laden because values are what animate us in a discussion. They animate us because they *matter* to us—that is, we are *attached* to them, which explains why they *materialize* in our interactions, whether implicitly or explicitly. It is this materialization that, I think, the ventriloquial approach allows us to unveil.

Between the realm of *qualities* (firstness) such as justice, health, and care, which *guide* and *govern* us (thirdness), we thus find secondness, the realm of communication and, more generally, action, which is what I have explored by studying these two excerpts. Even in the case where principles are not directly ventriloquized per se, figures are valued because of the qualities they display. For instance, the procedure is valued because of its quality of obligation. Similarly, what the doctors are saying is valued because of their knowledgeability. Finally, facts are usually valued because of their truthworthiness. In other words, we see

that interactants are constantly expressing, indirectly or directly, the values they are attached to through what they say and do. They are their vectors.

It is to this extent that we can say that dialogue and interaction are loaded with values. They are so because they express what *guides* our actions, whether these values themselves express a constraint (as in the case of obligations) or a desire (as in the case of justice). If we are *actors*, we are also *passers* to the extent *these values literally and figuratively pass through us and what we say*. It is these values that make our conducts accountable, but it is also they that define the ethical aspects of what we say and, more generally, do for another next first time.

***François Cooren**, PhD (Université de Montréal, 1996), is a professor in the Department of Communication at the Université de Montréal, Canada. His research focuses on organizational communication, language and social interaction, and communication theory. He is past president of the International Communication Association (ICA, 2010–11), past president of the International Association for Dialogue Analysis (IADA, 2012–21), fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, distinguished scholar of the National Communication Association (NCA), ICA Fellow, and former editor-in-chief of* Communication Theory *(2005–8).*

References

Bencherki, Nicolas, François Cooren, Boris H. J. M. Brummans, Chantal Benoit-Barné, and Frédérik Matte. 2020a. «La culture en tant que cultivation : vers une conception communicationnelle de la culture organisationnelle.» *Communiquer*, vol. 29, 89–109.

Bencherki, Nicolas, Frédérik Matte, and François Cooren, eds. 2020b. *Authority and Power in Social Interaction: Methods and Analysis*. New York: Routledge.

Bencherki, Nicolas, Viviane Sergi, François Cooren, and Consuelo Vásquez. 2021. "How Strategy Comes to Matter: Strategizing as the Communicative Materialization of Matters of Concern." *Strategic Organization* 19 (4): 608–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127019890380.

Benoit-Barné, Chantal, and François Cooren. 2009. "The Accomplishment of Authority through Presentification: How Authority is Distributed among and Negotiated by Organizational Members." *Management Communication Quarterly* 23 (1): 5–31.

Bergeron, Caroline D., and François Cooren. 2012. "The Collective Framing of Crisis Management: A Ventriloqual Analysis of Emergency Operations Centres." *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 20 (3): 120–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-5973.2012.00671.X.

Brummans, Boris H. J. M., Lise Higham, and François Cooren. 2021. "The Work of Conflict Mediation: Actors, Vectors, and Communicative Relationality." *Human Relations* 75 (4): 764–791. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726721994180.

Brummans, Boris H. J. M., Jennie M. Hwang, and Pauline Hope Cheong. 2020. "Recycling Stories: Mantras, Communication, and Organizational Materialization." *Organization Studies* 41 (1): 103–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840618819033.

Caronia, Letizia, and François Cooren. 2014. "Decentering Our Analytical Position: The Dialogicity of Things." *Discourse & Communication* 8 (1): 41–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750481313503226.

Cooren, François. 2010. *Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, Incarnation, and Ventriloquism*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Cooren, François. 2012. "Communication Theory at the Center: Ventriloquism and the Communicative Constitution of Reality." *Journal of Communication*, vol. 62, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2011.01622.x.

Cooren, François. 2016. "Ethics for Dummies: Ventriloquism and Responsibility." *Atlantic Journal of Communication* 24 (1): 17–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/15456870.2016.1113963.

Cooren, François. 2020a. "Beyond Entanglement: (Socio-) Materiality and Organization Studies." *Organization Theory* 1 (3). https://doi.org/10.1177/2631787720954444.

Cooren, François. 2020b. "Reconciling Dialogue and Propagation: A Ventriloquial Inquiry." *Language and Dialogue* 10 (1): 9–28. https://doi.org/10.1075/ld.00057.coo.

Cooren, François, and Sergeiy Sandler. 2014. "Polyphony, Ventriloquism, and Constitution: In Dialogue with Bakhtin." *Communication Theory*, vol. 24, 225–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12041.

Dewey, John. 1939. "Theory of Valuation." In *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 2, edited by Otto Neurath,* 1–67. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Fisher, Walter R. 1978. "Toward a Logic of Good Reasons." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 64 (4): 376–84.

Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Goffman, Erving. 1981. *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Goldblatt, David. 2006. *Art and Ventriloquism: Critical Voices in Art, Theory and Culture*. New York: Routledge.

Gomart, Émilie, and Antoine Hennion. 1999. "A Sociology of Attachment: Music Amateurs, Drug Users." In *Actor Network Theory and After*, edited by John Law and John Hassard, 220–47. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Graeber, David. 2001. *Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams*. New York: Palgrave.

Harman, Gilbert. 2000. *Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy*. London: Oxford University Press.

Hennion, Antoine. 2007. "Those Things That Hold Us Together: Taste and Sociology." *Cultural Sociology* 1 (1): 97–114. https://doi.org/10.1177/1749975507073923.

Koschmann, Matthew A., and Nicholas R. Burk. 2016. "Accomplishing Authority in Collaborative Work." *Western Journal of Communication* 80 (4): 393–413. https://doi.org/10.1080/10570314.2016.1159728.

Latour, Bruno. 1986. "The Powers of Association." In *Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?*, edited by John Law, 264–80. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Latour, Bruno. 2005. *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory*. London: Oxford University Press.

Livingston, Eric. 1987. *Making Sense of Ethnomethodology*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Marx, Karl. 1951. *Theories of Surplus Value*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Matte, Frédérik, and François Cooren. 2015. "Learning as Dialogue: An 'On-the-Go' Approach to Dealing with Organizational Tensions." In *Francophone Perspectives of Learning through Work: Conceptions, Traditions and Practices*, edited by Laurent Filliettaz and Stephen Billett, 169–187. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Peirce, Charles S. 1955. "The Principles of Phenomenology." In *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, edited by Justus Buchler, 74–97. New York: Dover.

Perelman, Chaim, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. 1969. *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Poroli, Alessandro, and François Cooren. 2023. "Investigating the Making of Organizational Social Responsibility as a Polyphony of Voices: A Ventriloquial Analysis of Practitioners' Interactions." *Human Relations* 77 (6): 768–800. https://doi.org/10.1177/00187267231158497.

Richards, Ivor A. 1936. *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. London: Oxford University Press.

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni. 2015. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value." In *The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory*, edited by Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, 29–43. London: Oxford University Press.

Smith, M. Brewster. 2017. *Values, Self and Society: Toward a Humanist Social Psychology*. New York: Routledge.

Spates, James L. 1983. "The Sociology of Values." *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1): 27–49. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.09.080183.000331.

Taylor, James R., and Elizabeth J. Van Every. 2000. *The Emergent Organization. Communication as Site and Surface*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Taylor, James R., and Elizabeth J. Van Every. 2014. *When Organization Fails: Why Authority Matters*. New York: Routledge.

Vásquez, Consuelo, Nicolas Bencherki, François Cooren, and Viviane Sergi. 2018. "From 'Matters of Concern' to 'Matters of Authority': Studying the Performativity of Strategy from a Communicative Constitution of Organization (CCO) Approach." *Long Range Planning* 51 (3): 417–35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2017.01.001.

Wright, Alex, Timothy Kuhn, Snejina Michailova, and Paul Hibbert. 2023. "Ventriloquial Authority in Management Learning and Education: A Communication as Constitutive of Learning and Education Perspective." *Academy of Management Learning & Education* 22 (2): 312–30. https://doi.org/10.5465/amle.2019.0191.